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IX 
INTRODUCTION 
I: THE POLITICAL IN KIERKEGAARD'S THOUGHT 
To say that S0ren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) has a political 
philosophy is not an esoteric thought as some would have it. 
The question that needs to be asked when confronted with such 
a proposition is what might the concept "political philosophy" 
mean in this connection. To explain what is here meant by the 
concept of political philosophy is also to explain the title 
of this dissertation. 
Political philosophy, it is generally assumed, deals with 
the fundamental questions of human existence especially as 
they address the relationship of the human individual and 
society, the possibilities and limitations of such a 
relationship as well as the foundational principles, if any, 
that may guide it. 1 We believe these belong among the most 
important philosophic questions that can be asked, inasmuch 
as they address what is common to the human condition. 
It is the human condition that concerns Kierkegaard, and 
especially what he considers most essential about the human 
1 See especially Leo Strauss, "What is Political 
Philosophy," in Poli ti cal Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo 
Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 3-57. 
condition. To be human is for him to possess characteristics, 
actual and potential, that significantly differentiate, for 
better or for worse, the human condition from that of the 
divine, of which we know nothing, and from that of animals, 
of which we claim to know much. The human condition is thus 
different from either in that it alone consciously confronts 
its own mortality. In that very confrontation, however, 
Kierkegaard argues, "it is every human being's (Menneske J 
destiny (Bestemmelse) to become free, independent, itself" (SV 
12,267; WL, 259), all of which to Kierkegaard are ethical 
qualifications. 2 
It is this very difference that simultaneously embodies 
the capacity for acting at times as animals, and hence purely 
sensually, and at other times, we like to think, divinely; it 
is this difference that originally spawned political 
philosophy. It is something specific in the human condition 
that makes possible and necessitates political philosophy. 
This something specific is the human capacity to think, 
the fact that human beings are thinking beings who can 
perceive reality and act accordingly and simultaneously 
2 
"The one who ethically chooses himself, he chooses 
himself concretely as this specific individual (Individ) .. 
. . The individual thus becomes conscious of himself as this 
specific individual with these talents, these inclinations, 
these drives, these passions, influenced by this specific 
social milieu, as this specific product of a specific 
environment. But as he becomes conscious of himself in this 
way, he assumes everything as his responsibility" (SV 3,232; 
EO, 250-51). 
2 
imagine ideality and strive to go beyond the givens of this 
world. They are thinking beings who can abstract from their 
own condition and thus transcend it, but who are also capable 
of concretizing their own condition in an attempt to 
understand and act upon its possibilities and its limitations. 
As Kierkegaard has Johannes Climacus say in the Postscript, 
"The subjective thinker is someone existing, and yet he is 
someone thinking; he does not abstract from Existents and from 
the contradiction, but he is in it, and still he must think" 
(SV 10,52; CUP, 314). 
Political philosophy addresses itself to this thinking 
capacity not only for the purpose of addressing the 
meaningfulness of thinking, but also, as implied in the 
earliest manifestation of this symbolic expression of reality3 
by the Socratic dictum "know thyself," to provide a guidance 
for thinking. Immediately we see that thinking is 
qualitatively qualified by philosophy, which to Kierkegaard 
means that the character of thinking is ethically qualified. 
Importantly "[t]he ethical has to do with particular (enkelte] 
human beings, and, note well, with every single self [hver 
Enkelt]" (SV 10,25; CUP, 284). 
3 This expression has been borrowed from the introduction 
to John G. Gunnell's Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and 
the Origins of Political Vision (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1968 and 1987), pp. 4-10. Also Eric Voegelin, 
Israel and Revelation, vol. 1 of Order and History (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 20, 34, 
and the "Introduction" in passim. 
3 
In the age of modernity where the ethical and the 
political have become sharply differentiated, this explanation 
of the meaning of political philosophy still does not 9ualify 
Kierkegaard's philosophy as political. We need to see how he 
conceives of the ethical. First, in an early journal note he 
briefly explains the content of the last chapter of book X of 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as the ethical's relation to 
the political of which it is a part. He then comments on how 
strange it is that Aristotle's own dialectic "almost suspends 
[h~ver, as in the German aufheben] this observation inasmuch 
as the contemplative life is the highest, and this lower form 
of happiness lies in the practice of the political virtues. 
But the contemplative life is isolation. 114 For Kierkegaard to 
think for the sake of thinking is not to think in the most 
human manner; rather it is to think disinterestedly. Thinking 
must have a purpose beyond itself. Thinking must aim at 
comprehending the human condition which essentially is 
relational -- to the other, to society. Thinking must address 
the "idea of community." 
Second, the individual, by becoming conscious of the self 
as a relational being and hence as a responsible being 
constitutive of belonging in some way, gains identity of the 
self as equal to the other. Thereby the single self (den 
4 PAP IV C 27 (JP 114). 
4 
Enkelte) 5 fulfills its highest potential, its destiny. 6 This 
5 Den Enkelte strictly translated means "the only one" or 
"the single one. " However, the adverb enkel t can also mean 
"simple." We have chosen to translate Kierkegaard's principal 
category of den Enkelte as "the single self" rather than as 
"the individual," inasmuch as the latter is not only overused, 
it also connotes so much related to liberal theory that was 
not necessarily true of Kierkegaard's category. This choice 
of translation also enables us to avoid most sexist language 
by using the third person singular neuter in connection with 
"the single self." In this way translations and 
interpretations begin to look much more like what 
Kierkegaard's original Danish text intended. 
This is not to say that there are not problems with this 
choice of translation, or that Kierkegaard did not at times 
use sexist language. When connected with nouns and sometimes 
adjectives, it has been necessary to retain the translation 
of the adverb "individual" as, for example, in "individual 
existence. " Moreover, sometimes Kierkegaard does use the 
Danish Individ. In those cases it has always been translated 
as "individual." Whenever Kierkegaard uses the masculine "he" 
we have done the same in translating quotations. We also 
recognize, however, that the word "self" connotes a particular 
level of consciousness in much contemporary literature. Such 
connotations should not be attached to our translation of den 
Enkelte as "the single self." Any change in consciousness of 
the single self will be evident in the context the category 
appears, and only then. 
Furthermore, the fact that den Enkelte is capitalized has 
nothing to do with Kierkegaard's attachment to this category. 
Rather it is because he is following the rules of writing of 
his time, and den Enkelte is a noun. Not until 1948 were the 
new "rules of correct writing" (retskrivningsregler) imposed 
on the Danish language. Among other more confusing changes, 
all capitalization was abandoned except for pronouns. 
Much has been made in English translations of the old 
rule of capitalization of nouns under which Kierkegaard 
worked, giving eager translators an opportunity for pursuing 
personal agenda and thus unnecessarily influence their 
translations interpretively by also capitalizing particular 
words in the English translation that would not normally be 
capitalized. Kierkegaard had many means of emphasizing 
particular words or phrases or even sentences, and he used all 
of them, but capitalization was not one of them. The new 
translations of "Kierkegaard Writings," edited and in many 
cases translated by the tireless Howard v. and Edna H. Hong 
and published by Princeton University Press are thankfully 
free of such aberrations. 
5 

identity as equal and as a belonging being qualifies the 
single self's comportment toward the world. Although this 
stance of equality and belonging may be purely formal, a 
matter of consciousness, it nevertheless has an 
anthropological characteristic. As Kresten Nordentoft has 
pointed out in his interpretation of Kierkegaard, 
the task could not be set if it were not possible 
for man to realize it. . Thus every person 
becomes conscious of himself in concern for himself 
because his existence takes place upon conditions 
of ambiguity, in time, in hope or fear. 7 
To think in terms of equality and belonging, an ethical 
dimension to be achieved, is precisely to love one's self. As 
Kierkegaard puts it, it is the purest form of human love 
(Menneskekjerlighed). 8 To think one's equality and relatedness 
in this way is for Kierkegaard to act out the "idea of 
community," and indeed constitutes an act of freedom. It is 
a stance he considers the optimal potentiality of the human 
condition. Thus he seeks to describe the single self as it 
essentially comports itself toward the world, and he 
understands it in that particular way he admires in Plato's 
political philosophy in which the state is not made higher 
6 
"To the best world belongs equality." PAP VII 1 B 88, 
p. 295. See also PAP VII B 202, PAP VIII 2 B 31:24: "• .. to 
love the neighbor is precisely to want to be essentially equal 
for all people." Also PAP VIII 2 B 71:9. 
7 Kierkegaard's Psychology, tr. Bruce Kirmmse 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 76. 
8 PAP VII 1 B 202. 
6 
than the single self. The single self remains individuated in 
its concern for the good of the whole. 9 
In community (Menighed) the single self is; the 
single self is dialectically decisive as the 
presupposition for forming community, and in 
community the single self is qualitatively something 
essential and can at any moment also become higher 
than "community," precisely as soon as "the others" 
fall away from the idea. The cohesiveness of 
community is that each is a single self, and then 
the idea. . . . Evero" single self in community 
guarantees community. 1 
In order to understand the structure of the single self 
Kierkegaard unfolds that single self in its essential 
dimension which is decisively ethical/political. 
Without risking much, then, we can say Kierkegaard has 
learned his political philosophy from Plato and Aristotle. He 
approaches the fundamental questions partly in an analogous 
manner, and partly he rewrites the script to formulate a 
political philosophy commensurable with the Christian teaching 
he knows from revelation, and especially from Pauline 
teaching. 
With this understanding of Kierkegaard's conception of 
political philosophy, the title of this project should also 
become clear. To be a citizen is to strive to be 
ethical/political before being in any other way. To be in this 
way, to understand one's self in this relational manner, that 
is, to think essentially, is to be a person of character. 
9 PAP VII 1 A 70 (JP 3327). 
lO PAP X 2 A 390 (JP 2952). 
7 
Neither citizenship nor character are qualities that would 
describe divine beings or animals. They belong exclusively to 
the human condition. 
From this perspective it would seem Kierkegaard 
understands the ethical/political to have a natural basis as 
Plato and Aristotle maintained. For Kierkegaard this is both 
true and not true. In the Fragments he talks about a human 
being's "second nature." But even here he almost 
embarrassingly parallels Plato who also claims that naturally, 
not wisdom, but the desire for pleasure rules the soul. It is 
only after experiencing periagoge, the turning around, that 
wisdom comes to rule in the soul which is now ordered by 
justice. 11 It is only after the self's acceptance of itself as 
it optimally and hence truly is, something that according to 
Kierkegaard is occasioned by God's grace which enables the 
single self to acknowledge its original condition as untruth, 
it is only then the self becomes conscious of the actual 
(egentlige) sense of citizenship. Character is achieved in the 
enactment of this awareness, in the single self's comportment 
toward the world. 
The implication of a second nature that allows the single 
self fulfillment of its most genuine self suggests that the 
11 Gorgias 491e-492a and Republic 443c-444e. 
Kierkegaard's following of Plato's political philosophy is 
considered embarrassing only in view of his occasional 
derogatory remarks about what he sometimes considered Plato's 
speculative tendencies: for example SV 9,171-172n; CUP, 184 
and note. 
8 
self's original nature suffers from a pathology of 
consciousness that renders it untrue and therefore incapable 
of citizenship and character. The aim of this dissertation is 
first to lay bare the cause of this pathology, a pathology 
which Kierkegaard believed was fundamentally grounded in 
modern philosophy's adaptation of scientific methodology by 
which a separation of knowledge and experience occurred. 
second, we seek to explain the consequent symptomatic effects 
on thinking as Kierkegaard understood them. Third and finally 
the aim is to present his therapeutic "corrective," by which 
he intended to restore the possibility for the single self to 
achieve its optimal condition. As such, the dissertation 
suggests that Kierkegaard's project constitutes a philosophy 
of political consciousness framed as a phenomenology garbed 
in Christian language. 
* 
S0ren Kierkegaard has been examined from many points of 
view, predominantly philosophical, theological, psychological, 
and literary. These analyses have for the most part focused 
on his earlier pseudonymous writings of indirect communication 
emphasizing his differentiation of aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious realms of existence. 
This study will focus on the direct communication of his 
later works almost exclusively published under his own name. 
9 
Its aim is to suggest the appropriateness of interpreting the 
thought of Kierkegaard with a particular concern for its 
implications on political meaning. It will be shown that his 
later writings, and especially Two Ages and Works of Love 
reveal a heretofore unexamined dimension that indicates the 
undeniable presence of a philosophy of political consciousness 
that is therapeutic in form. 
This is not to say that earlier writings will not be 
consulted. Indeed, in order to fully appreciate what we call 
Kierkegaard's "corrective" of liberal theory, it has been 
necessary to examine certain philosophical concepts that 
embody his general critique of modern society, concepts that 
are only touched upon in the later works, but which are more 
fully detailed in the indirect communication of the 
pseudonymous literature and especially in the works authored 
by Johannes Climacus Philosophical Fragments, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, and De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. 
Of most interest in the later writings is Kierkegaard's 
novel understanding of human rights as well as his critical 
assessment of certain fundamental defects of his time to which 
he was one of the first serious thinkers to respond. It will 
be shown that Kierkegaard engages in a "corrective" of the 
natural rights' understanding of freedom and equality. In 
doing so, he establishes his own interpretation of these 
tenets of modern political existence as existential 
obligations, and hence as something to be achieved, rather 
10 
than as given rights. 
In order to fully appreciate the radical nature of 
Kierkegaard's theory of freedom and equality, it becomes 
necessary to understand the underlying assumptions of his 
critique of modernity and the consequent symptomatic effects 
that necessitated this therapeutic "corrective." Kierkegaard 
characterizes the liberal concept of rights as given as one 
of the fundamental misunderstandings of modernity that 
originated in the separation of knowledge and experience. This 
separation was the consequence of the emergence of modern 
natural science with its emphasis on method and objective 
truth. In chapter one we shall see how Kierkegaard's attack 
on modern philosophy's adaptation of scientific methodology 
to all epistemological inquiry leads to an all out 
confrontation with Hegel's systematic development of 
consciousness by means of logical and historical explanation. 
Kierkegaard's argument is that classical philosophy's 
teleological approach to questions of being and Christianity's 
emphasis on transcendental providence had been replaced with 
an exclusive focus on immanent and indefinite progress 
rendering questions of the good all but irrelevant. For 
Kierkegaard the idea of such a dependency on logic and the 
course of history is absurd inasmuch as logic cannot explain 
existence and historical events can only be considered 
accidental or approximate and can provide no certainty about 
the future. The problem for Kierkegaard is that systematic 
11 
philosophy has rendered what he calls essential human 
experience nonessential in its quest for objectivity, 
something Kierkegaard interprets as disinterestedness. All 
emphasis is now on reflection (e.g. calculation), which leaves 
human beings as passive observers on the margin of all 
essential relationships, lost in the consequent chasm between 
fact and value. 
When, in addition, Christianity has been posited as an 
historical phenomenon and its truth cognitively revealed as 
an eternal truth as in Hegel's philosophy, then the problem 
of the truth of Christianity has been removed, meaning the all 
important dialectic of human experience has been rejected. For 
Kierkegaard this development completes the separation of 
knowledge and experience inasmuch as the realm of knowledge 
has now been circumscribed leaving human experience 
undifferentiated. 
Both in chapter one and in chapter two Kierkegaard's 
attack on Hegel's system will be the focus. The point of 
dividing up Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel's systematic 
philosophy in this way is not to deny the oneness of the 
system. Rather, it is, in the first place, to show that 
philosophy's conformity to scientific method has wrought a 
cleft in the union of knowing and experience, a union that was 
all important to classical philosophy. In the second place, 
it is to show the symptomatic effects of this objective 
tendency on theoretical and practical thinking, and 
12 
consequently to show how a pathology of consciousness has 
emerged. The latter will be discussed in chapters two and 
three. 
The dissertation then turns to the most debilitating 
symptomatic effect to follow from this separation of knowledge 
and experience, an effect Kierkegaard diagnosed as the loss 
of authority. This loss, he claimed, had pathologically 
affected individual consciousness manifesting itself both in 
theoretical and practical thinking. 
On a philosophical level, he rejected the "objective 
tendency" which had intellectualized ethical conduct and 
subordinated religious life to speculative philosophy. This, 
of course, was especially true in Hegelianism which speculated 
systematically and objectively on the truth of things, such 
as Christianity, projecting them as indisputable historical 
phenomena of equivalent veracity. Likewise Kierkegaard 
rejected Hegel's imposition of logic on existence by which an 
attempt was made to generate identity between object and 
subject, thought and being. Inasmuch as logic cannot explain 
movement, according to Kierkegaard, by so doing, he charged, 
Hegel had only confirmed the loss of meaningful existential 
experience. 
On a religious level, the problem of making Christianity 
merely an object of cognition had relaxed the tension of the 
paradox of the Incarnation. It meant that becoming a Christian 
was as easily achieved as citizenship requiring no special 
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effort and posing no "offense" (Forargelse) to reason, 
Kierkegaard's definition for an act against the understanding. 
Moreover, it meant the relationship between philosophy and 
Christianity had become confused inasmuch as Christianity, on 
the one hand, had been transformed into a reflective 
objectivity aimed at transcending existential uncertainty. On 
the other hand, in order to appear reasonable, Christianity 
by its embrace of worldly aspirations had jeopardized its 
mystical authority, and thus it had deformed its own truth in 
the very creation of "Christendom." 
Kierkegaard's differentiation of Christianity and 
"Christendom" will be discussed in detail only inasmuch as it 
affects the existential condition of the single self, and 
likewise the problematic of the paradox of Christianity. This 
paradox he posits as a challenge to reason to recognize its 
own limitations, and to the single self to recognize 
Christianity as essentially subjective and hence of 
existential concern. Refusal to do so, Kierkegaard charges, 
implies a rejection of foundational authority, the source of 
ultimate happiness. 
In chapter three we shall turn to the symptomatic effects 
of the separation of knowledge and experience on practical 
thinking -- again expressed as a loss of authority. 
On a political level, Kierkegaard accepted the emergence 
of the liberal state, but with severe qualifications. On the 
one hand, liberal politics had produced "the illusion of 
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perfect equality" conjured up by "the false prophets of 
secularism in the name of Christianity." On the other, there 
was the obsessive preoccupation with worldly things generated 
by "the present age" and its unquestioned adherence to 
materialism. Envy becomes "the negatively unifying principle" 
meaning people are brought together on the basis of what they 
are against, rather than what they support. The implication 
for Kierkegaard is the principle of characterlessness. 
He juxtaposes the two foremost structures of modernity: 
revolution to achieve civic freedoms and the leveling process 
to acquire equality. The former had led to violence and 
anarchy while the latter now 
stillness that nullified all 
was leading to a stifling 
individual achievement. The 
implication was an equivocation of all relationships, be they 
political or familial, meaning the natural authority inherent 
to such relationships had eroded. Consequently the role of 
citizenship had become marginalized, as the leveling process 
had rendered the single self atomized, isolated, and impotent 
engrossed with computing the problems of the political 
relationship, but never actively participating in the decision 
making process, and therefore separated from the shared 
morality that is constitutive of the "idea of community." 
Finally, on a psychological level, Kierkegaard claims 
negative categories dominate everyday existence rendering 
impotent human beings the victims of "externality. 11 The human 
condition, he charges, is determined by public opinion as the 
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self is defined in terms of its public role based on 
superficial consciousness of social differentiations. It is 
an alienated state, quantitatively justified, that implicitly 
denies all investments of erotic feeling or of political 
11 inwardness" ( Ind er 1 ighed) . The consequence is an abstract 
form of subjectivism that entails a denial of human nature as 
Kierkegaard understands it. 
Kierkegaard uncovers this problematic by juxtaposing the 
categories of excellence and leveling, showing that the latter 
negates the former, meaning that there is no longer a basis 
for political will, but rather a "spiritlessness" (Aandl0shed) 
best described by its philistine-bourgeois mentality. This 
mentality constitutes a pathology that Kierkegaard will argue 
is articulated in the voluntary mediation of the principle of 
contradiction, an axiom of human existence. He shows how the 
suspension of the principle of contradiction leads to self-
contradiction through a number of examples that all 
demonstrate the lack of authority. The problem is that 
authority is inherent to being in harmony with the self. 
In chapters four and five the dissertation turns to its 
central theme: Kierkegaard's radical therapeutic "corrective" 
of the tenets of liberal existence. We shall see how 
Kierkegaard put his trust in the individual human being, 
believing that the single self, if shown the way, will 
ultimately choose the course of action that will bring him the 
most fulfillment and hence the most happiness. Modernity has 
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prevented such a course of action precisely by its confusion 
of the two realms of existence and the consequent symptomatic 
equivocation of values, and hence it has engaged in a denial 
of differentiated experience. 
This part of the analysis will focus on the declaration 
of the rights of man (Menneske-Rettigheder), which in 
Kierkegaard's rigorous interpretation signified mankind's 
self-deification. The declaration posited rights as political 
in nature and assumed them as given, implying they dictated 
certain political circumstances. But Kierkegaard argues this 
is a fundamental misunderstanding. The rights of man had 
already been provided, meaning they are existential and must 
be viewed as obligations or duties to which the single self 
is intentionally dedicated for the purposes of achieving 
genuine freedom and equality. 
The problem as he sees it, is that only an inadequate 
understanding of freedom can be derived from political rights, 
and inasmuch as human beings by nature are distinct, an 
imposed equality is but a chimera. In other words, modernity 
has confused what is by the grace of God with what is by human 
design. To Kierkegaard freedom and equality are ethical 
categories that essentially engage each individual in a common 
purpose without suppressing the original individuation idea. 
That is to say, they are tasks the single self must undertake 
in order to realize community and personal fulfillment. 
Kierkegaard's novel and undeniably rigorous conception 
of freedom and equality assumes the religious (and rational) 
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expectation expressed in the law's demand, "You shall love 
your neighbor as yourself." In its fulfilled state, this law 
constitutes the foundation of his "idea of community." This 
1aw, therefore, has universal application. In order to fulfill 
this law's demand, Kierkegaard appeals to what he considers 
the deepest and most fundamental characteristic of human 
nature: love. 
Love (Kierlighed), he argues, is the dynamic force 
underlying such essential experience. In its "eternal 
transformation," i.e. in understanding it as duty to the law's 
demand, love not only separates itself from the bonds of 
necessity, it also frees the single self of "preferential 
love" (such as erotic love (Elskov) or friendship) which makes 
distinctions and like acquisitiveness excludes. "Only law can 
give freedom," Kierkegaard reasons, establishing a connection 
between love and freedom. And only the law that requires the 
single self to love its neighbor indiscriminately, only that 
law does not make distinctions, establishing a connection 
between love and equality. 
From the perspective of love as obedience to a law, it 
becomes clear that freedom originates in human action 
establishing true humanity (Menneskelighed) which to 
Kierkegaard constitutes genuine human equality (Menneske-
Lighed). That is to say, the reform Kierkegaard deems 
necessary is the realization of the thought of equality 
(Lighedstanken) which only through love can be effected and 
still maintain freedom. Such a comportment toward the world 
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not only fulfills the II idea of community, 11 but assures the 
single self of the greatest happiness precisely because it 
expresses its most genuine self. 
Where Liberalism basically posits freedom and equality 
in enlightened self-interest, it follows that the single self 
need only prudently to act on its self-understanding of these 
interests to achieve fulfillment. In this case an appreciation 
of the political dimension of human existence is diminished 
insofar as individual freedom is expressed in proprietary acts 
that owe nothing to society. In contrast, Kierkegaard claims 
that freedom and equality are grounded in acts of self-
determination expressed as obligation to a law. Inasmuch as 
this act originates in love, which essentially seeks 
satisfaction in community, it follows that political 
consciousness becomes a necessity for the completion and 
fulfillment of human experience. That is to say, the 
realization of community as an external social arrangement 
presupposes an internal transformation of the understanding 
of human nature proper. 
What appears to be unique about Kierkegaard's concept of 
love is its upbuilding (opbyggende) quality. Loving your 
neighbor (the person before you) presupposes the presence of 
love as the ground in that other person, and by this very 
presupposition he builds up love in him without attempting to 
make any demands of him. This capacity for upbuilding is 
present in every single self, Kierkegaard will argue, inasmuch 
as it is not dependent upon natural or social advantages. 
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Rather it is in every person (Menneske) by virtue of character 
demonstrated "through his behavior in common things, through 
his relationship with his fellows, through his langua9e, his 
expression." 
Such an upbuilding quality, Kierkegaard is certain could 
not be derived from the positing of a universal criterion that 
with unqualified truthfulness could evaluate every human 
action. The proper conception of love can only be derived 
through the God-relation, he insists, and only exercised 
through citizenship and character and thereby express the 
"idea of community." In that sense, love as upbuilding has an 
efficacious quality inasmuch as Kierkegaard expects the 
qualitative personality of the single self to uplift political 
and social life rather than vice versa. For him the single 
self is prior to society inasmuch as it is personal conduct 
that will determine the character of society. In that 
upbuilding sense, therefore, love constitutes what this 
project has defined as a philosophy of political 
consciousness. 
* 
Since Howard A. Johnson in 1962 published a critical 
essay "Kierkegaard and Politics, 1112 only a few attempts have 
been made to elucidate the presence of political meaning in 
12 A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard a Johnson and Niels 
Thulstrup (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), pp. 74-84. 
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Kierkegaard's thought. 13 They have almost exclusively been 
based on the early writings14 beginning with Kierkegaard's 
dissertation The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to 
socrates (1841) 15 and ending with Concluding Unscientific 
postscript (1846). Of the later writings, only Two Ages has 
received some attention from this perspective. 16 It is the 
intent of this study to show the wealth of political insight 
revealed in these later works. 
13 Some noteworthy examples are Russell H. Davis, 
"Kierkegaard and Community" in Union Seminary Quarterly Review 
XXXVI, 4 (Summer 1981): 205-222; Gregor Malantschuk, The 
controversial Kierkegaard, tr. Howard v. and Edna H. Hong 
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980); Paul 
Milller, "Kierkegaard som social of poli tisk tamker" in 
Kierkegaardiana, 13 (1984): 122-127; and Merold Westphal, 
Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 1987. 
14 A notable exception is Bruce H. Kirmmse, whose two-
volume dissertation "Kierkegaard's Politics: The Social 
Thought of S0ren Kierkegaard in Its Historical Context," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 
1977), focusing on all Kierkegaard's later works has made a 
major contribution to Kierkegaard scholarship by analyzing the 
historical context including its political aspects. Also John 
w. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981); and "Kierkegaard on Self and Society" 
in Kierkegaardiana, 11 (1980): 178-196. 
15 For all references to Kierkegaard's writings both in 
the original Danish and English translations see the 
bibliography with the appropriate names of pseudonymous 
authors as well as year of first publication and generally 
accepted abbreviations of each work preceding this 
Introduction. 
16 Merold Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology" in Op. Cit. 
pp. 43-59; Werner Stark, "Kierkegaard on Capitalism" in 
Kierkegaard's Presence in Contemporary American Life, ed. 
Lewis A. Lawson (Methuen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. , 
1970), pp. 120-149; and David Bruce Fletcher, Social and 
Political Perspectives in the Thought of s0ren Kierkegaard 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982). 
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such a revelation would be of great significance to the 
discipline of political science inasmuch as it would add a 
novel dimension to the study of contemporary political 
thought. But it would also introduce the question why 
Kierkegaard's understanding of freedom and equality has not 
been uncovered before and hence why his writings have not been 
included in the mainstream of political theory. 17 
Much of this is due to the popular but mistaken belief 
that Kierkegaard's philosophy of the single self (den Enkelte) 
is acosmic, meaning it emphasizes an individualism that 
distances itself from all social concerns and hence is 
apolitical in nature. 18 Moreover, contemporary political 
17 Only two dissertations that deal exclusively with 
Kierkegaard have come out of Political Science: Robert Dale 
Bonser, "The Role of Socrates in the Thought of S0ren 
Kierkegaard" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
Santa Barbara, 1985); and Knud Rasmussen, 11 s0ren Kierkegaard's 
Political Ideas" (PH.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 
1965). To the best of our knowledge no published writings on 
Kierkegaard have come out of Political Science. 
18 See, for example, Louis Mackey, "The Loss of the World 
in Kierkegaard's Ethics" in Kierkegaard: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. Josiah Thompson (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 266-88; Louis Dupre, 
"The Sickness Unto Death: Critique of the Modern Age" in 
International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, 
ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 
1987), pp. 85-106; and Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth: 
Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1967). 
In the Postscript Johannes Climacus suggests that charges 
of acosmism may be ill founded: "If ethics were to take away 
the entire world from ... a thinker, letting him keep his 
own self, he would probably regard such a trifle as not worth 
keeping and would let it go with the rest -- and so it becomes 
acosmism. But why does he think so slightingly of his own 
self? If it were the meaning that he should give up the whole 
world in order to content himself with another person's 
ethical reality, he would be justified in disdaining the 
exchange, sv 10,44; CUP, 305. In a double sense Kierkegaard 
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theorists tend to think of Kierkegaard as a religious author, 
which is indeed what he called himself (SV 18,81; POV, 5), and 
hence it is believed that his writings could not embody a 
rational political philosophy. 19 
affirms the political relation. 
19 David Bruce Fletcher, Op. Cit. has correctly 
identified three noted authors who held this view: H. Richard 
Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), 
pp. 243-44; Marjorie Grene, Introduction to Existentialism 
(Chicago: Phoenix Press, 1959), pp. 38-40; and s.u. Zuidema, 
Kierkegaard (Philadelphia: Presbytarian and Reformed, 1974), 
pp. 18-19. Both Zuidema and Grene draw on Kierkegaard's 
personal history to bolster their conclusions. Fletcher does 
the same to prove the opposite. One aim of this project is to 
show that it is not necessary to include biographical data to 
demonstrate Kierkegaard's political or philosophical concerns. 
see Paul Holmer, "On Understanding Kierkegaard, " A Kierkegaard 
Critique, eds. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1962), in passim. Finally there is 
Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), who is a favorite 
of political theorists because of his excellent translations 
especially of the works of Nietzsche and Goethe. His 
interpretations of Kierkegaard's writings, however, leave a 
lot to be desired, and, we want to suggest, have negatively 
influenced political theorists on the subject of Kierkegaard. 
Kaufmann is not only negative in his overall assessment of 
Kierkegaard, his critique is all but an assassination of him 
both personally and in terms of his thought, an approach that 
makes little sense inasmuch as he in fact includes Kierkegaard 
in this and other surveys. The major points of his critique 
involve misquoting, misreading, and misunderstanding of 
Kierkegaard's thought, for example, attacking his psychology 
as inferior to Freud's when in fact Kierkegaard's psychology 
is far different and is generally characterized as 
anthropological philosophy (p. 184). He characterizes 
Kierkegaard's single self as a tormented individuality without 
the open horizon of Nietzsche, Goethe, or Kant (pp. 184 and 
189), when in fact it is Kierkegaard who is willing to 
entertain the idea of something beyond the scope of reason or 
empirical inquiry. He describes Kierkegaard's religion as 
authoritarian omitting an explanation of what it is the age 
in fact refuses to obey, namely the potentiality of their own 
selves, and omitting the fact that Kierkegaard's most 
important ethical principle is freedom (p. 176-77). The brief 
positive comments at the end of this diatribe, which few 
readers probably ever arrive at, demonstrate that at least in 
part Kaufmann is perfectly capable of reading Kierkegaard with 
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But one should also keep in mind that exploring 
Kierkegaard's authorship involves immense problems because 
Kierkegaard himself consciously set out "to make a penetration 
of his work more difficult. 112° Kierkegaard wrote in various 
modes of communication, both direct and indirect, often 
publishing both simultaneously under his own and pseudonymous 
names, and making much use of a dialectical approach. 21 
Moreover, his formulation sometimes would make use of an 
aphoristic style and at other times of a Hegelian and hence 
convoluted style giving "the appearance of chance and 
caprice," and making it difficult to discover "what an 
exceedingly rigorous ordering" underlies the development of 
his thought. Indeed, Kierkegaard seems to appeal to a 
an open mind ( especially p. 2 02) , which makes the prior 
unrestrained critique look even more strange. 
20 Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, tr. Howard 
v. and Edna H. Hong {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971), p. 3. 
21 This approach should not be confused with Hegelian 
dialectics. Kierkegaard distinguishes between two kinds of 
dialectics: conceptual and qualitative dialectics. As Sylvia 
Walsh Utterback, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Christian 
Existence" (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1975), pp. 
11-13, explains: "Conceptual dialectic refers to the 
conceptual or logical method of viewing one thing and its 
opposite simultaneously. The dialectical task is to sustain 
a dual perspective which emphasizes the opposition, duplicity, 
and tension between concepts rather than the synthesis and 
mediation of opposition as in Hegelian dialectics. While 
opposites seem to contradict each other, sometimes they 
actually complement each other." Qualitative (e.xistential) 
dialectic refers not to cognitive concepts, but rather to 
existence. It is what Kierkegaard calls "the dialectic of 
inwardness or 'the ethical' in individual existence." See also 
Paul Holmer, "Kierkegaard's Logic, " in Kierkegaardiana 2 
{1957), pp. 34-5. 
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particular audience when he in his journals notes "the task 
must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the 
h t d 1122 noble- ear e. 
That he also wrote in a relatively obscure language and 
suffered much in early English translations has only 
aggravated the circumstances of interpretation. At best, then, 
Kierkegaard's writings are regarded as "essentially esoteric 
literature, 1123 difficult to approach. Nevertheless, this study 
is also meant to encourage political scientists to further 
explore the riches of this immense authorship, especially in 
view of the emergence of the excellent new translations of the 
entire "Kierkegaard Writings," in order to dig open new areas 
of thought as well as a different approach to political 
meaning. Kierkegaard's somewhat obscure phenomenology deserves 
to be poured over by theorists, political and otherwise, as 
this projects hopes to show. 
* 
II: THE DIALECTICS OF KIERKEGAARD'S AUTHORSHIP 
Kierkegaard utilizes an indirect methodology in conveying 
his propositions about the single self. That is to say, he 
22 Malantschuk, Op. Cit. p. 4. Quotations are from PAP 
VII 1 A 104 (JP 656) and PAP VIII 2 B 88, pp. 184-85. 
23 c. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and 
"Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 2. 
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does not prescribe a philosophy of existence by dictating a 
psychiatric restorative to the problem of existence. That 
would not provide the proper condition for the achievement of 
freedom and equality and would be to misunderstand his 
Socratic perception of the teacher-student relationship (SV 
6,17; PF, 12). Rather he maieutically provokes the reader to 
seek and acquire insight into the optimal standard for human 
activity whereupon the single self is expected to 
existentially appropriate this cognitive authority into its 
own life experience. The best way to do this, Kierkegaard 
suggests, is to catch the reader's attention not by pointing 
an accusing finger, but by carefully leading the reader to the 
point where self-consciousness becomes activated (SV 18, 101-
0 2 ; POV, 3 5 ) . 
To activate the consciousness of the reader necessitated 
an aesthetic detour which Kierkegaard himself characterized 
as deceptive (SV 18,105; POV, 40). It was designed to "lift"24 
the illusion under which the recipient (the reader) presumably 
existed. It was to be a proper preparation for a communication 
of truth, but to make this effective Kierkegaard insists "I 
must understand more than he -- but first and foremost I must 
surely understand what he understands {SV 18,97; POV, 27). 
Kierkegaard refers to this "deceptive" method as "the indirect 
24 I have used the English translation "lift" (ha!ve) in 
the sense of "lifting away" to underscore Kierkegaard's 
implied illusion as something ephemeral that would have to 
float up and away --if someone blows at it hard enough. Later 
it will become obvious this illusion is anything but 
ephemeral. 
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mode of communication" as opposed to "direct communication. 1125 
Employing a direct attack Kierkegaard believes would only 
confirm the deluded in his illusion as well as embitter him, 
while the indirect approach would allow the deluded recipient 
to find his own way out of the illusion. Thus Kierkegaard 
reasons that the religious author in the present age must 
abandon "all the old military science" (SV 18,103; POV, 38) 
of direct attack and instead get in touch with the people in 
a less direct manner. That is to say, he must begin with 
aesthetic achievement, "[t]hat is earnest money" (POV, 26). 
The point of Kierkegaard's argument is his insistence 
that he has to communicate an uncomfortable truth, and 
therefore he must proceed with caution. 
Consequently one does not begin in this way: I am 
a Christian, you are not a Christian; but in this 
way: you are a Christian, I am no Christian. Or one 
25 
"Objective thinking is wholly indifferent to the 
subjectivity, and thereby also to inwardness and 
appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct . 
. . . [I]t can be understood directly and be recited by rote. 
Objective thinking is therefore conscious only of itself, and 
is therefore not a communication [ . J • Everywhere the 
subjective is of importance in cognition, and consequently 
appropriation constitutes the main issue; there communication 
is a work of art. It is doubly reflected, and its first form 
is precisely the subtlety that the subjectivities must be held 
divinely apart from one another, and not be permitted to fuse 
or coagulate into objectivity. This is objectivity's parting 
from the subjectivity," sv 9,65-8; CUP, 70-3. Moreover, "The 
indirect mode of communication makes communication an art in 
a different sense than when it is assumed by imagining it in 
this way: that the communicator has to present the 
communication to someone knowing, that this person may judge 
it, or to someone not knowing, that he may learn something. 
But no one bothers himself about the next consideration, that 
which precisely makes the communication dialectically so 
difficult: that the recipient is someone existing, and that 
this is the essential," SV 9,232; CUP, 246-47. 
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does not begin in this way: It is Christianity I 
proclaim, and you live merely in aesthetic 
categories; no, one begins in this way: let us talk 
about the aesthetic; the deception lies in that one 
talks in this way precisely in order to arrive at 
the religious. Given the assumption, however, the 
other is, after all, also in the illusion that the 
aesthetic is the Christian, for he believes he is 
Christian, and yet he lives in aesthetic categories 
(SV 18;105; POV, 41). 
The approach of indirect communication is to avoid the 
doctrinaire, avoid the pretense of theory, which, if 
communicated as knowledge, the recipient might misunderstand 
as something to be "known. 1126 As Louis Mackey explains, "his 
purpose was not mystification but distance. 1127 
Kierkegaard makes it very clear in his digression on the 
authorship in the middle of the Postscript that the fact "that 
there is no author is a means of keeping the reader at a 
distance" (SV 9,211; CUP, 226). The point is, the reader is 
not to dwell on the author in an exercise of hermeneutic 
gymnastics, but rather on the indirect communication which is 
meant to convey the state of illusion the reader presumably 
is in. 
As a religious author Kierkegaard was well aware of his 
polemic situation, striking out as he did from within the 
society in which he himself had a stake. Thus his intention 
was not to absent himself to the proverbial Archimedean 
26 
"That there is no result and no finite decision, is an 
indirect expression for the truth as inwardness, and thus, 
perhaps, a polemic against the truth as knowledge," SV 9,211; 
CUP, 226. 
27 Kierkegaard: A kind of Poet, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 247. 
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point. He recognized that "Every religious author, or speaker 
or teacher who absents himself, who is not there where the 
danger is, and where evil has its stronghold, he is a decei-
ver, and that will eventually become apparent" ( sv 18,117; 
poV, 59-60) . 28 Importantly, it should be noted, that 
Kierkegaard's aim was not destruction but reform (SV 12,203-
18; WL, 199-212). He considered his efforts as a necessary 
therapeutic "corrective" to the present age29 as will become 
clear in chapter four. 
Understanding Kierkegaard's methodology is to a large 
degree to understand his authorship which is both 
dialectically complex and intriguing, especially in view of 
its pseudonymous dimension. 30 The explanation of the 
28 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 61, has 
suggested that this is also the common stance of the social 
critic. "He is not a detached observer, even when he looks at 
the society he inhabits with a fresh and skeptical eye. He is 
not an enemy, even when he is fiercely opposed to this or that 
prevailing practice or institutional arrangement. His 
criticism does not require either detachment or enmity, 
because he finds warrant for critical engagement in the 
idealism, even if it is a hypocritical idealism, of the 
actually existing moral world." 
29 , K1rmmse, Op. Cit. p. 738. 
30 It should be noted that Kierkegaard did not just write 
under a pen name. Most of his pseudonymous writings each have 
their own carefully chosen pseudonym some of which, like 
Johannes Climacus, the rationalist, has been involved in more 
than one work. In each case, Kierkegaard aimed to convey a 
message with the name. Thus Climacus is the Latin for ladder, 
meaning he is the rationalist constantly climbing toward and 
beyond the limitations of reason. What he finds beyond 
reason's limitations he may not embrace existentially, but he 
refuses to stifle thought that by virtue of passionate wonder 
pushes itself toward the paradox, toward what it cannot know. 
It is in this sense this inquiry understands openness. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard in relation to himself ranks the 
29 
authorship that follows is analyzed with a view to 
Kierkegaard's political philosophy. From this perspective it 
is possible to argue that among other things he, from the 
beginning of his authorship, was aiming at a political 
philosophy motivated by the circumstances of his historical 
situation. This is not to say that Kierkegaard asks 'who 
should rule.' He for all intents and purposes accepted the 
decisions of regime made for many Western European nations by 
the dramatic political upheavals of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. Liberal democracy was becoming an 
undeniable fact. 
What concerns him now are the consequences of this new 
form of representative democracy that seems to sever the 
relationship between the single self and the state and in so 
doing generates internal relational conflicts. What concerns 
him now is the social condition as he mockingly observes the 
inevitable: 
[T]he dialectic of monarchy is historically both 
tried and settled. Now we are going to begin at 
another point, namely upon the intensive development 
of the state itself. Then emerges the category of 
"the single self. 1131 
pseudonyms hierarchically referring to them as higher and 
lower pseudonyms depending upon whether they are upbuilding 
or merely aesthetic. See Howard Hong's "Historical 
Introduction" to The Sickness Unto Death, pp. xxi-xx11. 
Importantly, and as stated in "A First and Last Declaration" 
at the end of the Postscript, Kierkegaard wants to be 
distinctly separated from these works, SV 10,285; CUP, no 
pagination, "p. 551," precisely because they represent unreal 
personalities lacking concretion. They are idealizations 
unbound by actual moral limitations of reality, Ibid. 
31 PAP 1 A 108 (JP 4116). 
30 
And Kierkegaard continues in a margin note, this time 
positing a warning: 
11 It is one thing when the people, the crowd, the 
opposition struggles against the king, t~~ 
government (that is what we call politics), 
another thing is when there are disturbances in the 
state in the sense as when in a dwelling the 
residents on the various levels become antagonistic 
-- not toward the landlord, but among themselves. -
- Controversy within the floors, all the way from 
the basement to the attic, but among themselves. 1133 
Kierkegaard is concerned with how authority had been 
transferred from its religious and political origins to 
spontaneously arising social structures that were eagerly 
embraced by an unconnected public. 34 In other words, the 
problem of society was not to be expected to come from 
outside, but rather from within where, as Kierkegaard puts it, 
the house is in a disarray. 
32 It should be noted that in chapter four we 
differentiate between "the political" in Kierkegaard which 
constitutes an existential condition closely associated with 
the ethical dimension of the single self and "politics" as 
here explained by Kierkegaard himself. 
33 PAP VIII 1 A 109 (JP 4117) . Also Merold Westphal, 
"Kierkegaard's Sociology," International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1984), pp. 133-34. 
34 Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), Ch. 2 in passim and 
especially p. 40: "It is decisive that society, on all its 
levels, excludes the possibility of action . . Instead, 
society expects from each of its members a certain kind of 
behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which 
tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to 
exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement." Also 
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1960), Ch. 10 in passim; and John H. Hallowell, The 
Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1954), p. 69. 
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It is this pathological condition Kierkegaard wants to 
make the reader aware of and especially the effect it has on 
the single self's spiritual health, and consequently on its 
understanding of the concept of citizenship. 
His authorship can best be understood as he, in an 
Aristotelian fashion and hence scientifically, isolates the 
most important element from the context of the whole in order 
to analyze this element from its most ideal, indeed extreme, 
position. Like Aristotle, Kierkegaard presents this ideal 
version of individual existence in what Kresten Nordentoft has 
referred to as "literary-psychological experiments, 1135 on 
three progressive levels: aesthetic existence the end of which 
is pleasure, ethical existence which aims at some 
institutionalized good such as marriage or vocation, and 
religious existence which in Kierkegaard's scheme consists of 
two levels. In religiousness A the single self pursues 
dialectical inwardness in a development of self through self-
knowledge in a relationship with God. In religiousness B the 
individual reclaims the world in relationship and community 
yet maintains the "dialectical tension with the passionate 
inwardness of religiousness A. 1136 Thus in Kierkegaard's 
35 Kresten Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 13. 
36 Russell M. Davis, "Kierkegaard and Community" in Union 
Seminary Quarterly Review 36 no. 4 (Summer 1981): p. 212. For 
a formal analysis of the "structure" of Kierkegaard's theory 
of stages see Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of 
Inwardness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Mark 
C Taylor's Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of 
Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975) is also helpful here. 
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"phenomenology of spirit" the single self is placed "in a 
progressively more self-conscious position of responsibility 
for his own life, " 37 a progression, however, that has no 
implications of logical necessity. These various forms of 
existence allow Kierkegaard to work out his category of the 
single self (den Enkelte) exposing all the traits and 
attributes these various experiences embody, and in so doing, 
he demonstrates his considerable psychological prowess. 
These spheres of existence are presented in the form of 
more or less poetic prose from exciting and profound 
Nietzschean type disjunctive aphorisms and only apparently 
disorganized essays38 in Either-or, vol. I, to extraordinarily 
long, awkward, and repetitive Calvinistic type essays in 
Either-or, vol. II, that depict the kind of ethical life that 
grounds its principles in social institutions and thereby 
expresses the God-relationship, 39 an ethical life distinct 
The implication of structure in the stages of existence 
should not be confused with Hegel's systematic dialectics 
emphatically castigated by Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. It is 
interesting to note that in his later writings of direct 
communication, Kierkegaard all but abandons these 
differentiations of forms of existence as his attack on the 
present state of affairs becomes more overt and radical. In 
a sense these later writings present the "either-or" of 
concrete existence: the life of the "philistine-bourgeois" or 
the life of the "ethico-religious personality." 
37 Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel 
vs Kierkegaard on Faith and History (Chambersburgh, PA: 
American Academy of Religion, 1972), p. 74. 
38 George Connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in 
Kierkegaard's Thought (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
1985), p.54. 
39 b'd L.L, p. 161. 
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from the Christian life described in the later literature. 
However, it is what is in between these two extremes, and that 
includes the rest of Either-or, vol. I and all the other early 
pseudonymous writings that demonstrate the breadth and depth 
of Kierkegaard's analytical acumen. From this perspective it 
is no wonder these early works have captured the imagination 
of readers throughout the world. 
From the perspective of political philosophy, however, 
these are the works that render the least to an understanding 
of Kierkegaard's writings. In these works the single self is 
portrayed abstractly, without a concrete context and would 
seem to exist in a void. 4° Kierkegaard himself points to this 
problem in the essay entitled "The Tragic in Ancient Drama 
Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama" in Either-Or, vol. 
I. There he equates the form of his pseudonymous authorship 
with the modern experience as he describes how in modern 
tragedy there are no epic circumstances. The hero is not tied 
to categories of state, of family, or of destiny (something 
that will become clear in chapter three) nor to a context 
which in Greek tragedy represents the fatalistic element where 
the hero's destruction is the result of both deed and 
suffering. In modern tragedy, in contrast, Kierkegaard 
contends the hero's destruction results from his deeds alone 
40 Russell Davis, op. cit. pp. 214-16, has admirably 
attempted to deduct a theory of community from the 
pseudonymous authorship, but even he must in the end resort 
to the later literature and especially to Works of Love to 
find concrete meaning to religiousness B's requirement for 
community. 
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and hence "situation and character are actually predominant." 
The pain belongs to the hero alone; he is transparent only 
unto himself. There is "no epic foreground, no epic residue. 
The hero stands and falls entirely on his own deeds 
(Gjerninger)" (SV 2,133; EO I 144). 
Kierkegaard presents the category of the single self in 
these pseudonymous writings of indirect communication exactly 
as that self exists in "the present age," unattached, 
disinterested, if transparent, only to the self, but not 
comprehensible to others, and completely preoccupied with the 
self as most poignantly exemplified in the essay "Johannes the 
Seducer," that concludes Either-Or, vol. I. 
With this explanation in mind it becomes necessary to ask 
how these early pseudonymous writings are to be understood, 
especially in view of the fact that they were accompanied by 
a parallel series of direct communications that Kierkegaard 
refers to as "Upbuilding Discourses." It was in the very 
first of these latter, published just three months after 
Either-or, that Kierkegaard introduced his category of the 
single self undeniably underscoring his claim in the Point of 
View that he wanted, at least for his own sake, to remind the 
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world that his was a religious project. 41 He knew well that 
people would not read these discourses, and certainly not with 
the enthusiasm accorded especially Either-Or. Howeve_r, the 
presence of these direct communications only intensify the 
problem of the early writings inasmuch as they too focus upon 
an unattached and hence abstract single self. Kierkegaard 
explains the parallel series this way. 
"The religious is immediately present straight from 
the beginning. Conversely, the aesthetic is again 
present still at the last moment .... Hence first 
and last assurance is provided against interpreting 
the phenomenon thusly: that it is an aesthetic 
author who with the lapse of time has changed and 
has kind of become a religious author" (SV 18,86; 
POV, 12}. 
But this does not explain the problem of the abstract single 
self, and thus it would seem that at the outset of this 
dialectical authorship two things seem to be occupying 
Kierkegaard. 
On the one hand, he wants to present what is going to 
form the central focus for his work as an author, namely the 
single self as it emerges most ideally within the various 
spheres of existence. It would be described in such a way as 
to appear either detrimental or beneficial to its spiritual 
health, but without the clutter that a social context 
41 See the chapter titled "The Expectation of Faith" in 
Edifying Discourses, in passim. Note that in all the latest 
scholarship, including the new translations, the Danish word 
used so much by Kierkegaard to characterize the "right" form 
of love (see chapter five}: opbyggende, which Walter Lowrie 
translated as "edifying," is now generally agreed upon should 
be translated as "upbuilding." However, because the new 
"Kierkegaard Writings" have not yet been completed, the reader 
must still rely on Lowrie's translation. 
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necessarily generates. Thus within these early writings the 
reader is only exposed to the internal impulses this single 
self must overcome if it is to achieve what Kierkegaard refers 
to as inwardness. 42 On the other hand, that something is 
missing is not lost on Kierkegaard. In a journal note from 
184 7, the year of the publication of Works of Love, he 
chastises his readers because they have not understood the 
meaning of his "maieutic prudence" designed to advance slowly 
so as not to reveal how much he is aware of, not to reveal 
what is to follow. 
On the occasion of my new upbuilding discourses 
there will probably be cries about that I do not 
know what the next is to be, do not know about 
sociality. Those fools! On the other hand, I owe 
to myself before God to confess, that there in some 
sense is some truth in it, only not as people 
understand it, namely that it constantly, when first 
I have quite clearly and sharply drawn up the one 
side, then the other side stands out so much 
stronger. 
Now I have the theme for the next book. It will 
be called: 
Works of Love. 43 
It is, then, only in the later writings, and 
42 This is where the reader is introduced to 
Kierkegaard's renowned concept of despair that takes a 
different form in each sphere of existence. Note, however, 
that this category is not worked through properly until the 
later literature, in other words, not until the social aspect 
of the individual's experience has been included. See The 
Sickness Unto Death, in passim, where Kierkegaard gives this 
concept its final comprehensive formulation. 
43 PAP VIII 1 A 4. Note that Kierkegaard in the Danish 
has a different spelling than throughout Works of Love of the 
word translated as love: Kjrerligheden. It is closer to the 
modern spelling of that word which simply eliminates the "j". 
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especially in Works of Love and Two Ages, where the social 
context is included, that the reader is introduced to the 
imposition of the reductionism of the collective idea in its 
historical manifestation, and is introduced to the qualifying 
or authenticating need (N0dvendighed) of the "idea of 
community" expressed in loving one's neighbor as oneself. Only 
then does Kierkegaard reveal all the external measures that 
manifest themselves internally, measures which the single self 
must incorporate into the economy of its life in its quest for 
existential authenticity. 
In every one of the pseudonymous works, in one way 
or another, this about 'the single self' appears; 
but there the single self is that aesthetically 
qualified in a preeminent sense, the excellent, etc. 
In every one of the upbuilding writings, and as 
officially as possible, this about 'the single self' 
appears; but there the single self is what every 
human being is or can be. The point of departure 
for the pseudonyms is precisely in the 
differentiation between human beings [menneske og 
menneske] in terms of intellect, cultivation 
[dannelse) etc; the point of departure for the 
upbuilding discourses is in the upbuilding, and 
consequently in the universally human. But this 
double meaning is precisely the dialectic of 'the 
single self.' 'The single self' can signify the only 
one among all, and 'the single self' can signify 
everyone (SV 18,159-60; POV, 124). 
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CHAPTER I 
A PROBLEM OF MODERNITY: 
THE SEPARATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE 
... I cannot understand how you can talk so cotdly 
and so calmly about what affects me so deeply. 
I wonder if my gaze is not turned away from what is 
important by letting myself begin with physiology, 
instead of as~uming the whole of physiology and 
saying: Begin. 
S0ren Kierkegaard is one of the first serious thinkers 
to address what he considers the primary problem of modern 
thought, a problem he believes has permeated all realms of 
human experience be they theoretical or practical. In view of 
the perceived seriousness of this problem, Kierkegaard found 
it necessary to introduce a radical rewriting of the most 
cherished tenets of the modern experience, freedom and 
equality. He realized that he could not mitigate the problem 
unless he addressed what was most fundamental to the human 
condition in the present age. Thus it is not a rewriting 
1 S0ren Kierkegaards Papirer, ed. P.A. Heiberg og v. Kuhr 
(K0benhavn: Gyldendal, 1915), VII 1 A 182, p. 118 (S0ren 
Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, ed. and tr. Howard v. and 
Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, 
#2807). Hereafter known as PAP followed by volume and number 
and (JP followed by number}. 
2 Ibid, p. 119. 
grounded in subjective arbitrariness nor in religious 
enthusiasm. Kierkegaard's concern lies with the health of the 
consciousness of the single self (den Enkelte) 3 which he 
believed had been severely threatened in the modern age. 
However, in order to fully appreciate the radical nature of 
Kierkegaard's theory of freedom and equality, what will here 
be referred to as his "corrective," it becomes necessary to 
understand the underlying assumptions for his critique of 
modernity and the consequent symptomatic effects of the 
imputed problem. 4 
I:1 
The underlying assumptions for Kierkegaard's critique of 
modernity had their origin in the fundamental separation of 
knowledge and human experience, a separation which Kierkegaard 
believed, occurred as a result of the emergence of modern 
natural science and philosophy's adoptation of scientific 
methodology. 5 He argues this separation ensued from the 
rejection of classical philosophy's teleological approach to 
questions of being. Classical philosophy presupposed an 
3 For more on Kierkegaard's category of the single self 
and our choice of translation see Introduction, p. iv, note 
5. 
4 These symptomatic effects as they express themselves 
theoretically and practically will be dealt with in chapters 
II and III respectively. 
5 See especially PAP VII 1 A 182-215 (JP 2807-2820) and 
SV 10,46-51; CUP, 307-312. 
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ordered whole that could be consciously known and experienced, 
creating for the single self a place in the world that would 
fundamentally shape the framework of his thought and thus make 
human existence directed and purposeful. This holistic 
approach was replaced by modernity's rigorous application of 
scientific methodology to all epistemological inquiry and with 
an exclusive focus on natural measurable objects. 6 
In our time it is the natural sciences which are 
especially dangerous. Physiology7 will ultimately 
extend itself to the point that it embraces ethics. 
There are already sufficient clues of a new 
endeavor: to treat ethics as physics, whereby all 
of the ethical becomes an illusion, and the ethical 
in the race is treated statistically by averages or 
is calculated as one calculates vibrations in laws 
of nature. 8 
Ethical and religious categories were excluded from modern 
philosophical analysis, signifying for Kierkegaard a 
secularization of consciousness. 9 This transformation of the 
6 The unfinished and during his own lifetime unpublished 
Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est (JC) by 
Johannes Climacus illuminates Kierkegaard's understanding of 
the shift that philosophy underwent as a result of Descartes' 
adaptation of the scientific approach to rational inquiry. 
7 By "physiology" Kierkegaard means biology and the 
doctrine of evolution (udviklingsl~re) according to Gregor 
Malantschuk, 11 s0ren Kierkegaard og Naturvidenskaberne," 
Kristligt Dagblad (October 22, 1951). Malantschuk appears to 
be a little ahead of himself since Darwin did not publish The 
Origin of Species until 1859, and hence Kierkegaard could not 
have known the doctrine of evolution. 
8 PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 2807). 
9 
"When the rich man drives with lights on his carriage 
in the dark night, he sees a small area better than the poor 
who drives in the dark -- but neither does he see the stars; 
precisely the lights prevent that. Just so with all 
secularized understanding (Forstandighed); it sees well close 
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h0W and what of philosophical inquiry led him to fear that 
all inquiry into the good, and hence questions of essential 
human experience, would lose their transcendent ground and 
instead be mathematized and answer only to material and 
efficient causes, as if they were laws of nature. 10 That is 
to say, the scientific method's insistence upon objectivity 
had resulted in a fundamental aesthetic and intellectual 
disinterestedness which Kierkegaard interpreted as "an 
expression for indifference to reality" (SV 10,24; CUP, 282). 
Inasmuch as Kierkegaard's philosophical anthropology11 
implied an eternal quality to which the ethical dimension of 
existence responds, the separation of knowledge and experience 
meant that the potentiality, or to use Kierkegaard's own 
language, "the possibility" (Muligheden) of essential human 
experience was no longer the aim of philosophical inquiry. 
Everywhere it is decisively concluded that thinking 
is the ultimate; science moves farther and farther 
up, but is deprived of the infinite view." PAP VII 1 A 234 (JP 
2289). 
1° Compare Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, tr. David Carr 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 9, where 
he explains how the new science dropped all metaphysical 
questions, and further on pp. 22-3, where he suggests modern 
natural science produced an altogether "new idea of 
mathematical natural science" that transformed the general 
idea of philosophy. 
11 See chapter four, note 65 for Reidar Thompte's 
"Historical Introduction" to The Concept of Anxiety, p. xiv, 
on how we are to understand Kierkegaard's concept of 
philosophical anthropology. 
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away from the primitive impressions of Existents. 12 
There is nothing to experience, nothing to learn, 
everything is completed and the task of speculation 
is now to rubricate, classify, and methodically 
arrange the particular conceptualization of thought. 
one does not love, does not believe, does not act, 
but one knows what erotic love (Elskov) 13 is, what 
faith is, and now the only question is about their 
place in the system: in the same way the domino 
player has his pieces lying before him and the game 
consists in putting them together (SV 10,46; CUP, 
307-08). 
That is to say, the scientific approach could not pursue the 
metaphysical categories essential to human experience, and 
12 Ordinarily Kierkegaard would use the Danish word 
Tilv~relse for existence. Here he is eager to emphasize the 
special meaning he brings to his particular conception of 
existence, a meaning spelled out in the Postscript, but which, 
according to Climacus, has its origin in Plato's Symposium. 
"Existents itself, to exist as such, is striving and is 
equally as pathetic as it is comic. It is pathetic because 
striving is infinite, that is, it is directed toward the 
infinite, is the actualization of infinitude which is the 
ultimate form of pathos; it is comic because striving is 
inherently a self-contradiction. This quality of 
Existents recalls the Greek conception of Eros as found in the 
Symposium [ 2 03bff] [where] . . . erotic love (Elskov) here 
means unconcealed Existents or that by which life is in its 
totality, the life which is a synthesis of the infinite and 
the finite. Poverty and wealth, according to Plato, begat Eros 
whose nature is created from both. But what is Existents? It 
is that child begat of the infinite and the finite, the 
eternal and the temporal, and therefore is continuously 
striving. This was Socrates' meaning: therefore love 
(Kjerlighed) is continuously striving, that is, the thinking 
subject is existing. It is only systematists and the objective 
philosophers who have ceased to be human beings and have 
become speculative philosophy which belongs in the realm of 
pure being (SV 9,79-80; CUP, 84-5). See also sv 20,66-7 where 
Jens Himmelstrup elaborates on Kierkegaard's use of the word 
"Existents." 
13 Climacus differentiates between erotic love (Elskov) 
and love (Kjerlighed) as in love of neighbor (see note above). 
This differentiation becomes very important in chapters IV and 
V where it will be shown that Kierkegaard's "corrective" is 
fundamentally grounded in the latter conception of love. 
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hence could render no meaningful explanations of the most 
important dimension of human existence: the striving embodied 
in the movement from possibility to actuality. 
Although Kierkegaard is addressing the problem of the 
natural sciences, "the conflict with the objections of the 
natural sciences and the struggle in this regard will . 
be analogical to the conflict with the system. 1114 Natural 
science could not incorporate this intentional movement on a 
concrete level, that is, in individual human existence. 
Kierkegaard is addressing the Hegelian system which was the 
major focus of his attack on speculative philosophy as it 
manifested itself in the guise (method) of modern natural 
science (something that will become clear in the present as 
well as in the following chapter) . 15 In other words, knowledge 
has become its own end, and the more dexterity scholarship 
could bring to this gathering of information, the more 
14 PAP X 5 A 73 (JP 2823). 
15 In referring to Hegelian systematic philosophy, which 
Kierkegaard believes took its cue from Cartesian rationalism 
(see JC in passim), his sardonic irony comes to the fore: "The 
objective tendency (which proposes to make everyone an 
observer and in its maximum into such an observer that he like 
a ghost is scarcely to be distinguished from the monstrous 
spirit of past eras) naturally refuses to hear anything and 
to know anything except what stands in relation to itself (SV 
9,110; CUP, 118). This extravagance of speculative philosophy 
has also been captured by Husserl, Op. Cit. pp. 8-9: "In a 
bold, even extravagant, elevation of the meaning of 
universality, begun by Descartes, this new philosophy seeks 
nothing less than to encompass, in the unity of a theoretical 
system, all meaningful questions in a rigorous scientific 
manner, with an apodictically intelligible methodology, in an 
unending but rationally ordered progress of inquiry." 
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knowledge became removed from what mattered in life, what 
Kierkegaard refers to as essential experience. 16 
"The subjective thinker is not a scientist, he is 
an artist. To exist is an art. The subjective 
thinker is aesthetic enough to give his life 
aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it, 
dialectical enough to thoughtfully govern it" (SV 
10,52; CUP, 314). 
This means the subjective thinker is a person of reason, a 
reason which governs the other traits. 
I:2 
Kierkegaard's intentional philosophy derives mainly from 
Aristotle. 17 According to Aristotle, philosophical inquiry 
into the nature of things required both knowledge and 
16 
"That essential knowledge essentially relates itself 
to existence -- does not mean ... that knowledge relates to 
something existing as its object, but means that knowledge 
relates itself to the knower, who is essentially an existing 
being and that for this reason all essential knowledge is 
essentially related to Existents, to existing as such. Only 
ethical and ethico-religious knowledge is therefore essential 
knowledge. But all ethical and all ethico-religious knowledge 
is essentially related to the fact that the knower exists (SV 
9,164-65; CUP, 177). See also SV 9,126-27; CUP, 135-36; SV 
9,173; CUP, 185; and again PAP XI 2 A 191 (JP 2303): 
"[M]athematical, historical learning, and so on, [are 
intellectual disciplines) which are not related to what kind 
of life one lives, to character." For a contrasting 
interpretation of Hegel's "system," see Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Reason in the Age of Science, tr. Frederick G. Lawrence 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 36-7. 
17 
"[When Aristotle) already has said that the transition 
from possibility to actuality is a kinesis, then he is not 
talking about the logical possibility and actuality but about 
that of freedom, and therefore he correctly posits the 
movement." PAP IV B 117, p. 290. Also PAP IV C 47 and SV 
10,45; CUP, 306. 
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. 18 
exper1ence. Without experience human beings would be 
determined by fate unable to explain or adequately apply in 
a practical sense the data of their cognitive insigh_t. The 
philosopher is compelled to establish the truth of things by 
theoretical investigation, 19 and only by reflecting on that 
experience would there be an awareness of universal 
principles. 20 Only by applying both knowledge and experience 
could one hope to answer the What and Why of the world and 
thus discover its meaning. 
18 Metaphysics 981a, tr. taken from A.E. Taylor Aristotle 
on His Predecessors {La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing 
company, 1969): "· .. the human species lives also by the 
guidance of rules of art and reflective inferences . 
. [S]cience and art in man are a product of experience. For 
'experience has created art,' as Polus correctly remarks, 'but 
inexperience chance.' . . Now, for purposes of practice 
experience is recognized to be not inferior to art; indeed, 
we observe that persons of experience are actually more 
successful than those who possess theory without experience. 
The reason of this is that experience is acquaintance with 
individual facts, but art with general rules, and all action 
and production is concerned with the individual. Thus the 
physician does not cure man, except in an accidental sense, 
but Callias or Socrates or some other individual person of 
whom it is an accident to be a man. Hence, if one possesses 
the theory without the experience, and is acquainted with the 
universal concept, but not with the individual fact contained 
under it, he will often go wrong in his treatment; for what 
has to be treated is the individual." 
To "possess theory without experience" in this sense is a 
serious problem in the present age according to Kierkegaard. 
He uses the connection between knowledge and experience 
differently than Aristotle's example shows only to the degree 
that his individual, unlike Aristotle's physician, is not 
acting upon somebody else, but on himself. 
19 Metaphysics, tr. Richard Hope {Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1952), 997a13. 
20 · · · A.E. Taylor, Ar1stotle (New York: Dover Publ1cat1ons, 
Inc., 1955), p. 37. 
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Aristotle's point, according to Werner Jaeger, is that 
only when, for example, politics "is studied on scientific 
principles and regarded as a normative discipline," can 
knowledge "give the statesman insight into the ultimate norms 
in accordance with which he must direct his activity. 1121 This 
kind of move from theoretical insight to practical application 
is embodied in Aristotle's understanding of the nature of 
philosophy as teleological, meaning "(t]he very art or applied 
science and every ... action and choice seem to aim at some 
good. 1122 That is to say everything comes into being for the 
sake of an end. In Jaeger's words, "an end is that which 
always appears as the final result of a development, in 
accordance with natural law and by a continuous process, and 
in which the process attains its completion. 1123 In other 
words, classical philosophy conducted its epistemological and 
ontological inquiries precisely in order to allow 
participation in being making human existence directed and 
purposeful. 
21 Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His 
Development, tr. Richard Robinson (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1948), pp. 76-7. 
22 Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962), 1094a. 
23 Jaeger, Op. Cit. p. 75. 
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J:3 
with the scientific and philosophical revolution of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, a quantitative 
equivalence of all changes in nature had emerged which denied 
in its most negative aspect the possibility of any non-
physical dimension intervening in the course of physical 
events. Rather than engaging in discoveries that would make 
the universe meaningful in human terms, modern natural science 
concentrated its efforts on explaining the efficient and 
material causes underlying the phenomena of nature without 
concern for the practical aspects of life (SV 10,24; CUP, 282-
83) .24 It meant that the act of thinking changed as did the 
way of life for the single self. Not only was the contingency 
of its existence revealed, but as Karl Lowith has commented, 
it also implied a denaturing of human life. 25 This single self 
also became separated from his world, a world that was 
characterized "as a relatively insignificant background of 
man's forlorn existence. " 26 It was a world situated in a 
24 As Hannah Arendt has so aptly commented in Between 
Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 57: 
"Emphasis shifted from interest in things to interest in 
processes, of which things were soon to become almost 
accidental by-products." Compare Hans Jonas, "Seventeenth 
Century and After: The Meaning of the Scientific and 
Technological Revolution," Philosophical Essays (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 47. 
25 Nature. History. and Existentialism (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 24. 
26 b'd LL, pp. 27, 103. 
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seemingly infinite universe "that is the farthest removed from 
immediate existential concern of a self with itself, 1127 and 
subject only to certain laws that could be cognitively 
discovered. In these, human beings could not participate 
inasmuch as these laws rendered no universal categories for 
what Kierkegaard has defined as essential experience, and 
consequently the single self was utterly lost in the 
contingency of that world. 
I am at the end of my rope. I am nauseated by life, 
it is insipid without salt and meaning. . One 
sticks a finger into the ground to smell what 
country one is in; I stick my finger into existence 
-- it smells of nothing. Where am I? What does it 
mean: the world? What does this word mean? Who 
tricked me into this whole thing and now leaves me 
standing there? Who am I? How did I get into the 
world; why was I not asked, why was I not informed 
of the rules and regulations, but thrust into the 
ranks as if I was bought from a peddling shanghaier 
of human beings? How did I get involved in this 
big enterprise called reality? Why should I be 
interested? Is it not a matter of free choice? And 
if I am compelled to be interested, where is the 
conductor, I have something to say about this (SV 
5,171; R, 200). 
It is this circumstance that prompts Kierkegaard to call 
natural science sophistical and the scientist a sophist, 28 
27 Ibid, p. 102. 
28 PAP VII 1 A 195 (JP 2815); PAP VII 1 A 196 (JP 2816); 
PAP VII 1 A 199 (JP 2819); and PAP VII 1 A 185 (JP 2295). 
Malantschuk in Kristligt Dagblad reminds the reader that 
Kierkegaard's critical stance toward the natural sciences were 
at his own time difficult to comprehend in view of the general 
and often blinding enthusiasm over scientific progress. Today 
his stance, although embraced by many, would to some degree 
also be misplaced inasmuch as we have come to understand that 
scientific knowledge is not as radically separated from the 
knower's mind as was thought in Kierkegaard's time and indeed 
up to very recently. See, for example, Michael Polanyi, 
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precisely because the relationship between science and 
philosophy had become confused. 
The confusion lies in the fact that it never becomes 
dialectically clear which is which, how philosophy 
is to use natural science. Is the whole thing an 
ingenious metaphor (then one might as well be 
ignorant of it), is it an example, an analogy, or 
is it of such importance that theory must be revised 
in relation to it?29 
The consequences for the single self would be detrimental, 
Kierkegaard laments, inasmuch as he believes that knowledge 
affects the knower's mind, 30 and the knower is essentially 
interested. Scientific methodology, in contrast, requires 
objectivity and hence disinterestedness, as when II a 
physiologist counts the pulse-beat and studies the nervous 
system (which] has no relation to ethical enthusiasm. 1131 
Personal Knowledge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958 and 1962), esp. pp. 299-324; and Stephen Toulmin, "The 
Construal of Reality: Criticism in Modern and Postmodern 
Science," The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 112. See 
also note 79 this chapter. 
29 PAP VII 1 A 200 (JP 2820). For somewhat parallel 
arguments see Hans Jonas, pp. 47, 66; Eric Voegelin, "The 
Origins of Scientism," Social Research 15 (1948), pp. 470-72; 
and Husserl, Op. Cit. p. 61. 
30 
"All knowledge has something captivating about it, 
but, on the other hand, it also alters the entire state of the 
knower's psyche." PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 2807). See also note 15 
this chapter. 
31 PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 2807). In the margin to this 
journal notation Kierkegaard has added: "Scientific admiration 
of nature's ingenuity in the human physiology is entirely 
heterogeneous, indeed is heresy in relation to the ethical 
which has nothing to do with admiration but only with this: 
You shall." PAP VII 1 A 183 (JP 2808). These (two) quotations 
are crucial to a partial demonstration of what Kierkegaard 
identifies as the modern pathology of consciousness and the 
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The scientific preoccupation with the configuration of 
the universe or newly discovered biological structures 
strictly for the sake of information gathering rendered what 
Kierkegaard calls essential human experience nonessential. 32 
The demand for objectivity, which required disinterestedness 
and impersonal analysis, had produced an investigator 
attaining knowledge of the world, but acquiring little, if 
any, self-knowledge. 33 This mechanical approach to a study of 
the universe had necessarily eliminated or so transmuted the 
ethical dimension that questions about the good are rendered 
consequent need for a "corrective." Malantschuk, Op. Cit. 
explains Kierkegaard's objection to the scientific approach 
vividly: "Kierkegaard finds that what is most comical are the 
materialist biologists: first they kill the spirit, that is, 
they acknowledge only the lifeless, the material as the 
foundational, and out of this dead stuff they then believe 
they can derive an explanation of life and all its variety. 
The material apprehension, according to Kierkegaard, has to 
do with 'that by killing one believes to have found the spirit 
that animates it.'" 
32 For parallel interpretations see, for example, 
Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1957), p. 2; E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Science (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 
1952), pp. 89-90; A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World 
(New York: The Free Press, 1925 and 1953), p. 30; and Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 261ff. 
33 PAP VII 1 A 200 (JP 2820). Compare to Husserl who in 
his "Vienna Lectures," Op. Cit., p. 295, stated: "Someone who 
is raised on natural science takes it for granted that 
everything merely subjective must be excluded and that the 
natural scientific method, exhibiting itself in subjective 
manners of representation, determines objectivity. Thus he 
seeks what is objectively true even for the psychic." See also 
pp. 56-7. 
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insignificant and even irrelevant, erecting an insurmountable 
chasm between fact and value. Kierkegaard refers directly to 
this chasm when he tries to explain the consequences of the 
scientific approach that has either engaged in hypocrisy by 
insisting that natural science will lead to God, 34 or has 
altogether set God aside leaving questions of good and bad to 
be decided "en masse." Thus he argues that neither moral nor 
religious judgments can be settled by human consensus ( SV 
15,172; SUD, 123-24 and SV 18,155; POV, 114) . 35 As Paul Holmer 
comments, for Kierkegaard philosophers had forgotten the 
meaning of existence; the familiar had escaped them. 36 
34 PAP VII 1 A 186 (JP 2809). It is surprising that 
Kierkegaard in this regard nowhere comments on his 
contemporary H.C. 0rsted, the discoverer of electro-magnetism, 
except to react negatively to a positive account of his book 
Aanden i Naturen (K0benhavn: Vintens Forlag, 1978), in the 
newspaper Berlingske Tidende, K0benhavn (Dec. 28, 1849). 
Kierkegaard's remark is little else than an ill tempered 
generalization when he notes: "· . the whole book is from 
first to last, scientifically, that is, philosophically 
scientifically, insignificant." PAP X 2 A 302. 0rsted's book 
sets out to elucidate the relationship between faith and 
science. The chapter titled "Videnskabsdyrkningen, betragtet 
som Religionsud¢velse" (The Cultivation of Science viewed as 
Religious Exercise), p. 146, is especially revealing: "The 
constant in nature comes from the eternally independent; the 
utterings on life from him who is life itself, the coherence 
and harmony of the whole from the one perfect wisdom." 
35 For parallel interpretations see Leo Strauss, Natural 
Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1953), pp. 8 and 35-80; Koyre, Op. Cit. pp. 2, 100-01, 105; 
Burtt, Op. Cit. p. 303; and Whitehead, Op. Cit. p. 142. 
36 
"Kierkegaard and Philosophy," New Themes in Christian 
Philosophy, ed. Ralph M. Mcinerny (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1968), p. 17. See also p. 33 for Holmer's 
interpretation of Kierkegaard's charge that modern philosophy 
is fearful of knowledge which cannot be categorized and 
systematized and therefore is placed outside of 
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By eliminating questions about the good, the two distinct 
realms of human experience had become confused, indeed 
conflated, positing worldly values as authoritative. The 
language of the spiritual realm as Kierkegaard recognized it, 
had been transmuted by the secular world's material 
expectations (processes) implying for Kierkegaard a clear 
rejection of a genuine dialectical life and rendering the 
single self unconnected and therefore confused and 
unfulfilled. 
I:4 
That the scientific approach also opposed Christian 
teaching's emphasis on the importance of the existence of the 
single self, the essence of which was rooted in an empirically 
unverifiable soul, only aggravated the problem from 
Kierkegaard's perspective. In this mechanized view of nature 
man was reduced to an observer by which Kierkegaard meant an 
"outsider" (Trediemand), a spectator (Tilskuer), someone who 
stood at the margin of all essential relationships (SV 14,73; 
epistemological concerns. Compare to Leo Strauss, "The Three 
Waves of Modernity," Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo 
Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 81-2: "The crisis ... of modernity 
reveals itself in the fact ... that modern western man no 
longer knows what he wants -- that he no longer believes that 
he can know what is good and bad, what is right and wrong .. 
• . The crisis of modernity is, then, primarily the crisis of 
modern political philosophy." 
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202). 37 TA, 
The active moral agent so elementary to classical 
philosophy and Christian teaching had been replaceq. by a 
11totali ty" ( SV 9, 4 7; CUP, 50) made up of an aggregate of 
individuals about whom it was assumed, as a matter of course, 
that they were Christians. As Johannes Climacus38 explains the 
Hegelian speculative viewpoint, "the philosopher contemplates 
Christianity for the sake of interpreting it with his 
speculative thought; aye, with his genuinely speculative 
thought" (SV 9,48; CUP, 51). 
But, Anti-Climacus responds, truth, as Christ argued, is 
like a food, it is a matter of "appropriating" (tilegne) it 
through "eating" (spise), not through lectures that leave the 
impression "truth is understanding." Hence "Christianly 
understood, the truth consists not in knowing the truth but 
in being the truth" (SV 16,193; TC, 201-02). Therefore 
Christianity cannot be taught as such. 
The aim of teaching is a result, learning something 
cognitively. The end of believing is a way of life, a 
particular lifestyle. In other words, the Christian single 
37 As E.A. Burtt, Op. cit. p. 90, has so poignantly 
expressed this problem: "[M)an is hardly more than a bundle 
of secondary qualities (as he) ... begins to appear for the 
first time in the history of thought as an irrelevant 
spectator and insignificant effect of the great mathematical 
system which is the substance of reality." 
38 For more on this pseudonym see Introduction, p. xxix, 
note 30. 
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self had become obj ecti vi zed, and this happened precisely 
because speculative philosophy had posited Christianity as an 
historical phenomenon in the development of consciousness of 
freedom (SV 9,46-52; CUP, 49-55; and SV 16,207; TC, 216). 39 
By positing Christianity as an historical phenomenon, it 
is assumed that its truth is cognitively revealed as the 
eternal truth, meaning the problem of its truth is removed. 
To remove the problem of Christianity is to obviate the 
dialectic of human experience, and hence in Kierkegaard's 
opinion to deny human nature proper. Climacus summarizes the 
distinction between the scientific and the Christian 
viewpoints in a terse statement in the Postscript: "The 
difference is merely this, that [modern natural] science will 
teach that the way is to become objective, while Christianity 
teaches that the way is to become subjective, i.e. to become 
a subject in truth" (SV 9,109; CUP, 117) . 40 To make his point 
39 Here Anti-Climacus engages in an appropriate and most 
interesting discussion about the difference between truth and 
truth and hence the confusion between Christianity and the 
triumphant church. He suggests that Christianity has been 
viewed as truth in terms of the result rather than viewing it 
as truth in terms of "the way'' (Veien) (SV 16,194; TC, 202}. 
However, a detailed analysis of this discussion is beyond the 
scope of this project. 
4o Also PAP VII 1 A 196 (JP 2816}; PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 
2807}; PAP VI B 40:5 (JP 2286); and PAP VII 1 A 34 (JP 2292}. 
It should be noted that Kierkegaard does not deny the value 
of the natural sciences. Indeed, he concedes with undeniable 
hubris he was quite inspired by the possibilities they 
provided. But he was more interested in the questions of 
existence: "By virtue of reason and freedom, life has always 
interested me most, and it has always been my desire to 
clarify and solve the riddle of life." Kierkegaard: Letters 
and Documents, tr. Henrik Rosenrneier, ed. Howard v. and Edna 
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climacus engages in a linguistic quip that loses little in 
translation: "The guidance of science is misguidance" 
(Videnskabens Veiledning er Vildledelse). 
Kierkegaard's fear is that the thinker has been left to 
oscillate with all the results his talents and instincts have 
provided him about the universe. This undialectical pursuit 
does not render him certainty of spirit, it does not allow him 
to "become transparent to himself in the decisiveness of the 
spirit, in the ethical appropriation of his talents," 41 and so 
he ends up understanding the world, but not himself. 42 And if 
he does not understand himself in this Socratic sense, 
Kierkegaard 
meaningless. 
concludes, his existence is essentially 
To the extent that there is a sort of unconscious 
life in such a person's knowledge, the sciences may 
be said to demand his life, but to the extent that 
there is not, his activity is comparable to that of 
the person who nourishes the earth by the decay of 
H. Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 45. 
Hereafter known as Letters. 
41 By "the ethical appropriation of his talents" 
Kierkegaard means something very close to what Charles Taylor 
in his seminal work Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 18 and 28, has called a 
framework, an orientation in moral space toward the good. 
"Framework is that in virtue of which we make sense of our 
lives spiritually. Not to have a framework is to fall into a 
life which is spiritually senseless." 
42 PAP VII 1 A 200 (JP 2820). In the margin Kierkegaard 
added a further notation of his skepticism at the thought of 
such a person living "happily in this way without feeling any 
misgivings because the deceptive variety of observations and 
discoveries continuously conceals the total unclarity." 
56 
her dead body." 43 
By removing experience from "essential knowing" 
(ya:!sentlig erkjenden) , an awareness of an intentional movement 
in the human condition has also been eliminated. The 
implication is that becoming fully human only demands what 
the world wants (SV 12,251; WL, 244). It also suggests the 
scientific method has been successful, but as Paul Feyerabend 
43 Letters, p. 44. Compare Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to 
Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 4: "The imposition of ... 
'objective' information detached from [existential] 
preferences and problems emptied existence of its epistemic 
ingredients and made it barren and meaningless." And again on 
p. 5: "To say that a procedure or a point of view is 
objective(ly true) is to claim that it is valid irrespective 
of human expectations, ideas, attitudes, wishes." But as he 
also and most appropriately reminds the reader, "Rationalism 
did not introduce order and wisdom where before there was 
chaos and ignorance; it introduced a special kind of order, 
established by special procedures and different from the order 
and the procedures of historical traditions." (p. 118) . 
. "Philosophy is the domain of thought and thought seems to 
be objective and independent of styles, impressions, feelings . 
. . . This is itself a philosophical theory. There are other 
views, such as that of Kierkegaard, who also asserts that 
thought receives content by being connected with a thinker, 
is essentially subjective and is incapable of producing 
'results' -- that is, permanent and unchanging signposts for 
an evaluation of the evanescent opinions of humanity. While 
objective thought, writes Kierkegaard [Climacus], translates 
everything into results and helps all mankind to cheat, by 
copying these off and reciting them by rote, subjective 
thought puts everything in process and omits the results; 
partly because this belongs to him who has the way and partly 
because as an existing individual he is constantly in process 
of coming to be, which holds true of every human being who 
has not permitted himself to be deceived into becoming 
objective, inhumanly identifying himself with speculative 
philosophy in the abstract.'' (p. 153). Cf. SV 9,63; CUP, 68. 
For more on the problem of the scientific method's demand for 
results see Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: 
Hegel vs Kierkegaard on Faith and History (Chambersburg, PA: 
American Academy of Religion, 1972), pp. 61-2; and for more 
on Climacus' objections, see sv 9,117-37; CUP, 126-47. 
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cautions, "this success is in part a result of a historical 
path of least resistance. 1144 However, a deepening of the self 
under these circumstances would be neither possible nor 
required (SV 12,223; WL, 217). But a deepening of the self is 
precisely what Kierkegaard's intentional philosophy allows 
for. 
Kierkegaard operates with two conceptions of intentional 
existence, one that posits an absolute end that requires 
existence to express "a pathetic relationship to an eternal 
happiness," and thus "involves a volitional concentration in 
the highest sense," and one that posits relative ends. Even 
the latter, Climacus argues, in itself could transform human 
existence, at least partially, except that modernity has 
become so preoccupied with "thinking about everything, we 
rarely see an existence that devotes itself energetically even 
to a relative end." 
The point of relative ends is that they are willed for 
the sake of other ends, while the absolute end "must be willed 
for its own sake" (SV 10,87-8; CUP, 352-53). This would mean 
that the decisive criterion for relating absolutely to the 
absolute would be that "one is willing to give up the relative 
whenever the relative conflicts with the absolute." As C. 
Stephen Evans goes on to say, for Climacus this is a universal 
argument and "is valid even if someone understands the 
44 Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 157n5. 
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absolute end differently than he does. This state of being 
willing to give up any and every finite good for the sake of 
the infinite Climacus calls resignation. 1145 
Climacus' language of resignation and its differentiation 
from suffering which, according to Evans, is "the condition 
of the individual self who is attempting to realize his 
condition but has not fully done so 1146 I has often been 
misunderstood to mean a withdrawal from the world. But 
climacus is very clear on this point. 
It is the absolute telos for the one willing, who 
wants to strive absolutely. . [T]he pathetic 
lies in existentially (existerende] expressing this 
in Existents; the pathetic lies not in witnessing 
about an eternal happiness, but in transforming 
one's own Existents into a testimony about it (SV 
10,88; CUP, 353 emphasis added). 
Climacus has three Socratic moments in mind here. 
First: what he calls the Socratic meaning of love 
(Kjerlighed), which is constantly to strive, a subject 
discussed above (SV 9,80; CUP, 85) . 47 
Second: the Socratic meaning of the problem of 
immortality: "But Socrates! He puts the question objectively 
in a problematic manner: if there is an immortality. . On 
this "if" he stakes his whole life, he dares to die, and he 
45 Kierkegaard's 'Fragments' and 'Postscript': The 
Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1983), pp. 163-64. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See also note 11 this chapter. 
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has so arranged the pattern of his life that it must be found 
acceptable -- if there is an immortality" (SV 9,168; CUP 180). 
climacus concludes, "the Socratic uncertainty was thus an 
expression of the fact that the eternal truth is related to 
an existing individual self, and hence must remain a paradox 
to him as long as he exists" (Ibid) . 48 
Third: what he characterizes as the "infinitely 
meritorious of the Socratic position (which] was precisely to 
accentuate that the knower is existing, and that to exist is 
the essential" (SV 9,173; CUP, 185). This means to appropriate 
into one's life what one knows, requiring what one knows is 
meaningful to existence. To strive for the absolute end 
absolutely is meaningful. This end is not meant to be achieved 
-- the paradox of striving -- for in that case it would be a 
finite end. 
The point Kierkegaard is trying to advance in the 
language of Climacus is that the striving takes place in this 
world, is expressed in this world. 49 As this project will 
argue, this is precisely the form of the "corrective" the 
content of which, as will become clear, is "You shall love the 
48 The translation of this latter part of the quotation 
is from Hannah Arendt, "What is Existenz Philosophy?" Partisan 
Review 13 (1946), p. 43. 
49 
"If the rights of knowledge are to have their due, one 
must venture out into life, out upon the sea, and raise one's 
scream in hopes that God will hear, not stand on the beach and 
see the others struggle and strive -- only then does knowledge 
acquire its true official registration." PAP III A 145 (JP 
2279). 
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neighbor as yourself." For Kierkegaard, then, to love God or 
to 1ove the good is expressed by loving the other, a this-
worldly act of consciousness which indeed is what is meant by 
Existents. 50 In other words, the solution to the problem of 
the contingency of human existence is to be found in our own 
experience, not outside of it, and the proof of its worth lies 
not in theoretical exegesis but in "practical activity." 51 
By positing a requirement for a dialectical existence 
that appeals both to absolute as well as relative ends, 
Kierkegaard has posited a standard, or as Leo Strauss would 
put it, "a solid basis of all efforts to transcend the 
actual." 52 By not providing a standard, any hope of improving 
the lot of humanity would appear to be superfluous. This seems 
especially true in an age where the dominant political theory 
appeals to the reductive view that denounces all qualitative 
distinctions in a celebration of the lowest common denominator 
of human characteristics and provides only minimalist rules 
so The "corrective" will be dealt with in chapters IV and 
V. 
51 Arnold Ljungdal, Problemet S0ren Kierkegaard, tr. Ina 
Rhode (K0benhavn: Stig Vendelk~rs Forlag, 1964), p. 60. 
52 Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 15. Strauss 
might object to Climacus' standard being considered a "solid 
basis" inasmuch as he is thinking of what is best by nature 
and would most likely consider Climacus' standard dogmatic 
(Ibid, pp. 320-21). Nevertheless, insofar as Strauss himself 
considers Locke's adaptation of di vine law from the New 
Testament to have both relevatory and rational validity (Ibid, 
pp. 204-05), and what is best by nature is something we can 
know as rational beings, the comparison does not seem out of 
hand. 
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that allow those lowest human characteristics to be 
53 , 
accentuated. In the dominant political theory one finds only 
material goals to strive for, and although these have all too 
well captured the human imagination, the crisis of modernity 
only appears to deepen. Thus Kierkegaard's emphasis on a 
standard can be considered unproblematic. It is only the 
implied content, which for Kierkegaard derives from Christian 
teaching, that may prove questionable. However, insofar as his 
focus is on Existents, expressed in loving the other as 
oneself, and hence constitutes a manifestation of community, 
and is a religious as well as a rational principle, 54 it 
appears the dogmatics Kierkegaard engages in would not 
necessarily prove problematic for non-Christians. 
I:S 
Kierkegaard's conception of philosophy as intentional is 
closely connected to his understanding of history. He analyses 
this concept under the general problematic of Philosophical 
Fragments: "Can a historical point of departure be given for 
an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure 
be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness 
(Salighed) be built on historical knowledge?" (SV 6, 7; PF, 1). 
53 We are especially thinking of John Locke, Second 
Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1980), chapters 2-5, 8-9. 
See also Charles Taylor, Op. Cit. p. 23. 
54 Strauss, Op. Cit., pp. 204-05. 
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His argument directly confronts Hegel's conception of 
history, which is that it constitutes the unfolding of human 
consciousness, an unfolding that takes place with logical 
necessity, whereby the freedom presupposed in the Christian 
view of life apparently disappears. Against this Climacus 
posits a conception of history which preserves a realm of 
freedom within which the single self has two major choices. 
one choice is to strive to fulfill one's potential, to choose 
to exist in that essential sense that Kierkegaard has labelled 
Existents: to live in terms of qualitative distinctions. The 
other choice is to wholly succumb to the givens of the 
material world, in which the end of all action is always 
already another end and hence constitutes a life of insatiable 
self-indulgence sort of like Socrates' leaky jar analogy 
by which he attempts to convince Callicles of the 
meaninglessness of his existential priorities. 55 
From Hegel's perspective, the problematic of the 
Fragments has been rendered unproblematic inasmuch as the 
transcendent has been immanentized by the logical movement 
which follows the law of necessity. In the "Introduction" to 
the Phenomenology of Spirit he claims 
"the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as 
the serial progression; it is the point where 
knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where 
knowledge finds itself, where Notion [Idea] 
corresponds to object and object to Notion 
55 Plato, Gorgias, tr. W.C. Helmbold (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1952), 493b-c. 
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[Idea). 1156 
Later he adds, "The movement of carrying forward the form of 
its self-knowledge is the labor which it accomplishes as 
actual History. 1157 Hegel's aim was to reconcile subject and 
object, what Descartes had wrestled apart and Kant was unable 
to bring together. 
Kierkegaard, believing that it is impossible to reconcile 
subject and object and still maintain existential freedom 
except in the abstract realm of pure thinking, adopts the 
Kantian dichotomous relationship of these entities. However, 
rather than concentrating on'~he object and how we are to 
understand such a phenomenon, he focuses on the thinking 
entity, on the subject who for him is a concrete existing 
single self faced with a reality that, as Arnold Ljungdal has 
interpreted Kierkegaard, "every second demands our 
interruption in the form of decisions and resolutions of the 
will." As Kierkegaard sees it the role of philosophy is to 
clarify what the ultimate presuppositions are for such an 
"active interruption" and hence to make human existence, not 
necessarily easier, but more meaningful. It is from this 
perspective that we must understand Kierkegaard's conception 
of freedom as well as his claim about truth being located in 
56 Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), #80, p. 51. 
57 Ibid, #803, p. 488. 
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subjectivity. 58 "It does not mean that there is no objective 
reality outside of us, but it must be personally 
appropriated, " 59 something the scientific method and its 
implication of logical necessity does not allow for. 
I:6 
The problem of the imposition of logic into existence 
will be discussed in chapter II. Here the focus will be on the 
problematic of historical necessity allowing us to see yet 
another dimension of Kierkegaard's analytical dexterity. That 
he sees a problem here cannot surprise anyone considering how 
this historical necessity expresses itself politically in 
Hegel's philosophy as discussed above. There his solution to 
the problem of the subject-object dichotomy was given 
political meaning in his concept of "Ethical Life." In his 
Philosophy of Right he claims this ethical life constitutes 
the Idea of freedom in that ... self-consciousness 
has in ethical existence its absolute foundation and 
the end which actuates its effort ... The objective 
ethical order posits within itself 
distinctions whose specific character is thereby 
determined by the concept, and by means of which the 
ethical order has a fixed content -- necessary and 
independent and an existence elevated above 
subjective opinion and choice. These distinctions 
are absolutely valid laws and institutions. 
58 For more on Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity see 
chapter two, section II:2:3. 
59 't Op • C 1 . p • 5 9 • 
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Hegel concludes his definition of ethical life by emphasizing 
the logical necessity of this movement. "Hence the ethical 
order is freedom or the absolute will as what is objective, 
a circle of necessity whose moments are the ethical powers 
which regulate the life of (accidental] individuals. 1160 
Climacus, for some reason, does not directly address 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, only the methodology that informs 
it. But he is not only interested in attacking speculative 
philosophy's conception of history as necessary, implying 
existence is subordinated to the self-questioning moments of 
the development of absolute consciousness, he is, as S0ren 
Holm has suggested, also interested in addressing the common 
sense view of existence which believes "the past cannot be 
changed and the future is extremely uncertain. 1161 This common 
sense view, in other words, is willing to accept risk inasmuch 
as it sees no way out of it, a point that will prove important 
to Climacus. 
First, however, we want to understand Kierkegaard's 
60 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), #142-45, p. 105, emphasis 
added. Translation is from Peter J. Steinberger, Logic and 
Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right (New Haven: Yale 
University Press University Press, 1988), p.151. He comments: 
"Thus, the laws and institutions of Ethical Life are 
'absolutely valid' not because of consent, not because they 
owe their existence to the best of intentions, not because 
they are selected by virtuous persons, but rather because they 
have in some sense been philosophically demonstrated." 
61 S0ren Kierkegaards Historiefilosof i (K0benhavn: Nyt 
Nordisk Forlag, 1952), p. 31. 
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questioning of the possibility of freedom in the concrete 
existence of the single self in Hegel's system. The first 
point of disagreement with Hegel comes when he, according to 
clirnacus, omits an explanation of how becoming. that is, 
coming into existence, 62 can possibly be incorporated under 
the category of necessity. After all, Hegel himself insists 
that becoming is only a factor when being and nothing are 
distinguished which implies a movement into time. It is at 
this point, of course, that the quality of determinateness is 
added to being and nothing in the very synthesis of 
, 63 becoming. For Clirnacus, the problem concerns the kind of 
change that takes place in becoming or corning into existence 
(Tilblivelse). 64 He understands all of history in its broadest 
sense to be a transition from possibility to actuality, and 
the condition for this actualization is kinesis. As S0ren Holm 
62 According to Hegel's Science of Logic, tr. A.V. Miller 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 
1969), pp. 82-3, becoming is a synthesis of being and 
nothingness. "Pure being and pure nothing are ... the same. 
What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being 
-- does not pass over but has passed over -- into nothing and 
nothing into being. . Their truth is, therefore, this 
movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: 
becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished but by 
a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself." 
63 Ibid, p. 92. 
64 
"In spite of all Hegel's talk about process, he does 
not understand world history in terms of becoming, but with 
the help of the illusion attaching to pastness, understands 
it in terms of finality where all becoming is excluded," SV 
1O,14n; CUP, 272n. See David Humbert, "Kierkegaard's use of 
Plato in his Analysis of The Moment in Time," Dionysius, VII 
(Dec. 1983) , p. 161. 
67 
explains, 
it is the actualization of the possible in its 
capacity of possibility which constitutes movement. 
A thing only begins movement and change when its 
actualization is this movement. In this 
actualization, however, there is no logical self-
development embedded, and Kierkegaard can therefore 
say in The Concept of Anxiety: "It is therefore not 
to be understood logically, but in the direction of 
historical freedom when Aristotle says all 
transiti~n from possibility to actuality is 
kinesis. 5 Hereby Kierkegaard strongly 
emphasizes that change, coming into existence, and 
becoming (Verden) are concepts which belong 
exclusively within the realm of being (V~ren) .. 
. and this factual or empirical being is in t~e 
domain of human life called existence (Existents) . 6 
climacus warns that these categories must not be confused with 
timeless or eternal being. With all other changes it is 
presupposed that that which changes exists even though change 
implies the suspension of its existence. But not so with the 
change implied in becoming, for inasmuch as what becomes does 
not remain the same or unchanged, then what has become is not 
this becoming but another. Climacus provides an enlightening 
example: 
If, in coming into existence [becoming), a plan is 
intrinsically changed, then it is not this plan that 
comes into existence; but if it comes into existence 
unchanged, what, then, is the change of coming into 
existence? This change, then, is not in essence 
[V~sen) but in being [V~ren) and is from not 
existing to existing . ( S) uch a being that 
nevertheless is a non-being is possibility, and a 
being that is being is indeed actual being or 
actuality, and the change of coming into existence 
65 Cf. Aristotle's Physics, tr. Richard Hope (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 201b. 
66 Op. Cit. pp. 34-5. 
68 
is the transition from possibility to actuality (SV 
6, 68; PF, 7 3-4) . 
climacus procedes to ask: "Can the necessary come into 
existence?" His answer is that becoming implies a chan~e, but 
the necessary cannot be changed inasmuch as it "always relates 
itself to itself, and relates itself to itself in the same 
way" (SV 6,68; PF, 74). Therefore the necessary is the one 
thing which cannot become, cannot come into existence 
precisely because the necessary is. To demonstrate this 
absolute difference, Climacus explains that the necessary does 
not endure the suffering that afflicts actuality when 
possibility is excluded not only as possibility as such but 
also the anticipation of possibility by becoming actuality. 
"[B]y actuality," Climacus insists, "possibility is 
annihilated (tilintetgjort)" (Ibid). Said differently, once 
we have history, the event cannot be changed, and thereby any 
other possible outcome has been ruled out; precisely by coming 
into existence, everything that becomes demonstrates that it 
is not necessary. Utilizing the Aristotelian definition of 
change Climacus concludes that "the change of coming into 
existence is the transition from possibility to actuality" 
( Ibid) . 
Hegel then goes on to say that necessity is the unity of 
possibility and actuality. 67 Climacus is adamant in his 
67 
"What is necessary cannot be otherwise; but what is 
simply possible can; for possibility is the in-itself that is 
only positedness and therefore essentially otherness. Formal 
possibility is this identity as transition into a sheer other; 
69 
response claiming that this is metaphysically contradictory. 
His point is that possibility and actuality are not different 
in essence (or nature) (V~sen) but in being (V~ren) (Ibid). 
Hegel does not appear to make this distinction. Nevertheless, 
from this difference in being, Climacus insists, no unity can 
be formed and certainly not a necessary unity, since necessity 
is not a category of being, but of essence, and "the essence 
of necessity is to be" (SV 6,69; PF, 74). Otherwise 
possibility and actuality, by becoming necessity, would become 
an entirely different essence. However, this would not 
constitute a change in being. Moreover, by becoming necessity, 
possibility and actuality "would become the one and only thing 
that precludes coming into existence which is just as 
impossible as it is self-contradictory" (Ibid) . 68 
Necessity stands all by itself; nothing whatever 
comes into existence by way of necessity, no more 
than necessity comes into existence or anything 
coming into existence becomes the necessary. Nothing 
whatever exists (er til) because it is necessary or 
because the necessary is. The actual is no more 
necessary than the possible for the necessary is 
absolutely different from both {SV 6,69; PF, 74-
but real possibility, because it contains the other moment, 
actuality, is already itself necessity. Therefore what is 
really possible can no longer be otherwise; under the 
particular conditions and circumstances something else cannot 
follow. Real possibility and necessity are therefore only 
seemingly different; this is an identity which does not have 
to become but is already presupposed and lies at their base. 
Real necessity is therefore a relation pregnant with content; 
for the content is that implicit identity that is indifferent 
to the differences of form." The Science of Logic, p. 549. 
68 See also SV 15,92-98; SUD, 35-42. 
70 
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The intriguing nuances of the abstract and the concrete 
that preoccupies Hegel's Logic through 844 pages do not 
concern Climacus whose only focus is the meaningfulness of all 
this to concrete existential experience. As should be 
sufficiently clear from the above is that Climacus' argument 
constitutes a direct refutation of Hegel's deterministic 
conception of time, a refutation of his historicism. Climacus' 
conclusion to the whole thought process, his imperative 
assumptions grounded in Christian teaching, is that "(al 11 
coming into existence occurs in freedom, not by way of 
necessity" (SV 6,69; PF, 75, emphasis added). 
On an abstract level, Kierkegaard (Climacus) is in full 
agreement with Hegel and indeed admires his theoretical 
69 Kierkegaard appears frustrated at what he considers a 
careless relating of these categories by Hegel: "Perhaps an 
investigation into the concepts of possibility, actuality, and 
necessity is something our time needs the most in order to 
clarify the relationship between the logical and the 
ontological. To be desired, however, would be for the one who 
wished to furnish something in this regard was influenced by 
the Greeks." PAP VI B 54:21. 
71 
't 70 dexteri y. Putting the two theories into perspective, 
however, one is not a refutation of the (logical) validity of 
the other. It is more like two ships passing in a foggy ~ight: 
there is no recognition. That is to say, Kierkegaard rejects 
Hegel's project because it operates in the realm of the idea 
and immanentizes the absolute end what for Climacus 
constitutes the necessary -- and thereby it is finitized. 71 
But this is metaphysically impossible. 
Hegel's scientific approach seeks the security of 
results, but to Kierkegaard nothing is secure, nothing is 
certain about concrete human existence. Life is a striving 
that must acknowledge its own incompleteness precisely because 
of the paradox of existence: that we can think the ideal but 
never concretely experience it. An existence confronted with 
such a paradox must necessarily be a tension-filled existence 
that accepts the contingency of its becoming and recognizes 
70 The fact that history is the conception of the Idea 
has certainly given Hegel "the occasion to display a rare 
scholarship, a rare sway in shaping the material in which 
through him there is turmoil enough. But he has also prompted 
the learner's mind to become distracted, with the result that 
he ... forgot to examine whether there has now appeared at 
the conclusion, at the end of that enchanted journey, that 
which was continually promised at the beginning, that which 
was, after all, the primary issue, that which all the world's 
glory could not replace, the only thing that could make up for 
the untimely tension in which one was kept -- the correctness 
of the method." 
71 As Climacus with irony intimates in the Postscript, 
and as some interpreter with equal irony has commented, God 
may be a Hegelian, but that is better than the other way 
around. Cf. SV 9,117; CUP, 126. 
72 
the futility of speculating about what is to be yet continues 
to hope for a more perfected outcome in the future. 
Life's task (is] to become subjective, and to the 
same degree the uncertainty becomes more and more 
dialectically penetrating in regard to my 
personality; it therefore becomes more and more 
important to me to think it in every moment of my 
life. Since its uncertainty is in every moment, this 
uncertainty can be overcome only by mf overcoming 
it every moment (SV 9,139; CUP, 149) . 7 
For Kierkegaard, historical events have come about by chance, 
or as he says in the Postscript, "maximally the objectivity 
that has come into existence, subjectively speaking, is either 
a hypothesis or an approximation because all eternal decision 
lies precisely in subjectivity" (SV 9,161; CUP, 173). By 
approximation is meant that "the past is not necessary 
inasmuch as it came into existence; it did not become 
necessary by coming into existence (a contradiction), and it 
becomes even less necessary through anyone's apprehension of 
it. If what is apprehended is changed in the 
apprehension," Climacus warns rather tersely, "then the 
apprehension is changed into a misunderstanding" (SV 73; PF, 
79-80) . 73 In other words, there can be no cognitive certainty 
72 In The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus undertakes 
a discussion of despair "defined by possibility/necessity," 
analyzing the impact on the self by the lack of either. Both 
possibility and necessity (as both Climacus and Anti-Climacus 
understand the latter) are "equally essential to becoming (and 
the self must, after all, become itself in freedom)" SV 15,92; 
SUD, 35. 
73 Climacus, in addition to making an historical 
argument, also appears to be making a hermeneutical statement. 
For more on Kierkegaard's conception of history as an 
approximation see Evans, Op. Cit. pp. 118 and 124: "Insofar 
73 
about historical events. 
As will become clear, the truth of an historical event 
will necessarily implicate an existential decision. But before 
continuing this line of argument, its present stage suggests 
a Kierkegaardian concern that is of much importance to the 
present project. 
I:7 
Climacus' perception of history as accidental -- "the 
unchangeableness [and hence the necessity] of the past is that 
its actual 'thus and so' cannot become different, but from 
this it does not follow that its possible 'how' could not have 
been different" (SV 6,71; PF, 77) is intriguingly 
comparable to Rousseau's conception of history. 74 However, 
where Rousseau appears to come to such a conclusion in order 
to allow for the positing of an alternative which he presents 
in the Social Contract, Kierkegaard's aim is to safeguard the 
as objective truth concerns existence, only approximations can 
be realized, not the truth itself. Insofar as final truth is 
achievable, it is achieved by abstracting from existence. In 
neither case does the truth exist, in Climacus' special sense, 
though truth may be nonetheless eternally real and, for God, 
actual." Also Crites, Op. Cit. p. 22n; Stephen N. Dunning, 
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis 
of the Theory of Stages (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), p. 182; and Mark c. Taylor, Kierkegaard's 
Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and Self (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 41. 
74 
"Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
among Men," The First and Second Discourses, tr. Roger D. and 
Judith R. Masters (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 97 
and in passim. 
74 
category of freedom which he considers essential and therefore 
a primary ethical category which he derives from Christian 
teaching, but which, as it were, is also a primary category 
of modern thought as a whole, whether we are considering 
Hegelian, liberal, or Marxist political theory. 
The problem with Hegel's approach is that the experience 
of absolute mind at its various stages of development and 
concretion is an absolute method that has enchanted 
scholarship to the point where it has forgotten to examine the 
method itself. 
The concretion, as Climacus says, was distracted away 
from inquiry, meaning it became so enthralled with its own 
theory that it forgot about its practical application. Indeed, 
Climacus chastises Hegel for utilizing world-historical 
examples to prove his point, when the Idea shows itself 
equally well in the life of a single self. 75 
Paraphrasing Johannes Sl0k, Die Anthropologie 
Kierkegaards76 the Danish editors of S0ren Kierkegaard Samlede 
V~rker explain that from Climacus' perspective the concrete 
is "not an expression for identity with reality, but an 
expression for the one who has shown himself to be able to 
take charge of himself, while the one who is not capable of 
doing this, but lives in the immediate, lives in the abstract" 
75 PAP VB 14 (JP 50, 3301). Also SV 9,118; CUP, 126. 
76 K0benhavn: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1954). 
75 
(SV 6,337). Thus the change that occurs in becoming is the 
presence of actuality from possibility, a transition that 
happens by virtue of choice and hence within the category of 
freedom. Nothing comes into existence by way of logical 
causality (ratio), but everything by way of a freely acting 
cause (SV 6,70; PF, 76). That is to say, everything that has 
come into existence belongs to the historical category. This 
is also true of nature, according to Climacus, albeit only to 
a certain degree. 77 
The problem for Climacus is that nature is too abstract 
to be dialectical with respect to time. Therefore, as S¢ren 
Holm points out, it is said in The Concept of Anxiety that 
nature's "security (Tryghed) is caused by the fact that time 
has no meaning for it. 1178 Although a plant does come into 
existence and hence partakes of time, its future is 
predestined unlike that of human beings who have alternative 
choices and hence represent the only phenomena that are truly 
dialectical (SV 6,70; PF, 76). Freedom for Climacus, however, 
should not be understood as liberum arbitrium. Rather, human 
beings are free to choose the good, and hence for Climacus it 
is a relative freedom. In turn every relatively freely acting 
cause points to an absolutely freely acting cause (Ibid). For 
77 Climacus is perfectly aware of Hegel's conception of 
the unfolding of the idea in history is temporal while its 
unfolding in nature is spatial. Indeed, in the case of nature 
he seems generally to agree with Hegel. 
78 , Op. Cit. p. 38. 
76 
climacus this absolutely freely acting cause represents 
necessity, that which eternally is, which undergoes no change, 
which does not become in history. 
Looking remarkably like Aristotle's first unmoved mover, 
the absolutely freely acting cause constitutes "(n]ecessity 
[which] stands all by itself" (SV 6,69; PF, 74) . 79 But if all 
relatively freely acting causes point to necessity, does this 
not negate the implicit human freedom? 
Kierkegaard anticipates the question: 
In a journal note 
The whole question about God's omnipotence [Almagt] 
and the relationship of evil to goodness can perhaps 
(instead of making the distinction that God effects 
the good and simply allows evil) be solved quite 
simply in the following way. The ultimate that can 
altogether be done for a being, higher than what one 
can make it into is to make it free. However, in 
order to be able to do that, there needs to be 
omnipotence. This seems strange inasmuch as 
omnipotence would seem to incur dependency. But if 
one wants to think [through the quality of] 
omnipotence, it becomes clear that precisely therein 
there must in addition be that qualification of 
being able in such a way to take oneself back again 
in the expression of omnipotence. It is precisely 
for that reason one human being cannot make another 
free, because the one who has the power himself is 
imprisoned in having it and therefore constantly 
acquires a relationship to the one he wants to set 
free. To this it must be added that in all finite 
power (talent, etc.), there is a finite self-love. 
Only omnipotence can take itself back while it 
gives, and this relationship is precisely the 
receiver's independence. God's omnipotence is 
therefore his goodness. For goodness is to give 
wholly, but in such a way that one by omnipotently 
taking oneself back again makes the receiver 
79 Cf. Metaphysics 1072b10. 
77 
independent. 80 
However, the question of existential freedom is not even 
relevant when the systematic becomes philosophy's approach. 
Thus Kierkegaard in another journal note compares the 
aesthetic to the ethical. Those engaged in the former can live 
a whole life being admired, and it is merely accidental 
whether such a person is persecuted or mocked. 
Each such a person is related as difference to the 
generally human, and his productions do not 
essentially touch on Existents since it takes place 
in the medium of the imagination. But an ethicist 
must essentially be persecuted or he is a 
mediocre ethicist. An ethicist is related to the 
generally human (consequently to every human being, 
and equally. not as difference)~ and he is related 
to human Existents as a demand.~ 1 
We have engaged in this digression in order to underscore 
Kierkegaard's distancing his conception of history from 
historicism. Rather he joins Lessing in his conclusion that 
"accidental truths of history can never become the proof of 
necessary truths of reason," nor can they compel faith or 
provide demonstrations that have the power of obligation. Only 
so PAP VII 1 A 181. Reminiscences of Hegel's master-slave 
theme is quite evident in this quotation, but it is obviously 
used rather differently. As will become clear in chapters IV 
and V, there is also a strong implication that human beings 
cannot make other human beings free something that 
according to Kierkegaard modernity has misunderstood. Here we 
should note that freedom, in any case, means something 
entirely different for Kierkegaard than the concept we find 
in, for example, natural rights theory. Indeed, these are the 
misunderstandings that Kierkegaard set out to "correct." 
81 PAP VIII 1 A 160, emphasis added. 
78 
the teachings themselves, that is, faith can do that. 82 
climacus adds, that from this perspective the historian is a 
"backwards prophet" inasmuch as the certainty of the past is 
grounded in uncertainty (SV 6,73; PF, 80). Hence it is not 
surprising or accidental that Climacus emphasizes striving as 
the necessary ingredient for arriving at truth, a concept he 
has inherited precisely from Lessing (SV 9,92; CUP, 98-9). 
Climacus' epistemology thus resembles Lessing's to a 
large degree, and like him he also differentiates between 
experience and historical evidence. Immediate sensation cannot 
deceive insofar as the question of truth does not exist for 
it. There is a suspension of judgment as with the Greek 
skeptics who in this way avoided being deceived. The 
proverbial stick in the water that looks broken but is 
straight when taken out -- both sensations are (correct) until 
consciousness makes a judgment about the truth or untruth of 
this sense perception. Thus Climacus insists that the factual 
cannot be known through pure reasoning but only by the act of 
judgment following upon critical analysis. "Abstract reasoning 
knows the necessary, but the historical is what has come into 
existence and is therefore not necessary but contingent and 
uncertain. 1183 
82 Lessing's Theological Writings, ed. and tr. Henry 
Chadwich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 53-
5. 
83 Eugene Webb, Philosophers of Consciousness {Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1988), p. 237. 
79 
We should note here, as Kresten Nordentoft suggests, that 
climacus is not setting the stage for a "naively empirical 
epistemology." Rather the opposite is true. "The problem of 
correctness and the problem of actuality do not belong to 
sensed phenomena or to sensation, but to the single self who 
wishes to interpret what has been sensed. 1184 
I:8 
Interpretation may take many forms and clearly involves 
risk. Climacus makes an historical argument suggesting that 
what for the Greek skeptics constituted knowledge, in 
modernity is clearly considered belief, indeed an act of 
freedom or expression of will ( sv 6, 76; PF, 83) . He then 
connects belief and history drawing a definitive conclusion: 
Now insofar as that which by belief becomes the 
historical and as the historical becomes the object 
of belief (the one corresponds to the other), does 
exist immediately and is apprehended immediately, 
it does not deceive. The contemporary, then, does 
use his eyes, etc., but he must pay attention to the 
conclusion, [and] ... the conclusion of belief is 
no conclusion (Slutning) but a resolution 
(Beslutning), and thus doubt is excluded (SV 6,76; 
PF, 8 3-4) . 
A careful reading of the text reveals that Climacus has made 
a subtle move from conclusions of belief in the ordinary sense 
to belief of an historical event in the extraordinary or 
eminent sense, which was his aim to begin with. In either 
84 Kierkegaard's Psychology, tr. Bruce H. Kirmmse 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 333. 
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case, it is important to understand that the (historical) 
conclusion is not cognitive, but rests with an existential, 
decisive act of will. Therefore we get an emphasis on 
striving. 
But there is another reason for this open ended 
understanding of history. Climacus realizes that if history 
is perceived deterministically and hence as necessary, there 
can be no room for wonder. 
Hegel, following Descartes, claimed that "thought must 
necessarily commence from itself. 1185 This means all previous 
philosophy must be set aside, as we have seen. Descartes 
doubted it away, and de omnibus dubitandum est represented for 
him an absolute beginning. Hegel appears to be more creative 
as he sets all previous philosophy aside only in order to use 
it as elements of his foundational system. 
For Climacus, however, philosophy must begin with wonder, 
just as it did with the Greeks; it must have an experiential 
ground. Thus he argues in Johannes Climacus that to dispense 
with this experiential dimension may prove satisfactory, even 
fruitful in the case of mathematical theses. These do not 
require talent and their truths are inherently authoritative; 
they merely need to be correctly enunciated. Or as Kierkegaard 
puts it in a journal notation, II there can be ho 
85 Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. vol. 3, 
tr. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York: The 
Humanities Press, 1955), p. 224. 
81 
conviction with respect to the mathematical; 11 for such a 
proposition there is proof which rules out all other claims 
against it. 86 But, Climacus complains, such propositions are 
not apt to generate character (PAP IV B 1 p.152; JC, 152). 87 
That is to say, the personality of the discoverer of these 
truths becomes a matter of indifference after the discovery 
(Ibid) . 
Climacus compares such theses with ethical and religious 
theses which, in contrast, have existential significance: they 
do not leave the knower untouched. Here we might think of such 
principles as freedom and equality which are primary ethical 
qualities in Kierkegaard's philosophy. Climacus' point is that 
these latter theses require authority behind them in the form 
of character or personality if they are to be accredited as 
true, "just as in civil life anyone may formally be a 
guarantor, and yet it makes an absolute difference who the 
guarantor is" (Ibid). Such theses cannot claim mathematical 
or philosophical necessity. They must have subjective 
beginning, meaning those who are to enunciate them must 
discover them, they must have talent, and they must have 
authority; they require a person to be passionately interested 
in existential participation, they require conviction (PAP IV 
86 PAP VII 1 A 215 (JP 2296). 
87 This text appears in the Danish only in S0ren 
Kierkegaards Papirer. Only in this case will journal notes 
appear within the text in parenthesis together with the 
English language citation. 
82 
B 1 p.135; JC, 153) . 88 Against such propositions other 
"proofs'' (Modbevis) can be posited, as the person of 
conviction is well aware of. "He knows very well what doubt 
may have to say: contra. 1189 
Moreover, Climacus continues, such knowledge necessitates 
a beginning in wonder (Forundring - Beundring) 90 echoing both 
Plato and Aristotle (PAP IV B 1 p.127; JC, 145). The problem 
as he sees it with not beginning the philosophical enterprise 
with wonder, but instead with doubt or with setting all 
previous philosophy aside, would necessarily mean to cut 
oneself off from classical Greek philosophy, and indeed from 
the metaphysical tradition, and hence to cut oneself off from 
the beginning. "Doubt is precisely a polemic against what went 
before" (Ibid). That is to say, other forms of beginning are 
discontinuous, and in Climacus' opinion they are therefore 
unsound. 
88 Evans, Op. Cit. p. 132, has already noted that in this 
regard Climacus's claims in the Postscript about the "role of 
subjectivity in objective knowledge bear a striking 
resemblance to the philosophy of science" developed by Michael 
Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn. However, Evans does not note 
Climacus' differentiation between mathematical knowledge and 
ethical and religious knowledge. In view of this 
differentiation the comparison may not be entirely correct, 
at least not with regard to Polanyi who believes scientific 
knowledge also depends on existential commitment. See note 27 
this chapter. 
89 PAP VII 1 A 215 (JP 2296). 
9° Kierkegaard throughout his authorship uses the two 
meanings of "wonder" intermittently. It should be noted that 
Beundring also means admiration. 
83 
with the pronouncement that all other beginnings, such 
as oescartes' beginning with doubt, is discontinuous, Climacus 
seems to say that if we are to make existence meaningful to 
humanity, we must understand human experience of reality in 
all its manifestations as well as their respective symbolic 
expressions, and that would necessarily include the classical 
Greek philosophical tradition. Hegel, in contrast, held that 
philosophy had to raise itself above the experience of wonder 
in order to allow for thought to begin from itself. 91 For 
Climacus his philosophy must therefore also be characterized 
as discontinuous. 
Finally, in a rather heavy handed critique of analytical 
thinking, Climacus charges that doubt excludes the thinker 
from the philosophical endeavor as such. 
I:9 
[W)hether it was assumed that philosophy actually 
continued to endure even if the single individual 
by means of his beginning excluded himself from it, 
or whether it was assumed that this beginning 
annihilated philosophy, [either way) one was thereby 
prevented from entering into it (PAP IV B 1 p.138; 
JC, 156). 
Turning to wonder's connection to Climacus' conception 
of history, it becomes quite clear that wonder and necessity 
are contradictory. To wonder about what is necessary is 
91 Hegel's Logic (Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences), tr. William Wallace {Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1975), #12. Hereafter known as Ency. 
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absurd. But by positing the historical as accidental, "there 
the uncertainty (which is the uncertainty of coming into 
existence) of the most certain coming into existence can 
express itself only in this passion worthy of and necessary 
to the philosopher" (SV 6, 73; PF, 80) . 92 That is to say, the 
historian can once again "stand by the past stirred by the 
passion that is the passionate sense for becoming, that is 
wonder (admiration) (Beundring). If the philosopher wonders 
over nothing ... then he has eo ipso nothing to do with the 
historical" (Ibid). Thus wonder is important to Climacus 
precisely because it guarantees continuity (PAP IV B 1 p.127; 
JC, 145) . 93 Discontinuity, in contrast, threatens to lock out 
of philosophical thinking the one historical event to which 
Kierkegaard is committed, and therefore he is compelled to 
mount his attack on what in his opinion has lessened the 
philosophical endeavor, lessened the task of thinking: the 
experience of absolute truth as he understands it. 94 
92 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 143, has captured the 
gist of Climacus' meaning: "Wonder is a pathos, something to 
be suffered, not acted .... In other words, what sets men 
wondering is something familiar and yet normally invisible, 
and something men are forced to admire. The wonder that is the 
starting point of thinking is neither puzzlement nor surprise 
nor perplexity; it is an admiring wonder." 
93 See also PAP VII 1 A 34: "That which stirs one to 
begin is wonder (Forundring), that with which one begins is 
a resolution (Beslutning). 
94 The details of this experience will be delt with in 
the last part of chapter two. 
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still, Climacus is intrigued by the notion of doubt 
precisely because he believes it represents more than an 
epistemological problem of discontinuity. The whole question 
of doubt as such bothers him, and he proceeds to describe its 
properties phenomenologically. 95 
Climacus begins the analysis by asking what it means to 
doubt from the perspective of its "ideal possibility in 
consciousness," realizing that an empirical investigation 
would lead nowhere (JC, 166). He orients himself by imagining 
a consciousness without doubt. Such a consciousness would be 
immediate or spontaneous, as in a child. Immediacy in this 
sense has the nature of indetermination, it is reality itself 
in a spatial-temporal sense. A child does not have to make 
major decisions but can remain (spontaneously) open to all 
possibilities. For such a consciousness everything is true or 
everything is untrue, meaning there really is no 
consciousness. The question of truth is suspended and only 
emerges when consciousness is "brought into relation with 
something else." That something else, mediacy, according to 
Climacus, is language, the expression of which constitutes 
ideality. Ideality, in turn, suspends (h~ver) immediacy or 
95 According to Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 275 and 
note, Kierkegaard explored the true dimensions of doubt more 
honestly, adding that it is "perhaps still the deepest 
interpretation of Cartesian doubt." Karl Lowith referred to 
Climacus' analysis as a radicalization of Cartesian doubt.~ 
Cit., p. 126. 
86 
reality (PAP IV B 1 p.146; JC, 168). This opposition of 
reality and ideality within consciousness defines 
consciousness as a contradiction, for the moment "I make a 
statement about reality, the contradiction is present, for 
what I say is ideali ty" ( Ibid) . In other words, language 
posits the contradiction, a contradiction that requires a 
resolution. The implication is the possibility of doubt in 
consciousness whose nature is contradiction -- or better, 
dialectical. Climacus' point is that in reality or immediacy 
as such, there is no doubt. Nor is doubt present in ideality. 
It is consciousness that brings them into relationship with 
each other, meaning consciousness indicates a state of 
conflict, a conflict that must be resolved in some way and can 
be resolved by doubt, although not exclusively. For Climacus 
there are other possibilities. Thus he insists the opposite 
of doubt is faith, and faith itself implies wonder (SV 6,61; 
PF, 65), and the autopsy of faith is to see (SV 6,92; PF, 
102). 96 
On the one hand, Climacus has been talking about 
reflection, the categories of which are always dichotomous. 
Reflection as such is the possibility of the relationship, but 
essentially it is disinterested or "without interest 
(interessel0s). Consciousness, on the other hand, is spirit, 
96 As Eugene Webb, Op. Cit., p. 237, has interpreted the 
Fragments, "wonder is the tension in subjectivity that moves 
one to reach from uncertainty (doubt] toward factual 
knowledge." Cf. SV 6,73; PF 80. 
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the categories of which Climacus defines as trichotomous. 
These categories constitute the relationship. Consciousness 
thereby represents interest (as in the Latin interesse meaning 
"being between") PAP IV B 1 p.148; JC, 170). Consciousness is 
interested in the sense that it is situated between reality 
and ideality, between the is and the ought, and a decision is 
called for. 
Now we can begin to see where Climacus is heading with 
this phenomenological description of doubt, for it is 
reflection that deals with all disinterested knowledge such 
as mathematics, aesthetics, or metaphysics, and therefore only 
presupposes doubt. Doubt, consequently, cannot be overcome by 
objective thinking inasmuch as objective thinking is always 
already qualified by it. The point is, doubt expresses 
something deeper, expresses interest (Ibid). That is to say, 
neither Hegelian speculative philosophy nor the scientific 
methodology can overcome doubt inasmuch as all systematic 
knowledge is reflection, and reflection is disinterested. 
Therefore doubt presupposes consciousness, and consciousness 
is interest. What we have learned is that Climacus has come 
to understand what it means to doubt; it means to express an 
interest (PAP IV B 1 p. 149; JC, 170). 
It would seem Climacus has caught Hegel in a self-
contradiction inasmuch as a logical system supposedly is 
neutral, unbiased, and hence unable to express something as 
mundane as interest. Climacus chastises Hegel for not entirely 
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understanding the concept of doubt when he claimed it could 
be overcome systematically (Ibid). Climacus would seem to have 
shown that either speculative philosophy is not entirely 
objective, or that it has essentially failed in its aim. We 
can now understand why it is that Kierkegaard can make so much 
fun of Hegel's claim to a presuppositionless philosophy. 97 
Climacus (Kierkegaard) regrets learning about Descartes 
through Hegel and wishes he had begun with the former. Whether 
that would have changed anything is questionable. What is no 
longer questionable, according to Climacus, and a young 
Climacus at that, is that to begin philosophy with doubt is 
to express a conscious interest. 98 Then we might argue that 
Descartes in "Discourse on Method" did not clear his mind of 
the "deceiving senses" nor of the "thoughts and conceptions" 
that were "no more true than the illusions of [his] dreams 1199 
97 See especially the wonderful little anecdote 
Kierkegaard concocted in which he has Socrates and Hegel 
engaged in a dialogue in the underworld, PAP VI A 145. 
98 This is also suggested by Feyerabend, Op. Cit. p. 36, 
when he writes, "There is no one 'scientific method,' but 
there is a great deal of opportunism; anything goes 
anything, that is, that is liable to advance knowledge as 
understood by a particular researcher or research tradition . 
. . . What is exclusive is not science itself but an ideology 
that isolates some of its parts and hardens them by prejudice 
and ignorance." Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and 
Gnosticism {Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), p. 42, understands 
Hegel's, and by extension Descartes', systematic approaches 
a little differently suggesting the leap into "the perfection 
of actual knowledge" is not to advance philosophy, but to 
abandon it in favor of becoming a gnostic. 
99 Op. Cit. p. 101. 
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as well as he believed he had when he sat down to write a 'new 
first philosophy.' The point is, as Kierkegaard added in a 
journal note, "doubt is produced either by bringing reality 
into relation with ideality [which] is the act of cognition 
... or by bringing ideality into relation with reality [and] 
this is the ethical: that in which I am interested is 
myself. " 100 
It now appears clear that when doubt and scientific 
methodology became embodied in philosophical inquiry human 
beings were left to themselves in a world whose significance 
had become increasingly reduced and man's place in it even 
more so. History and any meaning it could produce, such as the 
eschatological attempts especially by Hegel and Marx, took on, 
major proportions for the purpose of relieving the consequent 
anxiety that burdened modern existence, what Heidegger has 
lOO PAP IV B 13:18 (JP 891). Also PF, 256. 
90 
characterized as the "thrownness" of Dasein. 101 
From Kierkegaard's perspective, however, such fantastical 
ideas constitute nothing more than illusions. These illusions 
would ultimately deny human beings their true dialectical 
nature and thus would end up deceiving them. But has 
Kierkegaard not made matters worse by offering a conception 
of history grounded in freedom, a condition that would seem 
only to increase anxiety, not decrease it? After all, "the 
objective reality of contingent fact is that which can be only 
reasonably confirmed through attentive inquiry and critical 
judgment, 11102 requiring substantial effort upon the part of 
the concrete individual knower. 
Kierkegaard is not unaware of this predicament and stands 
ready, one might say all too ready, with the solution by which 
he will also address the common sense view of history 
101 Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), H 136, pp. 
175: "Factually, Dasein can, should, and must, through 
knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain 
possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of 
volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this 
into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of 
Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior 
to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of 
disclosure .... Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first 
essential characteristic of states-of-mind that they disclose 
Dasein in its thrownness." (Heidegger's debt to Kierkegaard 
appears self-evident when, in addition, we speculate . that 
Heidegger's choice of Dasein perhaps also to some degree was 
inspired by Kierkegaard's category of "the single self" (den 
Enkelte) when we separate the word, not in the way it is 
usually separated as Da-sein (there being), but as Das-ein. 
102 Webb, p. 238. 
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discussed above. One could argue that his conception of 
history is spuriously connected to his mission to revive a 
waning Christianity, although one has to proceed with some 
care here. Thus he claims there is an "organ . . which 
continually suspends ( oph~ver as the German aufheben) the 
incertitude that corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into 
existence," that is, the uncertainty of history, and this 
organ he calls "belief" (Tro) in the ordinary sense (SV 6,74; 
PF, 81). But that Climacus also has other than ordinary belief 
in mind seems obvious from the following quotation where he 
continues the characterization of belief. 
Precisely belief is of such a quality, for in the 
certainty of belief the uncertainty is continually 
present as the suspended, which in every way 
corresponds to that of coming into existence. Thus 
faith [Tro) believes what it does not see; it does 
not believe that the star exists, for this can be 
seen, but it believes that the star came into 
existence. The same holds true of an event. The 
'what' of a happening may be immediately known, but 
that it did happen, not at all, not even that it is 
happening, even if it happens, as it is said, right 
before our noses (SV 6,74; PF, 81-2). 
His point is that "second hand" followers of "the 
teacher" are no worse off than the "contemporary followers" 
were. The Incarnation is equally an object of faith, not of 
cognition. Thus Climacus reminds the reader that belief is not 
an act of cognition, but an act of freedom, an expression of 
will, requiring commitment, resolution, and courage to 
passionately engage in the act of judgment, engage in 
Existents. Such belief can suspend all doubt, not by way of 
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cognition, but by way of the will, and indeed constitutes the 
very opposite of doubt. That is to say, they are opposite 
passions, not cognitions. 
Belief and doubt are not two forms of knowledge 
which let themselves be qualified in continuity with 
each other, for neither of them is an act of 
knowing; they are opposite passions. Belief is a 
sense for corning into existence and doubt is a 
protest against every conclusion that wants to 
transcend immediate sensation and immediate 
knowledge (SV 6,77; PF, 84). 
For Kierkegaard subjective commitment plays a significant 
role in theoretical inquiry, but it plays an "absolutely 
decisive role in action, 11103 action expressed as love of the 
other, and hence expressed in the single self's comportment 
toward the world. What has become clear is that the problem 
of the mechanical approach of scientific methodology is not 
an unsolvable problem; therefore Kierkegaard pushes on in 
order not only to attempt to restore Christianity and 
transcendence to its "rightful" place in human existence, but 
also to prepare every human individual self for his or her 
possibilities which, indeed, if actualized, can mean genuine 
human fulfillrnent. 104 
103 Evans, Op. Cit. p. 133. 
104 Karl Lowith, Op. Cit., p. 104, has captured most 
poignantly the major points of Kierkegaard's critique of 
rnoderni ty as laid out in this chapter: "Kierkegaard is 
exclusively concerned with man's inner life. He resumes 
Augustine's quest for the soul and its relation to God as the 
only two things worth knowing. He thereby implicitly dismisses 
the classical concern with the logos of the cosmos as a pagan 
curiosity. A sentence like that of Anaxagoras, that the end 
for which man is born is the contemplation of the sun, the 
moon, and the sky, is utterly strange to Kierkegaard and his 
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Before the inquiry can progress to a discussion about 
Kierkegaard's so called "corrective," it is helpful to come 
to an understanding of the symptomatic effects as they 
manifested themselves upon theoretical and practical thinking. 
According to Kierkegaard these symptomatic effects were caused 
by the scientific methodology adopted by philosophical inquiry 
and by the consequent objective tendency, as laid out in this 
chapter. As Climacus laments in the Postscript, "[t]he way of 
objective reflection makes the subject accidental and thereby 
transforms existence into something indifferent, something 
followers. It is equally strange to those of us who, 
unencumbered by a god or a soul, but clothed in psychology and 
psychoanalysis, are living on the capital of the Christian 
concern for man's soul. Confronted with the task of 
recapturing a Christian existence according to the law of the 
Gospel, Kierkegaard felt that he had to ignore the laws of 
the cosmos and the modern discoveries of the telescope. If 
Christ appeared today, he said, the Christian task of 
appropriating His message would still be the same as it was 
for the first generation of Christians. But the natural 
scientist, and all those who believe in the truth of science 
rather than of the Gospel, would demand an examination of 
Christ's brain under a microscope to determine whether He is 
the Son of God or a schizophrenic. Unfortunately for the 
sciences, all the modern discoveries by telescope and 
microscope are irrelevant for an understanding of the human 
condition in its inwardness. A thoughtful person, according 
to Kierkegaard, who wants to understand what it means to exist 
as a self before God cannot be interested in natural science; 
for it does not make any difference for man's moral choices 
and religious decisions whether the moon is made of blue 
cheese or something else. What is the use of explaining the 
whole physical universe or world history if one does not 
understand oneself, one's own single self? As an existing 
self, man is singled out from the physical cosmos and world 
history and their deceptive greatness. To Kierkegaard the 
concern with six thousand years of world history, or with some 
billion years of cosmic history, is an escape from one's self 
into an illusory importance." 
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vanishing" (SV 9,161; CUP, 173). As such the objective 
tendency constitutes a negation of Existents proper. The 
scientific revolution originated in thought, Hans Jonas 
suggests, reflecting Kierkegaard's viewpoint wholly: it 
"changed man's ways of thinking, by thinking, before it 
materially changed, even affected, his ways of living. 11105 
105 , Op. C1.t. p. 47. 
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Chapter II 
A SYMPTOMATIC EFFECT: 
THE LOSS OF AUTHORITY IN THEORETICAL THINKING 
To assert the supremacy of thought is gnosticism. 1 
Christianity is not a doctrine, but expresses a 
contradiction of Existents and is a communication 
of Existents. 2 
The most debilitating symptomatic effect to follow from 
the separation of knowledge and experience Kierkegaard 
diagnosed as the loss of authority. The separation of 
knowledge and experience occurred when the scientific method 
was imposed upon philosophical inquiry. Thereby the realm of 
knowledge became circumscribed limiting the inquiry to 
questions which could be answered only by appeals to rational 
deduction or empirical induction. Neutrality was deemed a 
paramount methodological requirement obviating all appeals to 
existential experience, and thus the scientific method imposed 
a fixed opposition between subject and object. The realm of 
transcendent experience that had traditionally been the object 
of theoretical investigation, was now considered beyond what 
reason could explain or the scientist observe and measure. It 
1 SV 10,44; CUP, 305. 
2 SV 10,75-6; CUP, 339. 
was therefore entirely abandoned, meaning that what for 
Kierkegaard constituted the ultimate authority for all 
thinking had lost its absolute legitimacy. This loss, he 
claimed, had pathologically affected individual consciousness 
manifesting itself in the various realms of thought, whether 
philosophical, religious, political, or psychological. 
Although Kierkegaard was not to know perhaps the worst 
perversions of authority as they unfolded in the twentieth 
century with the totalitarian regimes of Nazism and Stalinism, 
the events that led up to and reached their explosive 
consequences in 1848 dramatically influenced the direction of 
this Danish author's writings. Thus he came to describe his 
own age as one lacking foundation and therefore lost in an 
unstoppable "vortex" (Hvirvel), "a prey to the illusion of 
wanting a fixed point ahead" when in actuality "the fixed 
point lies behind. 113 The fixed point ahead refers to the 
utopian theories fraught with eschatological overtones that 
at this time flourished throughout Europe. 
Kierkegaard became so preoccupied with analyzing and 
explaining the effects of this disease that it would not be 
inaccurate to characterize his authorship in the words of Eric 
Voegelin as a "quest for truth ... a movement of resistance 
to the prevalent disorder. 114 Kierkegaard thus described his 
3 Letters, #186, p. 262. 
4 In Search of Order, vol. 5 of Order and History (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), p. 25. 
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own time as "the age of dissolution" (SV 18,163; POV, 130), 
a dissolution that had manifested itself in the corruption of 
individual consciousness, and indeed a corruption that had 
proved to be unmanageably contagious (SV 12,77-8; WL, 85). 
Kierkegaard can say this inasmuch as he considers the category 
"the single self" (den Enkelte) to be a category of spirit and 
of spiritual awakening which stands in sharp opposition to 
what dominates the age, namely politics, meaning the worldly 
(SV 18,165; POV, 132) . 5 
This corruption, he argued, was most emphatically 
expressed in theoretical gnosticism (SV 10,44; CUP 305) and 
pragmatic "witchcraft" (Bedaarelse) (SV 10,56; CUP, 317), 
Climacus' label for the politics of ideology. The former, by 
which Climacus simply meant any assertion of the supremacy of 
thought over all other attributes of consciousness, came to 
dominate philosophical and theological inquiry. The latter, 
by which he especially meant the problem of mass movements 
with emphasis on the numerical, came to tyrannize political 
and psychological experience. In both cases, there was a loss 
of a fundamental ground of the human condition. 
Every revolt in passion -- against discipline, every 
5 It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard with his 
analysis of the problem of the age and later the positing of 
a therapeutic "corrective" conceives of this "corrective" as 
a movement "from the philosophical, the systematic, to the 
simple, that is, the existential," which has a political 
dimension, as we shall see. Kierkegaard parallels this 
movement to the one especially emphasized in Works of Love: 
"from the poet to religious existence" ( SV 18, 164n; POV, 
132n) . 
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revolt in the social life -- against obedience, 
every revolt in the political -- against secular 
rule, is connected with and is derived from this 
revolt of the human race against God ~ith respect 
to Christianity (SV 18,165; POV, 133). 
Kierkegaard's point is precisely that thought in general has 
been caught up in the spreading disease unable to wrestle 
itself free in order to obey the law's command for community 
and hence unable to actualize freedom and equality. Instead 
thought is entrapped in the web of numbers and mechanical 
devices to which the age pays homage. The conflict facing the 
dialectics of individual existence is thus manifold. In the 
present chapter the loss of authority in theoretical thinking 
will be dealt with, while the loss of authority in practical 
thinking will be discussed in chapter three. 
I:1:1 
On a philosophical level we shall confine the analysis 
to the problem that according to Climacus followed from "the 
objective tendency" of the age. This tendency, especially 
mastered by Hegelian philosophy, had intellectualized ethical 
6 It should be noted that Kierkegaard was an avid reader 
of Ludwig Feuerbach considering him helpful inasmuch as he 
performed what Kierkegaard considered an "indirect service to 
Christianity as an offended individuality. The illusion it 
takes in our age to become offended, since Christianity has 
been made as mild as possible, as meaningless as the scrawl 
a physician makes at the top of a prescription." PAP B 9. 
Offence, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is, in 
short, reason's unhappy reaction to reaching its limitation 
and its realization of another dimension of knowledge in which 
it cannot participate, SV 6,48-52; PF, 49-54. 
99 
conduct and subordinated Christian life to speculative 
philosophy which interpreted meaningfulness in terms of an 
abstract absolute that negated concrete individual experience 
(SV 9,110-13; CUP, 118-21). Climacus rejects this disposition 
of modern philosophy to speculate systematically and 
objectively on the truth of things, such as Christianity, 
projecting them as indisputable historical phenomena of 
equivalent veracity. 7 
According to Climacus such an approach to philosophical 
inquiry was attempted by Hegel whose systematic approach was 
intended to generate identity between thought and being, 
between subject and object. Hegel's speculative philosophy was 
aimed at overcoming the tension of bifurcated experience so 
provocatively delineated in Kantian philosophy. 8 It would do 
so as stated early in the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit by laying "aside the title 'love of knowing' and be 
7 
"People have become all too nimble in appropriating 
Christianity without more ado as a part of world-history; they 
have come to regard it as a matter of course that Christianity 
is a stage in the development of the human race" (TC, 216). 
As will become clear in chapter three, Kierkegaard can 
demonstrate that the irruption of Christianity into the 
ancient world represented a radical change in human experience 
(SV 12,133-44; WL, 136-47 and PF, especially ch. 1). See also 
Merold Westphal, History and Truth in Hegel's "Phenomenology." 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, Inc., 1978), p. 
207. 
8 
"Therein lies actually the whole foundational confusion 
of the modern age (which branches itself out in logic, 
metaphysics, dogmatics, and the whole way of life of the age) 
or the confusion lies foundationally in this: that the yawning 
abyss of quality has been removed from the difference between 
God and human being," PAP VIII 1 A 414. 
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g9tual knowing. 119 This move by Hegel incorporated and thereby 
discarded the existential dimension of knowing as discussed 
in the previous chapter, and hence it discarded what Climacus 
considered the necessary grounding for a meaningful truth. 
Thereby it restricted the "being of world and ego ... to the 
knowledge of the immediate or existent," prohibiting questions 
about "the context of the order of being in which this 
knowledge occurs. 111° From this, according to Climacus, there 
followed severe ontological and epistemological consequences. 
The systematic approach imposed logic on existence, by 
which Hegel only confirmed the loss of a meaningful 
existential experiential existence. 11 Climacus' overall 
rejection of Hegel's thought is a rejection of modern 
philosophy's capacity to fully capture the essence of 
particular concrete experience. Instead he wants to posit 
Existents as that which separates thought and being and all 
9 Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 3. 
10 Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, p. 
68. Echoing Kierkegaard, Voegelin has suggested that "while 
there is indeed a progress in clarity and precision of 
knowledge of the order of being, the leap over the bounds of 
the finite into the perfection of actual knowledge is 
impossible. If a thinker attempts it, he is not advancing 
philosophy, but abandoning it to become a gnostic." (Ibid, p. 
42). Cf. SV 10,44-6; CUP, 305-07. 
11 
"Existence constitutes the highest interest of the 
existing individual, and his interest in his existence 
constitutes his actuality. What actuality is, cannot be 
expressed in the language of abstraction. Actuality is an 
inter-esse between abstraction's hypothetical unity of thought 
and being" (SV 10,21; CUP, 279). 
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the other dichotomous pairs, not to imply that "Existents is 
thoughtless" (SV 9,105; CUP, 112) or ontologically empty, but 
to signify that it denotes more than knowledge. 12 
To begin, then, Kierkegaard posits "the leap" as "the 
most decisive protest against the inverse procedure of the 
method" (SV 9,90; CUP, 96, emph. added), referring to the 
circular nature of speculative philosophy. It is a radical 
opposition intended to clarify the contrary approaches to 
philosophical inquiry and thereby reveal the weaknesses of the 
one and the strengths of the other. Thus it is not accidental 
that Climacus just before engaging in a discussion of the 
problem of imposing logic onto existence contrasts Lessing's 
emphasis on striving for the truth with the systematist's 
claim to possess the truth by virtue of the system (SV 9,92; 
CUP, 98-9) . 
For this project their differences are of significant 
interest. 13 We shall look at a few fundamental differences 
12 
"The way of objective reflection makes the subject 
accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something 
indifferent, something vanishing. . But as Hamlet says, 
existence and non-existence have only subjective significance" 
(SV 9,161; CUP, 173). 
13 This chapter shall not attempt to give a comprehensive 
analysis of either approach, this has already been covered in 
a variety of analyses. See, for example, Stephen Crites, In 
the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs Kierkegaard on Faith and 
History (Chambersburgh, PA: American Academy of Religion, 
1972); C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and 
"Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983); Paul L. 
Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Logic" in Kierkegaardiana 2 (1957), 
pp. 25-42; Robert L. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel: The 
Dialectical Structure of Kierkegaard's Ethical Thought." Ph.D. 
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between them that will illustrate Kierkegaard's claim that 
there has been a loss of authority within philosophy. 
II:1:2 
The opposition between Hegelian and Kierkegaardian 
philosophy is not accidental, nor is it merely one thinker's 
negative reaction to another, and in this case towering, 
thinker's radical and influential philosophy. Their respective 
understanding of the basis of philosophy differs fundamentally 
as does their understanding of the object of philosophy. It 
should therefore not be a surprise that their methodological 
approaches would also differ. Perhaps it can even be argued 
that their respective methodologies were "causally" connected 
to how they perceived of the ground and purpose of philosophy. 
The first problem lies in how Hegel and Kierkegaard 
perceive of the beginning of philosophy and this beginning is 
for both of them closely connected with the object of 
philosophy. In the case of Hegel the object of philosophy is 
to unify rigid dichotomies, while for Kierkegaard it is to 
accept the paradox as given. Kierkegaard states their 
different approaches succinctly: 
dissertation (Indiana University, 1965); Dietrich Ritschl, 
"Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegels Logik," in Theologische 
Zeitschrift 11 (1955), pp. 437-465; Mark c. Taylor, Journeys 
to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980); Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's 
Relation to Hegel, tr. George L. Stengren. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980). 
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"The systematic idea is the subject-object, is the 
unity of thinking and being; Existents, on the 
contrary, is precisely their separation. From this 
it nowise follows that Existents is thoughtless, 
but it has distanced and distances subject from 
object, thought from being'' (SV 9,104; CUP, 112). · 
we shall begin with Hegel. 
Following Descartes, Hegel first rejects the Greek 
understanding of the beginning of philosophy as discussed in 
chapter one. What generates the situation that calls forth 
philosophy is for Hegel the problem of bifurcation 
(Entzweiung). For him philosophy is a response to the 
emergence of rigid dichotomies in a given culture such as that 
of body and soul, faith and reason, subjectivity and 
objectivity, freedom and necessity. Hence philosophy arises 
in response to rigid oppositions in order to restore unity, 
a unity that has been disrupted by these rigid dichotomies. 14 
Hegel stresses that philosophy does not simply dissolve the 
opposition into a new unity. "The sole interest of Reason is 
to suspend [aufheben] such rigid antitheses. But this does not 
mean that Reason is altogether opposed to opposition." 15 That 
is to say, it is to be a reunification in which opposition is 
not simply cancelled but is preserved precisely in being 
surpassed (aufheben). What philosophy opposes is the absolute 
14 The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System 
of Philosophy, tr. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 89-94. 
15 Ibid, pp. 90-1. 
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fixity the establishment gives to these dichotomies. 16 He 
wants to make these oppositions more fluid. 
In order for Hegelian speculative philosophy to come into 
play, even the deepest opposition must first have been 
established as with Greek philosophy. In other words, the 
point of departure for philosophy is experience, but, and this 
is what becomes problematic for Kierkegaard, it is a move away 
from experience, away from the world of senses to which 
experience is bound and "into its own unadulterated 
element. 1117 According to Hegel, philosophy "owes its 
development to the empirical sciences." However, by removing 
the immediacy of scientific materials "a development of 
thought out of itself" has at the same time been formed giving 
to the content of the empirical sciences "the freedom of 
thought" and hence an £ priori, meaning necessary character . 18 
What we have, then, is a "System of Philosophy," the 
implication of which is necessity. 19 
The movement of thought in the System of Philosophy 
follows the historical process as laid out in Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy. but it is freed of the historical 
externality. For Hegel, such a "genuine and self-supporting" 
16 Ibid, p. 91. 
17 Ency. #12. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See chapter I, p. ? and note. 
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thought is in itself concrete and therefore must be an Idea. 20 
His point is that the science of Idea is essentially system, 
because the true as concrete is only as unfolding into itself 
and as taking and holding together totality. Thought proper, 
then, the Idea, is only in the unfolding character of 
overreaching (tibergreifen). It is the unfolding of thought 
proper and hence a movement of thought that is intrinsically 
systematic and therefore necessary. 21 This means the 
standpoint that appears to be immediate must, within the 
science itself, be converted to a "result" in which science 
again reaches its beginning. What is clear is that fundamental 
to Hegel's systematic approach are the categories of movement 
and necessity. These categories enable Hegel to make "fixed 
thoughts fluid" thereby overcoming the "dead bones" of formal 
logic. 22 He calls this a metaphysical or ontological logic 
that necessarily seeks its fulfillment within its own self-
movement. Consequently the system of philosophy "exhibits the 
appearance of a circle which closes within itself and has no 
20 Ibid, #14. 
21 Ency. #13-15. 
22 Quoted in Robert Heiss, Hegel. Kierkegaard, Marx: 
Three Great Philosophers Whose Ideas Changed the Course of 
Civilization, tr. E.B. Garside (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 
Inc., 1975), pp. 56, 86. 
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beginning in the same way as the other sciences have." 23 
The points emphasized in this short survey of what the 
post-Hegelians have referred to as the dialectic, are the very 
points that become bothersome to Climacus. For him they can 
be reduced to necessity, a necessity that has its ground in 
the logical movement of the dialectic. 24 
Necessity must be discussed by itself. Only 
confusion has been caused by the later speculative 
thinking's importation of necessity into the 
interpretation of world history, whereby the 
categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity 
have become confused" {SV 10,45; CUP, 306-07). 
For Climacus a logical movement can explain nothing about the 
concrete existence of the single self, indeed it appears to 
want to remove itself from it. Therefore it cannot do what in 
Climacus' opinion is the task of philosophy. That is to say, 
a logical movement, which to Climacus is a contradiction in 
terms, cannot explain the meaningfulness of human existence 
as such, a meaningfulness that acquires its qualitative 
distinction in the category of freedom. 25 
23 Ency. #17. As will be discussed presently, it is not 
really a circle, but a spiral, a fact that was not appreciated 
by Climacus. 
24 Phenomenology of Spirit, especially pp. 2-3, 17, 51. 
25 It may be tempting to suggest that Climacus has not 
grasped that Hegel in his logic is discussing "necessity" by 
itself. But as was made clear in chapter one, what Climacus 
means by necessity differs radically from Hegel's 
understanding of this category. 
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11:1:3 
For Hegel the object of philosophy is the same as that 
of religion which is the truth "in that supreme sense in which 
God and God only is the Truth. 1126 But as Hegel adds, 
philosophy will have to show that it is capable of 
apprehending such truths unassisted, meaning reason will need 
no help from religion. 27 Why would Hegel say that? Hegel does 
not want to be caught up in the dichotomous relationship of 
reason and faith that plagued scholasticism. There, he says, 
metaphysical thinking had turned into dogmatism or unfree 
thinking. As noted with irony in the zuzatze to #32 in the 
Encyclopaedia, "Dogmatism may be most simply described as the 
contrary of skepticism." Hegel's point is that he cannot allow 
philosophy to be constrained by the Kantian dichotomy of 
phenomenon and noumenon. 
It is the problem of uncertainty that Hegel seeks to 
overcome, inasmuch as uncertainty would prove an embarrassment 
to philosophy. He claims to overcome this problem by 
presupposing enough intelligence to know transcendent being 
and its actuality. 28 
This actuality is what Kant referred to in the 
"Transcendental Analytic" as the noumenon: that which the 
26 Ency. #1. 
27 Ibid, #4. 
28 Ibid, #6. 
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understanding cannot know. "The most the understanding can 
achieve g priori is to anticipate the form of a possible 
experience in general. 1129 But Hegel answers this claim of 
uncertainty with a counterclaim, namely that the object of 
philosophy is the Idea, the noumenon of which phenomena are 
only "the superficial outside'' such as political and social 
organizational structures. 30 What concerns Hegel at this point 
is the absolute truth, and such truth, he argues, can only be 
known through thought proper, that is, through free and 
genuine thought which is itself concrete. 31 
Ordinarily, Hegel says, we take thoughts and the objects 
of thought (universals) to be anything but concrete. We take 
thought to be abstract. We take there to be an opposition 
between abstract thought (universals) and concrete individuals 
(particulars). To say that thought as free and genuine thought 
is concrete, is to dissolve and surpass this rigid opposition, 
the very aim for which philosophy arose in the first place. 
He goes on to promise that it will be shown that thought is 
at once itself and its other, that it overreaches 
(Ubergreifen) its other and lets nothing escape it. 
Concrete thought is not merely opposed to the sensible 
particular as its other, but it literally reaches over to that 
29 Critique of Pure Reason,tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: st. Martin's Press, 1929), B303. 
30 Ency. #6. 
31 Ibid, #14. 
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other in such a way that the other, the particular, is drawn 
into a higher unity. 32 In one move Hegel has overcome the 
dichotomies that he believed tainted knowledge as uncertain, 
and in so doing he has assured philosophy the throne of 
cognitive knowledge. 33 Thus the Idea, free concrete thought, 
thought proper, is only in the unfolding character of 
overreaching, it is only in its development in this 
overreaching by which unity is achieved. It is only the 
system. It is an unfolding of thought proper that is 
intrinsically systematic. As such it will eventually know 
ultimate truth, it will become actual knowledge. 
This proposition confronts Climacus with two problems. 
The first is the givenness of the proposition and hence its 
inherent necessity. As he sees it, with necessity there is no 
need for authority as such. Indeed, authority (and its loss) 
only makes sense in circumstances of liberty, that is, if 
consciousness is truly free. For Climacus this means that the 
32 Ibid, #20, #21. I am indebted to John Sallis' lectures 
on Hegel's logic for this and other insights into this 
difficult subject. 
33 We see how Hegel works this out politically in his 
Philosophy of Right where the individual gains a self-
awareness of his necessary relationship to the whole. As 
Steinberger, Op. Cit. p. 208, elaborates: "Reason prescribes 
the nature of political society and the nature of the 
individuals who comprise it; and each individual, as a 
rational creature, has the capacity to recognize that which 
reason prescribes. In fulfilling his capacity for reason, the 
individual comes to see that his very individuality is 
dependent upon society, and that only by being integrated into 
the body politic can he affirm his subjectivity and his 
freedom." 
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movement toward truth is not one of choice made in freedom, 
a fact that for him de-authenticates the progress of 
consciousness toward its own completion. The second problem 
is Hegel's arrogant claim that ultimate truth can be known 
cognitively. That kind of claim finitizes ultimate truth which 
to Climacus is the same as to negate the radical difference 
between the human and the divine and thus to reject an 
ultimate authority. 
Although Climacus would agree with Hegel on an abstract 
level, such abstractions he considers useless when it comes 
to existential experience (SV 9,158; CUP, 176). In short, such 
a presentation is to misrepresent truth and constitutes a 
complete denial of the human condition proper. As Paul Holmer 
explains, Kierkegaard ( Climacus) "denies that the relation 
between discourse and the world discoursed about is itself a 
logical relation. Meanings are logically inter-related, but 
not meanings and the world. 1134 An existential system is not 
possible precisely because the heterogeneity of existence and 
the inner life cannot be reduced to a logical conclusion. This 
is Climacus' point in "denying so candidly the Hegelian effort 
to introduce movement (kinesis) into logic. 1135 
"Logic cannot explain movement" Climacus says, meaning 
anything that has "any relation to existence (Tilvil!relse), 
34 
"Kierkegaard and Logic" in Kierkegaardiana 2 (1957): 
p. 29. 
35 Ibid, p. 41. 
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which is not indifferent to Existents. [must not] be 
incorporated in a logical system" ( SV 9, 94; CUP, 100) . But the 
development and transformation of subjectivity constitutes 
movement, the movement of intentional completion. Hence for 
climacus logic and movement are mutually exclusive categories. 
Logic is static and necessary, he insists, 36 whereas the 
existential development and transformation represents movement 
and is constitutive of an act of freedom. As Climacus 
expressed it in the Fragments as we have seen, all coming into 
existence occurs in freedom, not by way of necessity {SV 6,71; 
PF 77). Therefore the application of a logical system to 
explain the meaningfulness of human existence is nonsensical 
to Climacus. 
36 Holmer makes Kierkegaard's understanding of logic more 
intelligible when he explains p. 2 7: "Logic is for Kierkegaard 
the disciplined inquiry into the meaning structure and 
principles of knowledge .... Logic is, by him, not conceived 
to be immediately methodological nor a biological weapon. 
Throughout his literature he seems to make clear, too, that 
logic is a spectator science, it is broadly descriptive. But 
the question is -- of what? It is surely not ontological 
description; for this is the almost constant criticism made 
in the Postscript, and every other occasion permitting in the 
literature, of the Hegelian philosophy. 
Kierkegaard is a singular 'via media' thinker. Denying 
that logic is ontological, or a science about being, does not 
entail the affirmation that logic is an arbitrary invention, 
or simply conventional, or only rules like those governing a 
parlor game. He seems to be insisting that logic is a 
descriptive science, but descriptive principally of the 
structures implicit in the meaningful use of language. Logic 
describes the idealities, rules and norms, principles and 
criteria, in virtue of which meanings are communicated." 
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one might well wonder why Climacus, the rationalist, 
could not, if not adopt Hegel's dialectic, at least recognize 
the obvious movement within it, a movement motivated by 
spirit's self-testing dimension embodied in consciousness, in 
traditional terms, the quest for truth. 37 Indeed, he seems to 
misread Hegel when he claims that "pure thought without ado 
abrogates (h~ve = oph~ve like the German aufheben) all 
movement, or meaninglessly imports it into logic" (SV 10,19; 
37 Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 55. In a contrasting 
interpretation of Hegel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Op. Cit., pp. 17-
8, suggests: "(T]he distance proper to theoria is that of 
proximity and affinity. The primitive meaning of theoria is 
participation in the delegation sent to the festival for the 
sake of honoring the gods. The viewing of the divine 
proceedings is no participationless establishing of some 
neutral state of affairs or observation of some splendid 
demonstration or show. Rather it is a genuine sharing in an 
event, a real being present. Correspondingly the rationality 
of being, this grand hypothesis of Greek philosophy, is not 
first and foremost a property of human self-consciousness but 
of being itself, which is the whole in such a way and appears 
as the whole in such a way that human reason is far more 
appropriately thought of as part of this rationality instead 
of as the self-consciousness that knows itself over against 
an external totality. There is, then, another way in which a 
human heightening of awareness penetrates and discovers itself 
-- not the way inward to which Augustine appealed but the way 
of complete self-donation to what is outside in which the 
seeker nevertheless finds himself. Hegel's greatness lies in 
fact in that he did not suppose this way of the Greeks to be 
a false way left behind in contrast to that modern mode of 
reflection, but he acknowledged that way as a facet of being 
itself. It was the magnificent achievement of his Logic to 
have acknowledged precisely within the dimension of the 
logical this ground that gathers in and underpins what points 
in the opposite direction. Whether he named this nous or God, 
either way it is ultimately what lies utterly outside us, just 
as the mystical submersion of the Christians ultimately 
attains inward reality." 
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CUP 277), although he knows well the ambiguous nature of this 
language. The point is, Hegel's logic is not circular, as 
climacus suggests, but spiral. But Climacus (and here we must 
include Kierkegaard himself as well), is committed to formal 
logic, to Aristotle's principle of contradiction. 38 It is a 
position that apparently parallels Trendleburg' s Logische 
untersuchungen which Climacus praises in the Postscript for 
its proper understanding of movement as "the inexplainable 
presupposition, as the common factor wherein being and 
thinking agree and as the continued reciprocity" (SV 9,94; 
CUP 100). 
The curious problem is that Climacus sees no conflict 
between a formal logic which consequently embodies no movement 
and Aristotle's whole conception of kinesis, of teleological 
movement, especially as we find it in the Physics where 
Aristotle tells us a plant develops necessarily. One might 
even argue that in Aristotle's syllogism there is a kind of 
metaphorical movement inasmuch as the premise suggests a 
conclusion. For the thinker this always represents a movement, 
even though it was presupposed in the proposition. All of this 
seems to be acknowledged by Climacus when he proclaims: 
The transition from possibility to actuality is, as 
Aristotle rightly teaches kinesis, a movement. This 
cannot be expressed or understood in the language 
38 Kierkegaard is especially clear and unambiguous on how 
he understands the principle of contradiction and the 
consequences of its mediation in Two Ages, as will be 
discussed in chapter three. SV 14,88-94; TA, 97-103. Also SV 
10,12-3; CUP, 270-71. 
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of abstraction where movement cannot have assigned 
to it either time or space which presupposes 
movement or are presupposed by it (SV 10,45; CUP, 
3 06) • 
We must conclude that Climacus at best appears to be 
inconsistent about the question of logic, an inconsistency 
perhaps propelled by his imposition of passion in order to 
derive meaning from knowledge. That brings us to perhaps his 
most important opposition to Hegel's logical system, namely 
its claim to be able to know the absolute truth. 
II:1:5 
Climacus asks how it is possible to know the absolute 
truth, and his own answer is a clear rejection of this 
claim. 39 This is not to say Climacus is unaware of the 
attraction of gnostic thinking, but for him the enthusiasm of 
claiming certainty, even about the highest, is essentially 
nihilistic. 40 The absolute truth is not knowable because it 
involves an absolute paradox as well as an ultimate paradox 
for thought itself, what will be referred to as the 
39 
"This impiety (the abolition of the relationship of 
conscience) is the fundamental damage done by Hegelian 
philosophy," PAP VIII 1 A 283 (JP 1613). 
40 PAP II A 127. Compare with Eric Voegelin, The Ecumenic 
Age, vol. 4 of Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1974), pp. 27-8: "Gnosticism whether ancient 
or modern, is a dead end. That of course is its attraction. 
Magic pneumatism gives its addicts a sense of superiority over 
the reality which does not conform .... (I]t is a dead end 
inasmuch as it rejects the life of spirit and reason under the 
conditions of the cosmos in which reality becomes luminous in 
pneumatic and noetic consciousness." 
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intellectual paradox. In the chapter on the "Absolute Paradox" 
in the Fragments, Climacus (always the heroic climber) urges 
the reader to take the category of paradox seriously inasmuch 
as it fundamentally connects the human subjectivity proper. 
"One must not think ill of the paradox, because the paradox 
is the passion of thought, and the thinker who is without the 
paradox, he is like the lover who is without passion, a 
mediocre customer" (SV 6,38; PF, 38) . 41 
Paradox for Kierkegaard has two functions. Inasmuch as 
it is a category of thinking, it posits the limitations upon 
what thinking as a cognitive effort can accomplish, that is, 
41 In regard to paradox Eugene Webb in Philosophers of 
Consciousness (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 
p. 240, affirms the importance of this theme to Kierkegaard's 
philosophy: "There are two reasons for the prominence of the 
theme of paradox in Kierkegaard. One is that in trying to find 
a way to speak of subjectivity in a milieu in which 
philosophical language was oriented almost exclusively toward 
the description of objects of perception or of intellection, 
he was driven to use the currently available language of 
philosophical discourse in ways it was not suited to. In this 
respect, Kierkegaardian paradox is a function of the breakdown 
of a language pushed beyond its capacity .... There is also 
another type of paradox in Kierkegaard's thought, however, and 
it is this Climacus refers to as "the source of the thinker's 
passion." (Webb is relying on the older faulty translation of 
the Fragments; it should read as quoted above: "the paradox 
is the passion of thought."] This we might term "essential" 
paradox -- essential in that it stems from the structure of 
human consciousness itself so that there is no way it could 
be resolved by reformulation in another language. The paradox 
that is [the source of) the thinker's passion, as Climacus 
goes on to explain, is the desire to attain what is truly 
other than thought: "The supreme paradox of all thought is the 
attempt to discover something that thought cannot think. This 
passion is at bottom present in all thinking." 
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what thinking can ultimately think. 42 The paradox also reveals 
the difference between what can be known and what cannot be 
known, a state of differentiated, and hence tension filled, 
existence that Kierkegaard insists every concrete single self 
, 43 
occupies. 
Here we might want to think about what paradox means. In 
its very formulation paradox appears to be forbidding, indeed 
we can say it is self-concealing. 44 In that sense it is 
mysterious and ambiguous. But Kierkegaard chose the categories 
with which Climacus operates very diligently, and that is 
especially true of the category of the intellectual paradox 
which in its deepest most profound meaning signifies the 
absolute paradox, "the god, the eternal, as human in time" (SV 
20,156). 
42 
"This, then, is thinking's highest paradox: to want to 
discover something that it cannot itself think" (SV 6,38; PF, 
37) . 
43 SV 6,48-52; PF, 49-54. Also SV 9,70-74, SV 
10,3,18,75-6 and note,250-52; CUP, 75-79, 267, 276, 339 and 
note, 518-19; SV 12,192-97; WL, 191-96; and SV 16,167; TC, 
173. 
44 According to Liddell and Scott the etymological origin 
of paradox is Greek: paradoxos which means contrary to 
opinion, incredible, contrary to expectation, marvelous. Jens 
Himmelstrup (SV 20,152) has suggested its derivative meanings 
as absurd or incongruous (urimelig) , but also contrary to 
reason (fornuftstridig). But as the OED adds, "though on 
investigation or when explained, it may prove to be well-
founded (or, according to some, though it is essentially 
true) . 11 
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The ambiguity of the paradox lies in its ability to shed 
light where only darkness would appear to be present. But for 
light to appear we have to let .9.Q of ratiocination and leap 
across "radical discontinuity" between thinking and that which 
it cannot think: the paradox. "One 'leaps' by letting go, 1145 
by giving up any rational explanations of the paradox and 
instead allow the self to participate in what cannot be 
thought through enactment. The achievement is self-knowledge 
( SV 6, 4 6; PF, 4 7) . Cl imacus suggests "one who does not pretend 
to be a Christian (can best] raise the question of what 
Christianity is" (SV 10,75; CUP, 338), and that someone, of 
course, is himself. 
We suggest that that is Climacus' ultimate purpose, and 
we draw the conclusion that that was Kierkegaard's ultimate 
purpose with this rational pseudonymous author. 
Climacus, the rationalist, is existentially willing to 
recognize the limits of cognitive thinking and the possibility 
of transcendence beyond these limits. He is open toward the 
possibility of the absolute paradox, yet not afraid of 
questioning it, and hence he is genuinely open to the 
possibility of an absolute authority, although he apparently 
does not existentially embrace it. For that we need to 
progress in Kierkegaard's authorship to Anti-Climacus. But 
45 Louis Mackey, "A Ram in the Afternoon: Kierkegaard's 
Discourse of the Other," Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure 
of the Self, ed. Joseph Smith, M. D. , Psychiatry and the 
Humanities 5 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 202. 
118 
Johannes Climacus' passion, which for him expresses itself in 
thinking, allows him to envision (imagine) the offense 
(Forargelse) that "comes into existence with the paradox" (SV 
6,50; PF, 51) . 46 Moreover, this passion allows him to envision 
the possibilities of such an encounter between the paradox and 
the understanding (Forstaaelse) and to characterize it as 
being either happy or unhappy (SV 6,48; PF, 49). 
Depending upon the intensity of the passion the "paradox 
and the understanding [Forstanden) [may) meet in mutual 
understanding" ( sv 6, 48; PF, 49), thereby avoiding the offense 
to the understanding, or they may not. 47 If they do not meet 
in mutual understanding, that is, if thinking cannot accept 
its own limitation and think the paradox as such, thinking has 
suffered its own downfall, and for Climacus that is 
catastrophic. As Sl0k has pointed out, if Climacus' passion 
cannot encompass the god who is the ground of all thinking, 
of all that can be thought -- if you cannot think the ground, 
you cannot think at all. The implication is that self-
46 Mackey, "A Ram in the Afternoon: Kierkegaard's 
Discourse of the Other," p. 193, perhaps says it better when 
he suggests that because of the limitations of language "the 
Fragments neither says nor shows but rather performs the 
'absolute paradox': that the limit of language, its 
irreducible other, is also its radical source." 
47 Kierkegaard suggests the analogy of self-love which 
also seeks its own downfall in love of the other. In chapters 
four and five a detailed analysis of Kierkegaard's concept of 
love will help us understand the possibility of a happy 
encounter between thinking and paradox. 
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knowledge, then, has broken down all together. 48 
Climacus by maintaining an open posture toward the 
intellectual paradox, that paradox, as it were, opens itself 
to him and unconceals or discloses the very essence of his 
being, what Climacus understands as genuine subjectivity. 
That intimated paradox of the understanding acts in 
turn upon a person and upon his self-knowledge in 
such a way that he who believed that he knew himself 
now no longer knows with certainty whether he 
perhaps is a more curiously complex animal than 
Typhon or whether he has in his nature a gentler and 
diviner part (SV 6,40; PF, 39). 
The paradox reveals the intentional movement that it makes 
possible, and thereby it defines what in the Postscript is 
characterized as becoming subject in truth. As such the 
paradox makes possible a genuine movement in freedom. 
This development or transformation of subjectivity, 
this its infinite concentration in itself over 
against the representation of the highest good of 
infinity ... is the developed possibility of the 
subjectivity's primary possibility (SV 9,108; CUP, 
116) . 
To the one who is open toward it, the paradox reveals the 
two-dimensional structure of human consciousness, and hence 
it reveals consciousness essentially as intentional and 
48 Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker (K0benhavn: Hans 
Reitzel, 1978), p. 118. Climacus' discussion is very 
reminiscent of Plato's inferred dialogue in the Republic 
(475e-476b) between the philosophos who is "the man who loves 
to look with admiration (philotheamones) at the ... truth 
of things ... as that which they are in themselves" and the 
philodoxos who can "see beauty only as it appears in the many 
beautiful things, but [is] unable to see beauty 'in itself.'" 
Eric Voegelin, Plato (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1966), pp. 65-6. 
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therefore tension filled. 49 This bifurcated nature of concrete 
experience, as Climacus has shown, cannot be mediated or 
reconciled in existence, least of all by the imposition of 
logic. 
II:2:1 
We can now turn to the symptomatic effects of the 
scientific methodology on religious thinking. Kierkegaard 
continues the attack on Hegel charging, that by virtue of 
speculative philosophy, the epiphany of Christ has been 
transmuted into doctrine illicitly deduced from history. 50 
The result is that Christianity has become the subject of 
cognition, not of action. This is "Christendom's" misfortune, 
Anti-Climacus laments, for by becoming an object of knowledge, 
Christianity has lost all its "juice and energy" (SV 16,44-5; 
TC, 37-8), meaning it has lost its efficaciousness. 
But Kierkegaard is not only battling Hegel's claim that 
we can have "absolute knowledge." His attack is also directed 
at Enlightenment philosophy and especially at "the established 
order" of the orthodox church. By immanentizing Christian 
doctrine it accomodated the influential scientific requirement 
49 By tension-filled we mean to say that a movement in 
freedom is always perilous, requires risk taking inasmuch as 
it does not contain the security of certainty that is 
characteristic of a movement grounded in necessity. 
50 
"History makes out Christ to be another than he in 
truth is" (SV 16,36; TC, 28). 
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which insists we can only know by way of rational deduction 
(Descartes) or empirical induction (Bacon). This is how 
"Christendom" emerges. 
on the one hand, it meant that the tension of the paradox 
of the Incarnation was relaxed, and becoming a Christian was 
now as easily achieved as citizenship (SV 9,46-7; CUP, 49-50, 
328 and SV 16,73; TC, 71) requiring no special effort and 
posing no "offense" (Forargelse) to reason. 51 On the other 
hand, the relationship between philosophy and Christianity had 
become confused inasmuch as "the problem of its truth ... 
becomes the problem of so interpenetrating it with thought, 
that Christianity at last reveals itself as the eternal truth 
. [and] is assumed as given" (SV 9,46; CUP, 49) . 52 
Speculative philosophy has transformed Christianity into 
a reflective objectivity aimed at transcending existential 
uncertainty, and at the same time Christianity, by its embrace 
of worldly aspirations, has jeopardized its mystical 
authority, and thus it has deformed its own truth in the very 
51 
"The decisive in the Christian suffering is: the 
volition and the possibility of offense for the suffering .. 
. . For when I voluntarily give up everything, choose danger 
and adversity, then it is impossible to avoid vexation 
(Anf~gtelse) (which again especially belongs to the category 
of the Christian, but which naturally has been abolished in 
Christendom" (SV 16,109-10; TC, 111). 
52 Also SV 10,66; CUP, 329. 
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creation of "Christendom."53 
Christianity represented a paradox that for Kierkegaard 
constituted an offense to reason. Christendom, in contrast, 
is Christianity accommodated to the established secular order 
where the tension of the paradox is relaxed, and hence 
essentially accommodated to speculative philosophy. 
The consequences of such a union (of Christianity 
and philosophy) are seen by rationalism, a 
representation, of which the confusion of language 
is a type, and just as it has been noticed that many 
words reappear in the different languages, in the 
same way the rationalists, even though they 
denigrate each other, have these words in common: 
philosophically, reasonable Christianity 
(Christendom and the whole presencing of Christ is 
an -- accommodation) . 54 
such an accomodation implied a circumscription of reason, 
meaning reason could no longer, like before the Enlightenment, 
noetically experience transcendent being. The scientific 
method had dictated to philosophy what could be known and 
experienced, and the established order," which represented 
Christianity, accommodated this demand. 
If one were to describe the whole orthodox-
apologetic striving in one single sentence, but also 
with categorical precision, one would have to say: 
the intent is to make Christianity plausible 
53 
"Christendom has abolished Christianity without itself 
realizing it; the consequence is that if anything is to be 
done, an attempt must be made once again to interpose 
Christianity into Christendom" (SV 16,45; TC, 39). 
54 PAP I A 98. 
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(sandsynlig) . 55 
This destructive turn of events for Christianity lead 
both Anti-Climacus and Johannes Climacus to characterize the 
circumstance of "Christendom" as the "way Christianity became 
paganism" (SV 16,45; TC, 38. Also SV 10,66; CUP, 329). It 
meant the Christian experience had not only become confused, 
but had also been negatively influenced by what Peter Gay, 
echoing Kierkegaard but more likely thinking of John Locke, 
has characterized as the Enlightenment's "appeal to reason and 
reasonableness. 1156 
What does it mean to make Christianity reasonable? Making 
Christianity reasonable is precisely the problem for 
Kierkegaard, who sees this movement as the world's imposition 
of its principles on the domain of Christianity. Although 
these principles may be appropriate in secular affairs where 
concern is about relative goals, they tend to degenerate 
Christianity. In Kierkegaard's opinion they deprive the human 
individual of a higher form of life, which is precisely what 
a Christian life makes possible and to which the human being 
as he or she essentially is apparently aspires. He expresses 
55 Nutidens Religieuse Forvirring. Bogen om Adler, p. 78; 
OAR, 59. Kierkegaard chose the word sandsynlig with great 
care, for literally it means "truly visible." 
56 The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of 
Modern Paganism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), p. 
354. The work referred to by John Locke is The Reasonableness 
of Christianity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 
in passim. 
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this conviction when he has Climacus pronounce in the 
g_pstscript: 
Here it is not asked whether Christianity is right, 
but what Christianity is about. Speculative thought 
leaves out this preliminary agreement, and therefore 
it is successful with the mediation. Before it 
mediates, it has already mediated, that is, 
transformed Christianity into a philosophical 
doctrine (SV 10,75; CUP, 338). 
To ask what Christianity is about is precisely to 
question and thereby manifest the difference between what is 
immanent and what is transcendent for Kierkegaard, a 
difference modern philosophy on a whole according to Anti-
Climacus, has attempted to deny deluding "us into the notion 
that faith has an immanent quality, that it is immanency" (SV 
16,136; TC, 140). 57 The point is, as Gregor Malantschuk has 
noted, that Kierkegaard perceived of Hegel's philosophy as one 
designed to engender thought about immanence as absolute 
57 Anti-Climacus is especially aiming at Schleiermacher 
who in On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, tr. 
John Oman (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958) 
insisted religion is natural to the human being (p. 9), is a 
feeling or affection (pp. 36, 46, and especially 54) that 
originates not in a pure impulse to know, but rather in how 
human beings comport themselves toward the nature of things. 
The editors of the Danish edition who refer to 
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, 3rd edition, vol. I, P. 167ff, 
also suggest the referral in PAP 1 A 273 to Hegel and 
Hegelians appears to be incorrect. However, Anti-Climacus, as 
well as Kierkegaard himself, could easily be drawn to this 
conclusion, it would seem, from Hegel's lectures on faith in 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, one vol. ed. Peter c. 
Hodgson "The Lectures of 1827," tr. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, 
and J.M. Stewart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), pp. 134-37. There Hegel pronounces that "faith --i.e. 
certainty inasmuch as it is feeling and exists in feeling . 
. . is certainty of God, immediate knowledge." (p. 134). 
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within philosophy as well as within theology. But "if people 
by logical thinking can manage all of existence, then 
[Kierkegaard can only come to the conclusion that] there is 
no room for transcendence. 1158 By rationalizing Christianity 
Hegel makes it into something philosophically comprehensible, 
that is, into doctrine. Consequently any statement about 
Christianity can be reduced to an opinion about Christianity, 
reduced to anybody's opinion about it. 
"What modern philosophy understands as faith is 
actually what is called an opinion [and this opinion 
is] proclaimed [forkyndes] to a person, and he now 
believes that it is so as the doctrine teaches. The 
next stage therefore becomes to grasp [begribe] this 
doctrine; this philosophy does" {SV 16, 136; TC, 
140) . 
58 
"Begreberne Immanens og Transcendens hos S0ren 
Kierkegaard" in Frihed og Existens: studier i S0ren 
Kierkegaards t~nkning (K0benhavn: C.A. Reitzel, 1980), pp. 
196-97. Malantschuk goes on to inform the reader that 
Kierkegaard thought of these concepts as belonging strictly 
to philosophy and theology and not to an upbuilding 
literature. Therefore he never uses these concepts in the 
upbuilding literature under his own name. There they instead 
are referred to as time and eternity, world and God, while in 
the pseudonymous literature the paradox or the absurd 
sometimes is substituted for transcendence "inasmuch as the 
oppositions these designations express would not appear 
without a transcendence." (p. 200). Malantschuk continues with 
an outline of Kierkegaard's two-tiered understanding of 
transcendence that is helpful to the present project: "The one 
designates transcendence as the fixed, unmovable point, the 
other the human being's possible attempt to reach the 
transcendental by negating the external reality as the ironist 
does it, or ... his own actuality, which happens if the 
human being has reached further in his spiritual development. 
Said in another way, we are here dealing with, on the one 
hand, God as the transcendental and, on the other hand, the 
human beings striving relation to transcendence." (p. 203). 
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Christianity has been reduced to a truth on par with 
other immanent truths, and as such it has lost its divine 
authority that has its ground in transcendence. If this is 
so, then its truth can be proclaimed by a genius who is 
qualitatively different from the apostle inasmuch as he is 
what he is by virtue of what he is in himself. In contrast, 
the apostle is what he is by virtue of divine authority. As 
Kierkegaard puts it in Authority and Revelation: 
The category of a genius lies within the immanent; 
therefore the genius may well have something new to 
bring forth, but it disappears again in a general 
assimilation by the race, just as the difference 
genius disappears as soon as one thinks the eternal. 
The category apostle lies within the transcendent, 
he has paradoxically something new to bring forth, 
the newness of which remains constant precisely 
because it is essentially paradoxical and not an 
anticipation in connection with the development of 
the race. An apostle remains eternally an apostle 
and no eternity's immanence sets him on an 
essentially equal level with all other human beings 
because he is essentially paradoxically different 
from all others. 59 
Thus an apostle or a prophet gains his authority to make 
proclamations from the transcendental. As Malantschuk adds, 
"thereby Kierkegaard has strongly emphasized the authority 
with which the transcendental can make itself manifest over 
against all knowledge that human beings can achieve within 
immanence. 1160 
Speculative philosophy negates this difference and 
59 Nutidens Religieuse Forvirring: The Book on Adler, p. 
139; OAR, 105. 
6° Frihed og Eksistens, p. 222. 
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thereby Christianity becomes something one learns -- by rote, 
as Climacus laments. If it is merely something one learns, 
like algebra, then it is to be assumed that everyone learns 
it, that everyone is a Christian as a matter of course. 61 
climacus makes an ironic comparison that has significant 
political overtones. 
He compares speculative philosophy's understanding of 
what it means to be a Christian to what it apparently means 
to be Danish. It is something you become by birth -- or two 
weeks later -- automatically. Inasmuch as geography teaches 
that the Lutheran-Christian religion governs in Denmark, it 
follows one is not Jewish, nor Muslim, but a Christian (SV 
9,47; CUP 49). The problem is that being a Christian is not 
a scientific question, nor is it a legal question. The 
community in which a single self resides does not make that 
single self what he or she essentially is. That, for Climacus, 
61 Gadamer, Op. Cit. p. 37, does not believe Hegel 
forecasted the end of history, as suggested by Climacus, by 
claiming that it is through Christianity and modern history 
that we have arrived at the point where all are free. "The 
principle of freedom is unimpugnable and irrevocable. It is 
no longer possible for anyone still to affirm the unfreedom 
of humanity. The principle that all are free never again can 
be shaken. But does this mean that on account of this, history 
has come to an end? Are all human beings actually free? Has 
not history since then been a matter of just this, that the 
historical conduct of man has to translate the principle of 
freedom into reality? Obviously this points to the unending 
march of world history into the openness of its future tasks 
and gives no becalming assurance that everything is already 
in order." 
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is to be objective. 62 From this perspective it is simply in 
bad taste not to be what everyone is -- as a matter of course. 
The conclusion is that in "Christendom" {Christenheden) 
Christianity has become a question of what is in fashion, what 
dominates public opinion, and then it has lost its authority 
in existential experience. 63 
Of course, being Danish is a legal question, but for 
Kierkegaard it has stronger connotations, as it does to be 
truly Christian. What he wants to show is that a personal 
investment in the "idea of community" is imperative for its 
actualization. By this "idea of community" he means a 
dedication to solidary relations as presenced in II love of 
62 
"Objective thinking is wholly indifferent to 
subjectivity, and thereby also to inwardness and 
appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct . 
. . . It can be understood directly and be recited by rote. 
Objective thinking is therefore conscious only of itself, and 
is therefore not a communication" {SV 9,65; CUP, 70). 
63 Chapter three will deal explicitly with the 
consequences of the loss of authority in existential 
experience. But it is appropriate to note here that Climacus 
almost wishes the situation back to those days when being a 
Christian stood in stark contradiction to the surrounding 
world both in an inward as well as an outward sense. Then 
being a Christian was a dangerous, but also an heroic 
undertaking. His point is that it was not difficult to know 
when you were truly a Christian. In "Christendom, 11 on the 
other hand, the external nuances may be diminutive confusing 
the individual struggling to become a true Christian {SV 
10,78; CUP, 341). Thus Climacus questions whether belonging 
to the visible church is serious evidence for whether one is 
actually a Christian suggesting "it is easier to become a 
Christian if I am not a Christian, than it is to become a 
Christian if I am that; and this decision is reserved for the 
one who has been baptized as a child," sv 10,64; CUP, 327. 
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neighbor as oneself. 1164 This concept is strictly an 
existential concept, and therefore it is not accidental that 
climacus in discussing speculative philosophy immediately 
turns to the one who does philosophy, to the thinker. 
II:2:2 
To discuss speculative philosophy without a consideration 
of the philosopher engaged in this thinking is for Climacus 
to set the cart before the horse, or at least it is to 
neglect, perhaps negate, the most important part of the 
equation. 
As is well known, Socrates says that if one assumes 
fluteplaying, one must also assume a fluteplayer, 65 
and consequently if one assumes a speculative 
philosophy, one must also assume a speculative 
philosopher, or several speculative philosophers" 
{SV 9,48; CUP, 50}. 
The question for Climacus is an existential question: 
What does this mean to the one engaged in this activity? 
Speculative philosophy, in contrast, "argues from the point 
of view of totality, from the state, from the 'idea of 
community' {Samfundsideen), from the scientific standpoint of 
geography to the single self." It follows as a matter of 
course that the single self is a faithful believer {SV 9,47; 
CUP, 50). No effort is necessary. No commitment or dedication 
64 The "idea of community" constitutes Kierkegaard's 
"corrective." This will be worked out in detail in chapters 
four and five. 
65 Cf. Plato's Apology 27b. 
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required except to comply with public opinion. And most 
important, no existential movement grounded in inwardness is 
necessary. The single self merely assumes the posture of the 
(natural or basic?} self, a being consumed with cognitive 
intent: to know what is transcendent, an intentionality that 
lacks all existential concern. This would not be problematic 
if Christianity was something essentially objective. "But if 
Christianity is essentially subjectivity, then it would be a 
mistake if the observer is objective" (SV 9,49; CUP, 51}. 
Climacus' category of subjectivity has brought much 
confusion, especially when he claims "subjectivity is the 
truth." The objective position is easy to comprehend. The 
truth or falsity of it is not dependent upon subjective 
conviction, is not dependent upon whether one is committed to 
it or not. To state the objective position requires no 
existential effort upon the part of the one speaking. To state 
the objective position in this manner, however, helps to 
clarify the subjective position. 
In the subjective position the truth lies within the 
relationship of the single self to it. The question is located 
in the nature of that relationship: whether it is one of 
interest or disinterest. What Climacus is saying is that if 
the nature of this relationship is one of disinterest, then 
the truth is not for that single self. But if the relationship 
can be characterized as interested, and by interest Climacus 
means passionately interested, then truth is precisely 
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expressed in that interest and is of decisive import to the 
single self -- the truth is. We can say, then, that truth is 
prescenced in how the single self comports itself toward the 
world, the truth is subjectivity. 
The double implication that Climacus makes is important. 
He presents the point this way: 
When the truth is questioned objectively, then the 
truth is reflected upon objectively as an object 
(Genstand], to which the knower is related. One does 
not reflect on the relationship, but on whether it 
is the truth, the true, he is related to. When this 
to which he is related is only [blot] the truth, 
the true, then the subject is in truth. When the 
truth is questioned subjectively, then it is the 
individual's (Individ] relationship that is 
reflected upon; if only the how [Hvorledes] of this 
relationship is in truth, then the individual is in 
truth, even if it in this way was related to untruth 
( SV 9 , 16 6 ; CUP , 1 7 8 ) • 
In a footnote Climacus adds an important clause: 
The reader will observe that what is spoken of here 
is the essential truth, or about that truth which 
is essentially related to Existents, and that it is 
precisely in order to clarify it as inwardness or 
as subjectivity, that this oppostion is shown 
(Ibid). 
II:2:3 
What, we might well ask, is all the disagreement about? 
The problem, according to Climacus, is that the question has 
been posed incorrectly. It is really about how Christianity 
is to be perceived without prejudice, which is the same as to 
ask what Christianity is. Climacus warns that this question 
must not be confused with the objective question about the 
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truth of Christianity (SV 10,68; CUP, 331). It is an 
existential question, meaning "Christianity essentially is 
about Existents, and to become a Christian is the difficulty" 
(Ibid). This means the question of Christianity significantly 
entails the relation of the single self to the transcendent 
being. That in turn requires an explanation of how such a 
metaphysical concept is to be understood, and Climacus 
accommodates this question. 
Here we again find a stark opposition to Hegel who in 
Climacus' understanding transports all of the transcendent 
realm into immanence, as we have seen. 11 In pure thinking's 
heavenly sub specie ~terni the distinction is suspended 
(h~vet)" (SV 10,60; CUP, 323). The whole has been finitized 
into one totality. 
For Climacus, however, the metaphysical or the 
ontological simply is (er), but it does not exist (er ikke 
til). There can be no totality, at least not a unified 
totality as Hegel wants it. "God does not think, he creates; 
God does not exist, he is eternal," while it is the task of 
the human being to think and to exist (SV 10,36; CUP, 296). 
S0ren Holm elaborates: 
As the one who is, God cannot be an object of faith, 
but only one of assumption. "Eternally understood, 
one does not believe that the god exists (er til], 
even if one assumes that he exists, 11 because eternal 
or pure being is simply a category of essence 
(V~sen] and not a category of being within the realm 
of factual being. In contrast, faith claims that the 
god has come into existence (er blevet til] within 
the realm of historical being whereby his eternal 
essence is inflected into the dialectical categories 
133 
of becoming [Tilblivelse]. In this historical 
factuality, meanwhile, the god must be said to have 
come into existence, because we are now outside pure 
timeless being. 66 
Climacus' point is that faith concerns itself with·being 
(V~ren) rather than with essence (V~sen). The object of faith 
is the Incarnation, the god who became human and thereby 
became the ultimate standard for human existence by 
manifesting the di vine dimension in the human species. As 
such, Christianity is a question not of the understanding, but 
of action, and therefore it is a question of Existents. 
Religious thinking is for Climacus a question of how a 
single self is to comport him- or herself before the paradox 
of the epiphany and about the authority that paradox imposes 
on the life of that single self in this world. That is to say, 
by coming into existence, by showing itself, the eternal gains 
a sovereignty over the historical's claim on individual 
existence because by so doing it introduces the divine 
dimension of being human. 
Climacus will concede this much to speculative 
philosophy, that if Christianity is to be a teaching, then, 
it is the kind of teaching that is to be understood as one 
that teaches that the task is to exist in it. Moreover, it is 
to be understood as that which teaches how difficult it is to 
exist in it, "what an enormous existential task (Existents-
Opgave) this teaching posits for the learner" (SV 10,75n; CUP, 
66 Op. Cit. p. 27-8. 
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339n) . 
This proposition that Christianity is an existential task 
would seem to clarify Kierkegaard's indirect approach in these 
pseudonymous writings as an advocacy for enactment rather than 
a positing of doctrinaire information to supply cognitive 
skills. They are not meant to be the subject of fact 
gathering. Rather they represent an indirect appeal to the 
reader not to read the text as an accomplishment in and of 
itself, but to urge a new beginning. In other words, 
"Christianity is not a doctrine, but an existential 
communication expressing an existential contradiction" (SV 
10,75-6; CUP, 339) that cannot be mediated, but only endured. 
To understand this is for Climacus to understand Christianity 
proper, and if personally appropriated, to have become a 
Christian in the most genuine sense. As such Christianity 
distances itself from the (easy) requirement of Christendom 
which from Kierkegaard's perspective stands as a pathology of 
consciousness and hence as detrimental to Existents. 
It is from this point of view that Kierkegaard's 
pseudonymous writings can be characterized as a dialogue with 
the reader, a dialogue that reflects more than what is 
immediately available in the text. 67 This dialogue continues 
in Two Ages and Works of Love. Here, however, Kierkegaard 
engages in direct communication as he discusses the 
67 I am grateful to Adriaan Peperzak for this insight. 
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problematic of the symptomatic effects on practical thinking, 
a thinking that manifests itself on a political as well as on 
a psychological level. 
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Chapter III 
A SYMPTOMATIC EFFECT: 
THE LOSS OF AUTHORITY IN PRACTICAL THINKING 
Since every development ... is finished only with 
its own parody, it will become apparent that the 
political is the parodic in the world's development 
-- first the actual mythological (the God side), 
next the human mythological (the human side), and 
then the realization of the world's purpose in the 
world (as the highest), a sort of Chiliasm, which 
nevertheless brings the individual politicians, 
animated by abstract ideas, into contradiction with 
themselves. 1 
If humanity had not with the speed of several 
hundred years and then by the passion of habit got 
stuck in the fixed idea that a tyrant is a single 
human being, it would be easy to recognize that to 
be pursued by the crowd is the most burdensome of 
all, because the crowd, after all, is the sum of 
individuals, so that each individual adds his little 
part, while the individual does not think of how 
much it amounts to when all individuals do it. 2 
Let us now turn to the problem of the symptomatic effects 
on practical thinking that follow from the separation of 
knowledge and experience, a separation brought about by 
philosophy's adaptation of scientific methodology. As with 
theoretical thinking, the problem manifested itself in the 
"objective tendency," that in the case of practical thinking 
1 PAP VI A 26 (JP 4108). 
2 PAP VIII 1 A 123 (JP 4118). 
was expressed numerically. That is to say, on a political 
1evel the focus turns from theoretical concerns to the problem 
of ideology. 
III:1:1 
Ideology for Kierkegaard has mostly to do with a 
consciousness directed at totality, with encompassing everyone 
in mass movements that appear to swallow up individual human 
beings and all but annihilate any existential initiative. 3 
This problem he treats extensively in Two Ages, but where Marx 
views mass society as epiphenomena! of economic structures, 
Kierkegaard (and Nietzsche) view their own time as engaged in 
a life-or-death struggle that is epiphenomena! of a spiritual 
condition. Merold Westphal suggests that this event of mass 
society is for Kierkegaard "intimately related to a parallel 
'religious' event, the death of God, or, in Kierkegaard's 
language, the disappearance of Christianity from Christendom. 
The massification of society is the flip side of its 
secularization. 114 
3 
"In the midst of all the exultation over our age and 
the nineteenth century concealed there sounds a hidden 
contempt for being human; in the midst of the self-importance 
of the generation there is a despair over that of being human. 
Everything, everything wants to attach itself; world-
historically one wants to bewitch oneself in the totality. 
Nobody wants to be an individual existing human being" SV 
10,55-6; CUP, 317. 
4 
"Kierkegaard's Sociology" in Kierkegaard's Critique of 
Reason and Society (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 
p. 43. 
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Here again the overall problem remains the same: the lack 
of a foundational ground and hence the loss of authority. Any 
authority that may exist is wholly relative and grounded in 
human consensus whether achieved democratically or in 
authoritarian ways. Indeed the concept of ideology as we have 
come to understand it would seem to imply just such a lack of 
absolute authority. 5 This is no more evident than in the 
liberal state that inevitably emerged as a consequence of the 
French Revolution6 and which, for all intents and purposes, 
Kierkegaard accepted albeit with severe qualifications. In 
that political system as well as in those others of a more 
socialist nature that were being promoted at the time, he 
strongly rejected what he called "the deified positive 
principle of sociality [which] in our age is precisely the 
consuming, the demoralizing principle that in the thralldom 
of reflection transforms even virtues into vitia splendida" 
5 See James Wiser's discussion of Karl Mannheim's 
Ideology and Utopia in Political Theory: A Thematic Inquiry 
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 36-41. Wiser argues that 
since all ideological thinking according to Mannheim is 
basically opinion, there is no objective truth against which 
"the opinions in question may be tested. The ability of reason 
to do this [as in Plato] however, is precisely what Mannheim 
denied. Given this, it may appear that Mannheim's sociology 
of knowledge necessarily leads to a radical relativism." (p. 
40) . 
6 For a discussion of Kierkegaard's view of the emergence 
of liberal democracy in Denmark see chapter IV. 
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(SV 14,79; TA 86) . 7 
Before we begin to unravel this statement a few 
preliminary comments on Kierkegaard's disposition toward the 
relationship between the single self (den Enkelte) and society 
seem appropriate. It is a relationship, as was noted in the 
introductory chapter, that has often been misinterpreted as 
non-existent. Many readings of Kierkegaard interpret his 
concept of the single self as other-worldly, removed from all 
political concerns. But to so understand Kierkegaard is to 
understand his concept of the single self abstractly, and 
hence to misunderstand it. 
Johannes Sl0k is correct when he states: "The point of 
departure for Kierkegaard is that there exists simultaneously 
a primary and dialectical relationship between the individual 
and society. 118 It is meaningless to understand the single self 
apart from society and equally meaningless to understand 
society apart from the single selves that make it up. That 
Kierkegaard analyzes one element of this unity separately, or 
almost separately, in much of his pseudonymous literature is 
merely a methodological question. It should not be construed 
7 Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," p. 4 6, reminds the 
reader reflection here signifies the attempt of thought to 
free itself from the idea of community. In other words, it is 
reflection "cut off from passion." 
8 Da Kierkegaard tav: Fra forfatterskab til kirkestorm 
(K¢benhavn: Hans Reitzel, 1980), p. 11. 
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as a conception of the single self as apolitical or asocial. 9 
But Kierkegaard, as we shall see in chapters four and 
five, does not understand this relationship between the single 
self and society in terms of external conditions such as those 
understood by consent theory. 10 Nor does he understand this 
relationship in terms of human law such as constitutional 
measures, although law as such plays a major role in his 
therapeutic "corrective." Indeed, Kierkegaard says somewhere 
he did not believe political authority or government should 
legislate moral behavior. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, then, 
he rejects the idea of the regime as an educational 
institution, and thereby he confirms his modern heritage. Nor 
does he present a theory of state that outlines the framework 
for how the wants of citizens are to be satisfied by a 
regulating state. To Kierkegaard, all such external concerns 
are ultimately arranged through policy decisions that speak 
only to material phenomena. Rather, he insists, the actual 
tension-filled dimension of the primary unity 
"individual/community" originates in consciousness and must 
therefore first be worked out in consciousness. As Sl0k 
9 It is difficult to resist quoting Aristotle who said in 
the Politics 1253a3: "He who is without a city through nature 
rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man." 
10 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal 
State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Richard E. 
Flathman, Political Obligation (New York: Atheneum, 1972); 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State. and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1974); John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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interprets him, "the socially qualified individual is 
conscious of himself." 11 That is to say, human beings are 
conscious of themselves as social beings, they are conscious 
of their need of society. This need is not to satisfy material 
concerns such as property or money, 12 but rather to enable 
each individual human being to actualize his or her potential 
as a socially qualified being. Kierkegaard makes this explicit 
in Works of Love when he acknowledges the universal claim that 
11 [a]ll through the ages everyone who has thought deeply over 
the nature of man has recognized in him this need for 
community" (SV 12,150; WL, 153). This qualification is 
manifested in the existential requirement "You shall love the 
neighbor as yourself." 
For Kierkegaard this natural relationship of the single 
self to his or her community is not only the point of 
departure, but indeed, from the perspective of the present 
work, the raison d'etre of what is held to constitute his 
11 Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 13. 
12 
"Alas, many believe that the eternal is imaginary, 
money reality: in regard to eternity and truth it is precisely 
money that is the imaginary .... What is the earnestness of 
life? If in truth you have considered this serious question, 
then remember how you answered it to yourself; or let me 
remind you how you answered it. Earnestness is a human being's 
relationship to God; everywhere the thought of God accompanies 
what a human being does, thinks, and says, earnestness is 
present; therein lies earnestness. But money is the world's 
god; therefore it believes that everything which has to do 
with money or has a relationship to money is earnestness," SV 
12,306; WL, 295-96. 
142 
philosophy of political consciousness. 13 The aim is to become 
the right sort of single self. 
Every serious person who has an eye for the 
conditions of this age will easily perceive how 
important it is, foundationally and in obedience to 
every consequence and under the weight of an 
enormous responsibility but also extended to every 
true extreme, boldly to oppose an immoral confusion 
that philosophically and socially wants to 
demoralize "single selves" ["de Enkelte") with the 
help of "humanity" or imaginary societal 
qualifications. It is a confusion that wants to 
teach ungodly contempt for the primary condition of 
everything religious: to be a single human being (SV 
18,161; POV, 126-27). 
The category of the single self therefore needs to be worked 
through, and this is especially true under the conditions of 
a social system that tends to ignore the social aspects of 
this category and consequently tends to ignore the single 
self's need for community. That is to say, "the present age" 
needs to be problematized from just this perspective. It is 
this task Kierkegaard set for himself. 
13 Sl0k is correct when he emphasizes that the relation 
to "the world" is in this sense constitutive, that it is 
inherent to the unity which is the unavoidable point of 
departure: individual/community. The relation to God is 
constitutive in another sense, "that it is the presupposition 
for the mentioned point of departure, but a presupposition of 
the remarkable structure that one cannot begin in it. One has 
to arrive at it; one must in the establishing movement of 
existence collide with it [st0de@ den), but collide with it 
as something that in the same moment presupposes itself." Da 
Kierkegaard tav, p. 30. 
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111:1:2 
Let us now look at the actual circumstances of liberal 
society that Kierkegaard considered problematic and in need 
of a "corrective." On the one hand, he insisted liberal 
politics had produced "the illusion of perfect equality" 
conjured up by "the false prophets of secularism in the name 
of Christianity" (SV 12,74; WL, 81). On the other hand, there 
was the obsessive preoccupation with worldly things generated 
by "the present age" and its unquestioned adherence to 
materialism. The combination of calculative reflection, a 
trend toward numerical equality, and the primary ranking of 
economic security, Kierkegaard feared could only result in 
envy becoming "the negatively unifying principle" (SV 14,75; 
TA 81). That is to say, envy would bring "people together on 
the basis of what they are against, rather than what they 
support. " 14 
To Kierkegaard envy and its consequences meant the 
emergence of the principle of characterlessness, a pathology 
that will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
Essentially characterlessness expresses itself in the absence 
of genuine action or decision thereby numbing the need for 
societal relations and producing events that exude an air of 
artificiality (SV 14,66-7; TA, 71-2). As Kierkegaard laments, 
there was a general inability to translate the considerations 
14 Merold Westphal, p. 57. 
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of reflection and observation into deed. Insofar as the 
ethical can only express itself in action, this all important 
category of the human condition was negated and in its stead 
the principle of comparison was engendered. In turn, the 
principle of comparison is what generated envy. 
Although there was nothing new about envy, here in 
modernity Kierkegaard believed it had taken on a different 
face. Where before envy had traditionally tended toward 
admiration, implying a recognition of excellence, in "the 
present age," he lamented, envy had turned toward leveling, 
a condition which "stifles and impedes; it levels" (SV 14,77; 
TA, 84) . Substantively the ingredients that make up the 
framework holding society together may be the same, but they 
point in different directions, have taken on new colors, or 
more appropriately, they have lost their differentiating 
colors. Thus leveling renders individuals uniform, yet 
atomized, isolated, and impotent at a marginal distance from 
the relational core of human existence. 
Under the sway of the leveling process the single self 
is left unconnected to fellow human beings and to the 
community as a whole15 engrossed with computing the problems 
of the political relationship, but never actively engaging in 
15 As Tocqueville described in Democracy in America, tr. 
George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1969), p. 508: The individual is "forever 
thrown back on himself alone ... shut up in the solitude of 
his own heart." 
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it, never actively expressing citizenship. The leveling 
process initiates what might be called a negative 
intentionality that contradicts Kierkegaard's conception of 
human nature proper. 
The leveling process is the counterfeit anticipation 
of eternal life, which has been abolished as other-
worldly and now is to be realized here in abstracto. 
If everyone, each one separately, essentially is in 
the divine totality, then equality is the 
consumation. But if the dialectic turns away from 
inwardness and wants to restore equality by the 
negative principle that they who separately are not 
essential are equal in the union of externality, 
then this is the leveling process. 16 
When, in addition, human consensus is now seen to determine 
the relationship between the single self and the state, Karl 
Lowith may be correct when he suggests Kierkegaard agreed with 
Marx that the modern human being as bourgeois is not a zoon 
politikon; "as a citizen he is abstracted from himself as a 
private individual." 17 
The focus from the political perspective will first be 
on the problem of externality and its connection to the 
leveling process and the latter's eager promoter according to 
Kierkegaard: public opinion (Publikum). Secondly, the 
dissertation will discuss the political consequences of this 
16 PAP VII 1 B 135:15, emphasis added. For a sympathetic 
understanding of the leveling process around this same time 
see Tocqueville, Op. Cit. vol. II, part III, especially 
chapters 19 and 21. Kierkegaard was apparently not familiar 
with this greatest work of Tocqueville's. 
17 From Hegel to Nietzsche (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 242-43. 
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pathological relationship. 
Kierkegaard's major point, which contradicts the leading 
political theories of his day, is that the idea of sociality, 
to distinguish it from his "idea of community," is not what 
can save the age. A number of things appear to be happening 
simultaneously here. The two concepts appear to be alike, and 
that is precisely the problem as Kierkegaard sees it. They 
have been confused with one another; their differences have 
not been discerned. But their differences are essential, 
because the idea of sociality expresses quantitative measures, 
what Kierkegaard sometimes scathingly refers to as the 
"numerical" (SV 14,96; TA, 106). He concedes that this form 
of "association-principle" has its validity in terms of 
material interests, meaning for decisions on policy and the 
distribution of goods this principle will do. But these items 
are not the object of his discourse. In contrast, the ''idea 
of community" expresses a qualitative measure, an experience 
of consciousness that allows the single self the benefits of 
community without the loss of its self-defining nature (SV 
14, 58; TA, 62) . 18 Kierkegaard illustrates this idea by an 
astronomical analogy and then compares the two. 
"The harmony of the spheres is the unity of each 
planet relating to itself and to the whole. Take 
away one of the relations, and there will be chaos. 
But in the world of individuals the relation is not 
the only constituting factor, and therefore there 
are two forms. Remove the relation to oneself, and 
we have the tumultuous self-relating of the mass to 
18 See introductory quotation to chapter IV. 
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an idea; but remove this as well, then we have 
brutality (SV 14,58; TA, 63). 
While the latter is the solution to the problem of 
modernity as will be shown in the following chapters, the 
former Kierkegaard perceived as the major ideological problem 
of modernity. But ingeniously he also recognizes it as an 
instrument of skepticism necessary for the right development 
of selfhood (SV 14,96; TA, 106). The idea of sociality serves 
a purpose, but ultimately it is negative inasmuch as in "the 
present age" it serves as entertainment, as an escape, or as 
an illusion; it does not fulfill a genuine need. Modern man 
has developed a series of artificial wants which he believes 
the numerical association can fulfill. Its dialectic is that 
as it strengthens individuals it enervates them; it 
strengthens by the numerical in the union, but this 
is ethically a weakening. Only if the single self 
despite the whole world has won an ethical 
disposition in himself, only then can there be talk 
of in truth uniting (SV 14,96-7; TA, 106). 
There is a strong implication here that the single self 
who belongs to a group, or to "the many" whom Kierkegaard 
admits is his polemical aim, 19 is somehow different from the 
person who remains his own self. In that sense it could be 
argued that Kierkegaard sees a regressive movement to the 
animal stage on the part of the modern single self who adheres 
to the idea of sociality and its emphasis on external 
concerns. In The Sickness Unto Death this impression is 
19 PAP VIII 1 A 23 (JP 5979). 
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strengthened by the following claim: 
[T]he concept judgment corresponds to the single 
self; judgment is not made en masse. People can be 
put to death en masse, can be sprayed en masse, can 
be flattered en masse, in short in many ways they 
can be treated as cattle, but people cannot be 
judged as cattle, for cattle cannot come under 
judgment. No matter how many are judged, if the 
judging is to have any earnestness and truth, then 
each single self is judged (SV 15,172; SUD, 123). 
The regression to the animal stage is problematic inasmuch as 
for Kierkegaard human beings are by nature both animal and 
spirit. Any attempt to examine the single self from that 
perspective Kierkegaard would consider reductionist. As 
Westphal has pointed out, the discussion is not about an 
evolutionary movement still to be completed. Rather, 
to become a herd is to sink, to fall below what one 
already is. But since we are spirit by nature we 
cannot become simply or merely animal, and the human 
herd will always be distinctively human. It 
presupposes, for example, envy which the animal herd 
lacks .... Mass society is a flight from spirit. 
It is a state in which those who are a polar tension 
of nature and spirit play the role of the animals 
they can never be. It is the shared bad faith by 
which individuals help each other sustain the 
illusion that they can shirk their spiritual destiny 
by joining the public. 20 
People find solace and power in numbers, but it is a 
power that can only satisfy their animal nature, and hence 
they are left individually incomplete. As Kierkegaard 
concludes this argument with scathing irony, "As long as we 
are many about it, then there is no wrong. It is nonsense and 
20 Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," pp. 48-9. 
References are to PAP XI 2 A 88 (JP 2986) and SV 14,75-7; TA 
81-4. 
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an antiquated notion that the many can do wrong" (SV 15,172; 
SUD, 123). Such is the wisdom of an age that determines all 
values by consent. 
It is clear that, inasmuch as the unity 
"individual/community" is the point of departure, Kierkegaard 
at least has certain requirements, if not an entire theory of 
state, for how that community should be structured. An 
appropriate subtitle for the work on which much of this 
section is based, Two Ages: A literary Review, would be "the 
impotence of politics." In this review of a novella of the 
same name Kierkegaard juxtaposes the two foremost political 
structures of modernity, that of revolution to win individual 
freedoms and the leveling process to assure equality both of 
which resulted in the loss of political authority. In the case 
of the former, the French Revolution had led to violence, 
anarchy, and riotousness (SV 14,58; TA 63), and in the case 
of the latter, the demand for equality had produced the 
leveling process. Both events happened, Kierkegaard claims, 
as the result of abuse of political power, and hence political 
authority had brought this nemesis of its own demise upon 
itself (SV 14,98; TA, 108). 
This development meant that all relationships, be they 
political, social, or familial in nature, had been 
equivocated, i.e. the natural (conventional?) authority 
inherent to such relations had eroded. It had eroded because 
the essential third factor, the idea, had dissipated and there 
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was no longer an object to which the parties could commit 
themselves. All points of direction had simply become blurred 
and unfocused leaving the relations intact but essentially 
meaningless. 
If the essential passion is taken away, the one 
consideration, everything becomes an insignificant 
externality without character. Then the flow of the 
spring of ideality is stopped, life together 
(Samlivet] becomes stagnant water, and this is 
crudeness. The coiled springs of life-
relationships, which are what they are only because 
of qualitatively distinguishing passion, lose their 
resilience; the distance of the differentiated from 
its difference in the expression of the qualitative 
is not the law for the relation of inwardness to 
each other in the relation. Inwardness is lacking, 
and to that extent the relation does not exist, or 
the relation is an inert cohesion (SV 14,58,72; TA, 
62, 78) . 21 
The loss of the idea in the political relationship means 
that the role of the citizen changes. Where before 
participation was the defining characteristic, spectatorship 
now characterizes the citizen. Kierkegaard says the citizen 
has become a third person (Trediemand}, (not to be confused 
with the idea or "the third factor}, meaning he no longer 
belongs in the relation. That is to say, the single self 
21 It is unfortunate that the new edition of Two Ages 
translates det Forskjelliges Fjernhed fra sit Forskjellige as 
"difference between opposites." Being different does not mean 
being opposites, and "distance" has a meaning other than 
"difference." The possessive sit is important inasmuch as it 
implies an underlying assumption of these different entities 
essentially belonging together. That is the whole point of the 
third factor. They belong together in the idea. Thus by 
invoking the third factor, Kierkegaard has avoided questions 
regarding the type of relationship between the entities and 
thereby avoided such Hegelian prototypes as the "Master-Slave" 
pair. 
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stands outside the relationship and becomes alienated toward 
itself. 
The role of citizenship has been marginalized by the 
cautious (prudent) preoccupation with calculating the 
particulars of the relationship, and the political authority 
has been reduced to meaningless procedural manipulation (SV 
14,73; TA, 79). The citizen no longer recognizes the bond to 
the political authority, a bond Kierkegaard says is natural 
(he uses the analogy of father and son (Ibid)), reminding us 
of his claim in Works of Love about the need of community 
natural to human beings. 22 If the naturalness of the political 
relation is unrecognizable to the single self, then the 
necessity for existential commitment to the political is also 
unrecognizable. 
Kierkegaard is here pointing to the major problem of 
liberal theory, its inability to engender moral fervor 
especially toward any notion of the good of the whole. This 
is important to Kierkegaard inasmuch as this concern for the 
whole, this good is constitutive of his "idea of community." 
22 Kierkegaard emphasizes this bond between the 
individual and the state when he comments in a journal note 
that the political relationship must engage each individual 
separately. "The excellent of Plato's Republic is precisely 
that he does not make the state higher than the individual. 
. In order to describe the individual he describes the 
state; he describes a democrat, and in order to do that he 
describes democracy. He constructs a state for the individual, 
unum nor is omnes this is the proper human ideali ty; 
otherwise we get the confusion about the many manifesting 
something entirely different by being many, than what each is 
separately." PAP VII 1 A 70 (JP 3327). 
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aut in liberal theory such concern for the whole has been 
sacrificed for the sake of individual self-satisfaction, a 
satisfaction grounded in the rights to property and hence in 
externality. As Locke himself concedes, reason, by which he 
meant something like community or "natural love amongst 
men, 1123 has been sacrificed on the altar of self-interest. 24 
In such a move the single self from Kierkegaard's perspective 
has paradoxically isolated itself from the shared morality 
that constitutes community. The single self has isolated 
itself from itself, inasmuch as it by nature needs community 
but instead sought refuge in the bosom of the crowd. "While 
both love of the ideal and the love of neighbor place 
constraints on self-love, there is a love that does not, and 
23 The Second Treatise of Government, #5. 
24 Ibid, #124 and #181. Also Sheldon Wolin, Politics and 
Vision (Boston: Litttle, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 332; and 
James L. Wiser, Political Philosophy: A History of the Search 
for Order (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), 
p. 222. Of course, one should be careful not to exaggerate the 
reality of a natural community in Locke. It is possible to 
read it as Locke's moral promise as we have done here and as 
is the tendency, for example, with Thomas Jefferson's 
"Declaration of Independence." However, M. Seliger, The 
Liberal Politics of John Locke (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
Ltd., 1968), p. 92, is right to point out that reason does 
have a role in creating an "artificial" but real or rational 
society when he argues that "(w)hat is political and non-
political [the state of nature) are comparable because a state 
of war exists wherever force is used without right whether 
there is, or is not, a common judge. What is political and 
non-political remains distinguished because the concerted 
appeal to heaven is occasioned by and directed against 
government, whereas in the hypothetical state of nature 
everybody is judged between himself and others. Herein lies 
the most important practical difference: political society 
minimizes the use of force." 
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thUS can be easily put in the service of pure self-interest. 
That is the love of the crowd. 1125 
Although he does not specifically say so, it is clear 
that Kierkegaard distances himself from liberal theory's 
appeal to the most basic human instincts and instead wants to 
appeal to what is best in human nature. 26 He insists all human 
beings possess a higher nature that has the capacity to 
transcend the givenness of mundane existence, and if they 
choose to activate this "second nature," in freedom, then the 
distances between the differentiated and its difference is 
fundamentally narrowed to where the relation can exist 
passionately. That is to say, the tension of the unity 
"individual/community" has regained its elasticity and hence 
its positive mode where self-identification becomes possible, 
25 Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," p. 57. References 
are to PAP X 3 A 509 (JP 1789); PAP X 4 A 344 (JP 1799); and 
SV 18,156-57; POV, 118. As Kierkegaard suggests in a journal 
note, historical categories change and now the crowd has 
become the tyrant, PAP VIII 1 A 123 (JP 4118). For more on the 
relationship of the single self and the crowd see PAP VII 1 
A 176 (JP 5948). 
26 Moreover, Kierkegaard who was an avid reader of 
Aristotle cannot have avoided Aristotle's reminder in the 
Politics 1254a35-1254bl about who is under consideration: "It 
is in things whose condition is according to nature that one 
ought particularly to investigate what is by nature, not in 
things that are defective. Thus the human being to be studied 
is one whose state is best both in body and in soul -- in him 
this is clear; for in the case of the depraved, or those in 
a depraved condition, the body is often held to rule the soul 
on account of their being in a condition that is bad and 
unnatural." In chapters IV and V it will be shown how 
Kierkegaard applies this Aristotelian approach to analysis and 
appeals to what is best in human beings. 
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that is, self-identification as a socially qualified single 
self "who accepts what through the differentiation is 
27 transparent." 
III:1:3 
What has been said of the political relationship is to 
a large degree true of the social and the familial 
relationships. Kierkegaard compares the meaninglessness of all 
these relationships including the political relationship, in 
"the present age" to a grandfather clock that instead of 
striking the correct hour simply strikes once every hour. The 
clock works, as it were, yet it does not work. It expresses 
its function, yet its function is faulty for it does not give 
the correct time. 
And so it is in an enervating tension: the 
relationship exists (bestaae); with an abstract 
uninterruptedness that prevents the breakdown, 
something expresses itself that may be called the 
manifestations of the relations, and yet the 
relations are not only indicated imprecisely but 
almost meaninglessly {SV 14,74; TA, 80). 
By not engaging actively in the political relationship, 
or in the other relationships that according to Kierkegaard 
are natural to the human condition, there is a breakdown in 
the unity "individual/community" which consequently loses its 
meaningfulness. Inasmuch as the purpose of the relationship, 
the third factor (the "idea of community"), the good, as it 
27 Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 18. 
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were, that outside the self which was supposed to bind 
individuals to each other while maintaining their 
individuality, their differences, that has ceased to exist. 
on the one hand, human individuals have lost sight of their 
true selves as social beings in need of community. On the 
other hand, they have lost sight of the moral dimension that 
expresses their "second nature," they have lost sight of the 
ethical, of the good. To lose sight of the good is for 
Kierkegaard to be in a state of passionlessness which he 
insists is a state that lacks the ''investments of enthusiasm 
and inwardness in the political and the religious" {SV 14,69; 
TA, 74). 
With this pronouncement Kierkegaard has finally revealed 
that he considers the political and the religious to be the 
essential structures of the unity individual/community. But 
he is careful to add that this is not because the religious, 
i.e. Christianity, needs the political. Rather the political, 
i.e. the state, needs the religious, needs Christianity. 
Guizot says, the only politics for the state is 
indifference toward all religion. 
That suffices for the old Christianity which said, 
Christianity is indifferent toward any state 
constitution, can live equally well under all of 
them. 
Alas, but this inversion that it is now the state 
that wants to play the superior as if it did not 
need religion -- while it is religion that does not 
need the state. 28 
As Sl0k explains, the aim of Christianity is to proclaim the 
28 PAP X 3 A 679. 
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God-relation as the only justification for authentic 
existence. But inasmuch as that message in and of itself is 
incommensurable with the requirements of worldly existence, 
Christianity is indifferent to the constitution of any state. 
Although Christianity may establish itself as a state church 
which is an economic advantage as well as an advantage for its 
need for security, in its essence, in performing its duties, 
it does not really need such assistance. 29 Still, Kierkegaard 
is adamant in his stance against the call for religious 
tolerance which he regards as religious indifference. From his 
perspective there was only one god, the Christian God of the 
Incarnation, which he considered an historical concept making 
Christianity different from all other religions. 30 Therefore 
toleration would amount at best to disinterest and at worst 
to heresy. 31 
Christianity must proclaim its essence as the truth, but 
precisely for this reason neither can the state be tolerant 
toward religion, because it depends on it. That is to say, 
according to Kierkegaard religion performs an indispensable 
29 Da Kierkegaard tav, pp. 42-3. 
3o PAP IX A 264. Also Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 45. 
31 
"Christianity has never been tolerant to the point 
where it would allow other people to be pagans or perish. No, 
it has been intolerant to the point where the Apostle would 
rather lose his life in order to proclaim Christianity to 
them. One forgets that intolerance is perhaps to want to rule 
over others, but that it certainly is not intolerance to want 
to suffer to help others. 11 PAP VIII A 591. 
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function in society. This function is not just on par with 
other institutions and organizations. It is not just a service 
rendered to those citizens who are especially religiously 
interested. "Christianity represents the new and undeniable 
condition of life ... on the basis of which a human being 
can become an authentic and serious human being. 1132 
Sl0k concludes Kierkegaard's thought on the subject of 
the relation between the church and the state with a claim 
that bears unmistakable resemblance to Tocqueville's 
description of this relationship. 33 "The state . . . needs the 
church, and it is only in the church the procedure is carried 
out which sends the human being back into life in society as 
"good" citizens. 1134 In other words, the church occupies a 
position different from and higher than other social 
institutions inasmuch as its function does not have a specific 
purpose. As Kierkegaard emphasizes in a journal note, 
216. 
While the church actually represents "becoming" 
(Vorden], the state represents existence [bestaaen]. 
Therefore it is so dangerous when state and church 
grow together and are identified .... When it [the 
state] is an existence (et Bestaaende], one has to 
be very careful about abolishing it precisely 
because the "state" is in the idea "the established" 
( "det Bestaaende"]; and perhaps one is better served 
by energetically maintaining a less successful 
establishment (Bestaaende] than reforming too 
32 Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, pp. 43, 46. Also PAP III A 
33 Op. Cit. vol. I, pp. 287-301. 
34 Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 46. 
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early. 35 
precisely because Christianity looks to the future, it exists 
in order to provide the authenticity that makes it possible 
for human beings to develop their existence in the various 
institutions of the state. That is to say, it makes political 
life in the state humanly worthy. 36 Christianity thereby 
posits merely two obligations on the single self: to humble 
oneself before the requirements of the ideal, and "then for 
the rest" to be a good (Christian) citizen (SV 16,73; TC, 71). 
III:2:1 
The desire for immortality that has plagued the human 
disposition since time immemorial in its attempt to attain a 
godlike happiness is for Kierkegaard nothing but a prideful 
experiment in self-deification. It is an endeavor to negate 
what human beings are, mortal, and therefore imperfect. 
Because human beings can think the perfect, however, their 
existence is necessarily a struggle to reach perfection and 
suffering at not being able to complete the struggle. As 
Michael Henry suggests, "the self-deifying self is somewhat 
aware, the demand to be everything is a sign, not of 
superiority but of inferiority, for such a self actually lacks 
35 PAP X 1 A 552. 
36 Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 46. 
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the strength and the courage to live with imperfection and 
existential tensions." 37 Hence on a psychological level, 
Kierkegaard insists negative categories dominate everyday 
existence rendering impotent human beings the victims of 
"externality." 
Public opinion plagues the human condition as the self 
has become defined in terms of its public role based on 
superficial consciousness of social differentiations {SV 
12,88-91; WL, 95-7) . 38 It is because of this superficial level 
of consciousness that the leveling process becomes possible 
when envy engages the single self's imagination and in 
Kierkegaard's opinion apparently dominates it. 
A state of envy is an alienated state, quantitatively 
justified, that implicitly denies all qualitative categories 
of community (SV 14,69; TA, 74). The consequence is abstract 
subjectivism which expresses itself in an atomization of 
individuals. In such separated individuals "the political and 
religious bonds, which ... invisibly and spiritually hold 
states together, have been dissolved or weakened" resulting 
37 Michael Henry, "The Dostoyevskian Psyche and the Total 
Critique" in The Good Man in Society: Active Contemplation. 
Essays in Honor of Gerhart Niemeyer, eds. John A. Gueguen, 
Michael Henry, and James Rhodes (Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America, 1989), p. 133. 
38 Kresten Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, trans. 
Bruce Kirmmse (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1972), 
p. 244, explains: "In Works of Love social identity is 
discussed as 'the outer garments of differentiation,' which 
the individual binds firmly about himself and in which he 
mimics all his life, like an actor in his costume." 
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in isolation and hence a concentration on narrowly conceived 
. t t 39 self-in eres s. According to Nordentoft, Kierkegaard 
compares this development to the transition of the Gree.k city 
state from a cosmological civilization permeated by the "God-
consciousness," to an anthropological culture representing 
"the modern reflective and individualistic consciousness." 40 
Kierkegaard suggests in his dissertation that this is 
symbolized by Socrates' lone voice of warning "which never 
concerns itself with the substantive interests of the life of 
the state. " 41 
Kierkegaard diagnosed this illness of modern society as 
a pathology of consciousness, and inherent to this pathology 
is a denial of human nature proper. He characterized this 
condition as spiritlessness (Aandl0shed) which is best 
described by what he called its philistine-bourgeois mentality 
(Spidsborgerlighed) lacking all potentiality, or possibility, 
39 Ibid, p. 245. Nordentoft is quoting from Either/Or, 
vol. I, pub. Victor Eremita, trans. David F. and Lillian 
Marvin Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944 
and 1959), p. 139. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The Concept of Irony with continual Reference to 
Socrates, trans. Lee M. Capel (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1965), p. 188 (SV 1,195), hereafter known as CI. It 
should be noted that Kierkegaard here in his dissertation 
refers strictly to Plato's Apology and relies far too much on 
Hegel for his interpretation. 
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as Kierkegaard prefers (SV 15,97; SUD, 41) . 42 This pathology 
bad resulted in a life "of meaningless externality devoid of 
character" (SV 14, 58; TA, 62), a life without passion 
(Lidenskab), without earnestness, without inwardness. In 
short, human existence had lost its fundamental ground 
necessary for the "idea of community." This loss was 
42 As we saw in chapter one, Kierkegaard embraces 
Aristotelian teleology with the categories of possibility and 
actuality, and underscores that it is a movement (kinesis) in 
the language of existence, not of abstraction (SV 10,45; CUP, 
306). Both presuppose the presence of spirit: "Man is a 
synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a 
synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. 
This third is spirit," SV 6,137; CA, 43. On the meaning of 
spirit see The Sickness Unto Death where Kierkegaard gives a 
profound characterization of spirit and simultaneously 
explains the meaning of "spiritlessness": "Every human 
existence that is not conscious of itself as spirit or 
personally conscious before God as spirit, every human 
existence that does not rest transparently in God but vaguely 
rests in and merges in some abstract universality (state, 
nation, etc.) or, in the dark about his self, regards his 
capacities merely as powers to produce without becoming deeply 
aware of their source, regards his self, if it is to have 
intrinsic meaning, as an indefinable something -- every such 
existence, whatever it achieves, be it most amazing, however 
intensively it enjoys life aesthetically every such 
existence is nevertheless despair," SV 6,102; SUD, 46. 
Spiritlessness, then, constitutes denial of one's nature 
properly speaking, meaning there is not even consciousness of 
potentiality, or to use Kierkegaard's (infamous) phrase, there 
is not even consciousness of the "possibility of possibility," 
SV 6,136; CA, 42. 
Eugene Webb in Philosophers of Consciousness (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1988), p. 270, has suggested 
this movement (in the Aristotelian sense from potentiality to 
actuality) is a "process of actualization, of coming into 
existence in the proper sense, " a metaphoric image Kierkegaard 
favored. As such it "has the advantage of emphasizing the 
dynamism of the actual rather than the stasis of the ideal" 
as is "the tendency of Voegelin' s favored Metaxy metaphor 
[which) image[s) human existence as an inevitable deficiency 
longing for an unattainable sufficiency." 
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substituted with what he called a "dyspeptic, abnormal common 
sense" which has its ground in public opinion and which 
focuses exclusively on self-interested, calculative 
reflection. summarily, human experience had lost its most 
essential dimension as a "tension of reflection 
transformed the whole of existence into an equivocation, that 
in its facticity is. while privatization [privatissime), a 
dialectical fraud, surreptitiously inserts a secret way of 
reading -- that it is not" {SV 14,71-2; TA, 77). 43 
III:2:2 
In a double sense Kierkegaard teaches that the true 
nature of the single self has been corrupted both in terms of 
what it naturally is and what is ethically possible or 
desirable. On the one hand, all individual judgment has been 
relinquished to public opinion, to group interests, to an 
aggregation of uniform beings. Then the single self stands in 
contradiction to its natural self as it acts prudentially in 
order to conform to the public's conception of what is 
sensible. It is a condition that expresses itself in endless 
computations that signify a general disinterestedness -- the 
43 It is unfortunate that the new translation of Two Ages 
misreads this ingenious conceptualization by Kierkegaard and 
consequently mistranslates the latter part of this quotation. 
The dialectical fraud is not that the individual in the 
privacy of his own heart reads or reflects in secret ways that 
are unreal in some way, but that he understands his 
dialectical existence as a public/private bifurcation rather 
than as a transcendent/immanent differentiation. 
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very requirement of scientific methodology. From this it 
follows that the problem has been transformed from one of 
existential qualities to one of abstract formulations, i.e. 
doctrine, or ideology, as it were. On the other hand, by 
negating a differentiated self that has its ground in 
transcendence, values have been equivocated as the distinction 
between good and evil loses its requirement for decisiveness. 
From Kierkegaard's perspective this equivocation means 
the ethical demand of human existence, that necessarily 
follows from the proper conception of human nature, has been 
abandoned. In other words, there has been a loss of character 
in the sense that qualities like inwardness and commitment to 
the common good have come to be considered imprudent. The 
problem with prudential calculations is that they necessarily 
lead to comparisons and are ultimately skeptical as the 
question of either-or is incessantly asked, and only answered 
with another either-or. The question of pleasure dominates 
these calculations, and since pleasure cannot be measured and 
certainly cannot be measured in terms of the pleasure of 
others, indecision is necessarily the result. But human 
imagination, being what it is, will always believe the other's 
pleasure is greater, and this is how Kierkegaard envisions the 
single self becomes entrapped in the condition of envy and 
uncertainty, its own and that of others (SV 14,75; TA, 81). 
From this perspective it sounds like Kierkegaard believed 
the modern single self has never grown up, has never reached 
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the maturity of being truthful to the self in the sense that 
self-awareness is attained without the aid of comparison. In 
the Kierkegaardian vernacular, the modern single self has not 
learned to choose itself as is the obligation of each single 
self, has not asked the Socratic question of itself. Instead 
we live a philistine existence of superficiality as a product 
of what the given society and its culture inescapably will 
make a person into given his predisposition. As Johannes Sl0k 
has so aptly interpreted Kierkegaard, a philistine lives in 
the illusion that he has freely made the principal decisions 
for his life which in reality external anonymous forces have 
made on his behalf. 44 
When uncertainty has taken this strong a hold of the 
single self, the decisions of life become dictated; 
Kierkegaard insists, we are then no longer capable of 
recognizing excellence, no longer capable of admiring it and 
evaluating it for its significance to society -- imitation is 
no longer a possibility for ordering society, learning by 
example is no longer an option. 
The present age tends toward mathematical equality 
44 Kierkegaards univers: En ny guide til geniet 
(K¢benhavn: Centrum, 1983), p. 28. Sl0k brings out a point 
about the philistine bourgeois that would seem to indicate 
that Kierkegaard in fact had four major spheres of "existence" 
even though he did not have a fictitious author to describe 
and analyse this existence-sphere. The reason for that is, of 
course, obvious inasmuch as a philistine bourgeois would not 
be able to explain his own condition. Once a philistine 
bourgeois becomes aware of his own condition and what it 
means, he is immediately transformed into an aesthete -- "in 
Kierkegaard's specific meaning of the word." Ibid, p. 28-9. 
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so that almost equally through all classes so many 
make one individual [Individ) {SV 14,78; TA, 85). 
It is the age of the ascendency of the category of "generation 
over the category of individuality" ( sv 14, 7 8; TA, 84·) • If 
this is true, it is also true that the single self suffers 
from a disinterest in self-improvement and a disinterest in 
the betterment of the community. To Kierkegaard this spells 
both ethical and political impotence, and he considers such 
a condition utterly irrational. 
The pathology is completed when envy, the consequence of 
uncertainty, instead begins to degrade excellence, to minimize 
its significance, until it actually is no longer excellence. 
Then "envy directs itself against the excellence that is, and 
against that which will come" {SV 14,77; TA, 84). 45 Envy 
establishes itself as an instrument of leveling, and from this 
nothing excellent can arise. The leveling process is thus 
impotent as it stifles and impedes initiative and is for that 
reason "abstraction's victory over indi victuals" ( SV 14, 78; TA, 
84). Then the leveling process is maximized, the bottom of the 
abyss, which Kierkegaard likens to "deathly silence," is 
reached. Out of this "deathly silence" nothing can rise, and 
powerlessness {Afmregtighed) reigns {SV 14,77; TA, 84). 
45 In the Danish text no i talization appears in this 
short sentence as it does in the translation. 
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III:2:3 
The juxtapositioning of excellence and leveling is 
deliberate on Kierkegaard's part. He wants to emphasize how 
the latter negates the former and, by so doing, negates human 
nature proper as intentionally oriented. 46 He defines 
graphically the emergence of this contradiction over time 
borrowing without blushing from Hegel's methodology. 
The dialectic of antiquity oriented toward excellence, 
he says, implied a single great individual actively and hence 
interestedly participating in the affairs of the city and 
thereby fulfilling the requirements of his social nature. 
still, Kierkegaard reminds the reader, there were many such 
as the slaves for whom this was not a possibility. Nor was it 
an alternative for women, something Kierkegaard omits from his 
consideration. The next step is the dialectic of Christianity 
oriented toward representation which implied the majority 
seeing itself in the representative and "liberated in the 
consciousness that it is them he represents, in a sort of 
self-consciousness" (SV 14,78; TA, 84). The participatory 
element has already been drastically reduced, which means the 
depravation of the single self has begun. 47 Finally, we have 
46 Here we should understand the intentional orientation 
to refer especially to the participatory aspect of human 
experience, a requirement of possessing a social nature. 
47 One might wonder whether Kierkegaard really means to 
say that the emergence of institutionalized Christianity is 
in fact the beginning of the individual's downfall. If so, 
that may indeed be the reason he places so much emphasis on 
achieving contemporaneity with the first generation which 
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the dialectic of "the present age" which is oriented toward 
equality. At this level the participatory element of the human 
condition has been completely numbed by the leveling process 
which Kierkegaard insists is the logical implication of the 
generation's dominance over single indi victuals. Instead of 
concrete participation we get the abstraction of public 
opinion which tends to dictate human experience. 
As a member of the public, Kierkegaard explains that the 
single self remains an observer of existence, but does not 
engage in it. Public opinion is incapable of establishing 
community because its members lack contemporaneity, they lack 
presence. They lack the engaged non-spectator presence of the 
active person of inwardness who, for example, form the 
membership of majorities and minorities. While the latter are 
accountable to their membership, this is not true of public 
opinion which therefore lacks all integrity. Yet, it remains 
a dominant force upon the psyche of its members, even under 
the worst circumstances because public opinion can do no 
wrong. Public opinion is always "right," or it is not at all. 
In contrast, majorities may well lose their power if their 
membership lose interest (SV 14,84; TA, 92). 
passionately participated in the life of Jesus. See SV 6,53-
98; PF, 55-110. 
For a parallel argument see Eric Voegelin, The New 
Science of Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1952), p. 123: "The more people are drawn or pressured into 
the Christian orbit, the greater will be the number among them 
who do not have the spiritual stamina for the heroic adventure 
of the soul that is Christianity." 
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Kierkegaard suggests that the phantom of the public and 
the all pervasive power of public opinion emerges only in the 
absence of a strong communal life which gives substance to the 
historical single self's existential experience. What is 
lacking in modern society is such a strong communal life, 
precisely because the participatory element has been 
substituted by an emphasis on the self and the external 
interests of the self. Kierkegaard is drawing the obvious 
conclusion that also occurred to Tocqueville, 48 namely that 
only through the act of participation can single selves 
transcend their private reality in a concern for the good of 
the whole. Lacking this element of existence, people will 
suffer from the loss of a concrete foundation that reinforces 
and upbuilds the single self through experience, yet without 
shaping it in any determined sense. The result are single 
selves who have turned into anonymous uniform beings that lack 
all distinction. 49 Finally, membership in the public is 
48 Op. Cit. vol. II, pp. 509-13. 
49 As Hannah Arendt would argue, it is only through 
participation in the political that the individual can 
distinguish himself, an axiom Kierkegaard apparently also 
subscribes to. The Human Condition, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 30-7. Also Glenn Tinder, Against 
Fate: An Essay on Personal Dignity (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981}, p. 36. 
In a parallel description of public opinion Tocqueville 
phrases it well when he says in Democracy in America, p. 435: 
"The nearer men are to a common level of uniformity, the less 
are they inclined to believe blindly in any man or any class. 
But they are readier to trust the mass, and public opinion 
becomes more and more mistress of the world." 
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demoralizing. While there are responsibilities connected with 
membership in the race, or citizenship in a state or 
community, none are needed for membership in the public. The 
public retains its status, for good or for bad, and requires 
nothing from its membership. Thus membership in the public 
dulls the people's sense of citizenship and community to the 
point where both are all but forgotten. To Kierkegaard such 
a state of mind constitutes a pathology of consciousness. 
At this pathological stage public opinion has entirely 
corrupted individual rationality. Moreover, insofar as the 
single self's desire for applying the extreme formulation of 
the concept of equality, the leveling principle, to personal 
existence, it also signifies the downfall of the single self. 
It is thus an age of complete skepticism which apparently 
cannot be halted, because any attempt to halt the leveling 
process exemplifies the very principle of leveling. 
Kierkegaard refers to this as the "spontaneous combustion of 
the human race {SV 14,80; TA, 87), a pregnant phrase he also 
uses in Works of Love. 
III:2:4 
What we need to ask is what constitutes the underlying 
cause for this pathological condition, and Kierkegaard is very 
forthcoming and unambiguous on that point. 
describes the problem as one of the 
170 
In general he 
world's self-
. . t' so ae1f1ca ion. Self-deification removes the authoritative 
element of transcendence and renders the world without a 
standard (Maalestok) by which to measure itself. One might ask 
whether standards must necessarily have a transcendent 
dimension. Nevertheless, for Kierkegaard, the lack of such a 
measure results in ambiguity and equivocation in existence, 
a condition that is especially articulated in the voluntary 
mediation of the principle of contradiction between good and 
evil. 
For Kierkegaard the principle of contradiction 
constituted an axiom of existence. "To suspend [ha:?ve = opha:?ve 
= the German aufheben) the principle of contradiction is the 
existential expression for being in contradiction with 
oneself" (SV 14,88; TA, 97). And to be in contradiction with 
oneself is to be separated from the idea the framework for 
which is the essential distinction between good and evil in 
so "If order is to be maintained in existence -- and God 
does want that, for he is not a God of confusion -- then the 
first and foremost thing to keep in mind is that every human 
being is an individual (enkelt) human being, becomes self-
conscious of being an individual human being. If human beings 
are first permitted to run together in what Aristotle calls 
the animal category [Politics 128la40-43 and 128lbl5-20) --
the multitude -- then this abstraction instead of being less 
than nothing, less than the most insignificant individual 
human being comes to be regarded as being something -- then 
it does not take long before this abstraction becomes God," 
SV 15,167; SUD, 117-18. 
The editors of the English translation are correct in 
suggesting that II if this is the portion [ in Ar is tot le' s 
Politics) to which Kierkegaard refers, he makes selective use 
of it, for Aristotle argues both sides of the mass/individual-
expert issue," SUD, 180, note 65. 
171 
action and decision (SV 14,61; TA, 66). To suspend this 
essential distinction is to be nothing at all. Or to put it 
in positive terms, it means that to be existentially, and 
hence to acknowledge the distinction, is to be in harmony with 
oneself, with who one is. It is to be at home with the self. 
The principle of contradiction strengthens the 
individual [Individ] in faithfulness to itself, so 
that he, like that steadfast number three Socrates 
speaks of so beautifully, will rather endure 
everything than become a number four or even become 
a very large even number. He will rather be 
something small in faithfulness to himself than all 
sorts of things in contradiction with himself" (SV 
14,89; TA, 97) . 51 
Not to be faithful to oneself or not to be in harmony with 
oneself expresses itself in a number of debilitating ways that 
are all grounded in the original suspension of the principle 
51 Kierkegaard is, of course, referring to Plato's Phaedo 
104c. But more importantly, he is also referring to the 
Gorgias 482c where Socrates says to Callicles: "It would be 
better for me that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be 
out of tune and loud with discord, and that multitudes of men 
should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should 
be out of harmony with myself and contradict me." The 
translation is Hannah Arendt's, The Life of the Mind (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 181. She emphasizes 
"being one" claiming it is frequently left out in translation. 
What is of particular interest in regard to this quotation is 
its relationship in the dialogue to philosophy's capacity to 
engender community as opposed to the efforts of rhetoric. As 
Socrates insists, "philosophy speaks always the same'' (482b) 
while rhetoric caters to the people's divergent interests, 
not to their needs, which always are the same. Thus Plato 
performs a double move inasmuch as Socrates' love of 
philosophy not only creates harmony in his soul but also in 
the city. For Kierkegaard, to speak always the same is to 
acknowledge the principle of contradiction in its broadest 
implication. It means to be in character with oneself and to 
remain so, and hence to be faithful to oneself. Only by being 
in harmony with oneself is community possible. 
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of contradiction. But common to them all is that they sharply 
differentiate between externality, a materialistic category 
that in Kierkegaard's opinion preoccupies ''the present age," 
and inwardness, a passionate category he claims characterizes 
the age of revolution (SV 14,57-62; TA, 61-6). 
To clarify this claim it is helpful to place the examples 
Kierkegaard uses in two columns, one that belongs to 
inwardness and one that belongs to externality, and then to 
name and describe what mediates and hence obscures their 
distinctiveness. 
inwardness 
being silent 
private 
form 
hiddenness 
loving 
subjectivity 
speaking 
public 
matter externality 
disclosedness 
dissolute 
objectivity 
The "disjunction" between the first pair, being silent 
vs speaking, is suspended by chatter. To chatter is for 
Kierkegaard pathological inasmuch as he believes silence is 
inwardness. Without silence, without inwardness, essential 
speech and action becomes impossible. Here it should be 
remembered that Kierkegaard by essential means passionate 
political and religious inwardness. It is essential speech 
and action grounded in thoughtful silence that characterizes 
human beings as human, he says, but it is also speech and 
action that provides the framework for community. Thus 
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Kierkegaard speaks about "the more a person has ideality and 
ideas in silence, the more he will be able in his daily 
associations to regenerate [gjenf0de] his daily life and the 
daily life of other people." In contrast, chatter can only 
expose emptiness as a ground and hence produce nothing 
essential, only thoughtlessness (SV 14,89-90; TA, 98-9). By 
chatter Kierkegaard, of course, means gossip which he 
considers all the more prevalent because "ambiguity is a 
titillating incitement and entirely differently verbose than 
the joy over the good and the abhorrence of evil" (SV 14,72; 
TA, 78). 52 
Chatter also suspends the distinction between public and 
private, and as a result we get a public whose only interest 
is what is most private (SV 14,91; TA, 100) . 53 Kierkegaard is 
not so much concerned about a public/private distinction as 
such, as noted above. It is, nevertheless, a popular subject 
among contemporary political theorists who do not acknowledge 
the transcendent/immanent distinction which Kierkegaard 
52 The new translation at this point takes what would 
seem to be unnecessary freedoms. Apparently the word 
"equivocation" does not appear in the Danish text. We say 
apparently, because only one Danish edition of Two Ages has 
been available for this project. However, several English 
translations have been consulted from which it would seem an 
addition has indeed been made. 
53 Kierkegaard's analysis of the present age has an 
immediate bearing on contemporary times, and agreement with 
Westphal is easy when he suggests "Kierkegaard offers us a 
shoe that fits embarrassingly well. At times it appears that 
he knows us better than we know ourselves." "Kierkegaard's 
Sociology," p. 44. 
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considers a much more fundamental distinction. His concern is 
with the pathological consciousness of the single self. He 
suggests that with the creation of public opinion, a creation 
he insists can happen only in the absence of a strong 
communal life, nothing is sacred, everything is disclosed. 54 
Mediating the principle of contradiction also brings 
forth formlessness which suspends the distinction between 
what is referred to as form and matter [Indhold]. 55 That is 
to say, according to his philosophical anthropology human 
beings are constituted by soul and body, but it is spirit 
that qualifies them {SV 6,138; CA, 44) . 56 With formlessness, 
however, what is inner and what is outer becomes confused 
(ambiguous) and the principle of action becomes externally 
qualified. Then human beings begin to act strictly "on 
principle" (SV 14,92; TA, 101). To posit the principle of 
action or moral conscience externally, in the majority, as 
54 We might speculate that inasmuch as Kierkegaard 
himself was the object of much gossip or "chatter," it is not 
unlikely that a very personal feeling is emerging here. On the 
other hand, the tabloids of contemporary society had their 
equivalent in Kierkegaard's days (cf. The Corsair Affair, ed. 
and tr. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), and hence Kierkegaard's proposition 
cannot simply be dismissed as sour grapes. 
55 Strictly speaking, Indhold means content, but I 
believe Kierkegaard is taking his clue from Aristotle's 
formulation in De Anima 412a where he defines the body as 
matter and the soul as form, the actuality of the body. 
56 In his "Historical Introduction" to The Concept of 
Anxiety, p. xiv Reidar Thomte clarifies how Kierkegaard's 
philosophical anthropology should be understood. See chapter 
IV, p. 172, note 65. 
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for example in Locke's theory of state, 57 or in accordance 
with the "Greatest Happiness Principle" as in 
utilitarianism, 58 for the sake of supporting, on principle, 
the demand of the age, is to act calculatingly and in 
disregard of the needs of the whole community. It is to 
render the single self undifferentiated and hence without 
personal responsibility, and that is essentially to act in 
contradiction with the genuine self and therefore to act 
disharmoniously in regard to the self {SV 14,92-3; TA, 101-
02) . 59 
57 Second Treatise of Government, ##95, 127-31. 
58 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York: New 
American Library, 1962), p. 319 and in passim. 
59 Cf. Sheldon Wolin , Op. Cit. p. 338: "As Locke's 
argument reveals, the growing distrust of conscience 
stimulated the search for a new kind of conscience, social 
rather than individual, one that would be an internalized 
expression of external rules rather than the externalized 
expression of internal convictions ... to protect what a 
growing secular society most treasured; namely weal th and 
status, or more briefly, "interests." 
It is also possible that Kierkegaard is referring to Kant 
in regard to the formless tendency of acting "on principle." 
Kant says in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1959): 
"An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth 
in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the 
maxim by which it is determined .... Duty is the necessity 
of an action executed from respect for law" (p. 16) . He 
continues, "Law alone implies the concept of an unconditional 
and objective and hence universally valid necessity" (p. 34, 
emphasis added). Inasmuch as the categorical imperative 
"contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxim 
should accord with this law ... there is nothing remaining 
in it except the universality of law as such to which the 
maxim of the action should conform .... There is, therefore, 
only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to 
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law" (pp. 38-9, emphasis added). The 
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To be without personal responsibility, according to 
Kierkegaard, is to be superficial, and superficiality 
suspends the distinction 
disclosedness. Inasmuch as 
between hiddenness 
"superficiality gives 
and 
the 
appearance of being anything and everything," what is 
essential is not allowed to be thought through in hiddenness, 
and thoughtful intention is not allowed to emerge. Everything 
is hurriedly forced to the surface, undeliberated, and what 
is disclosed is characterized as emptiness. It is an 
emptiness which Kierkegaard says "nevertheless extensively 
wins the disappointing advantage of delusion over essential 
point for Kierkegaard is that one's duty in this case is to 
universal law and hence to something external to one's self. 
Duty is not to the good, not to the neighbor, not to God. It 
is to an abstract principle the goodness of which cannot be 
guaranteed, or at least is not guaranteed by Kant. As he says 
a little later, "A thing has no worth other than that 
determined for it by the law" (p. 54). Although this 
legislation which "determines all worth must therefore have 
a dignity, i.e. , unconditional and incomparable worth" to 
which a rational being can have nothing but "respect" (p. 54), 
Kant also concerns himself very little about the effects of 
such a principle on the individual human being except, of 
course, to secure his autonomy. One could perhaps even argue 
Wolin's characterization would be accurate in the case of the 
categorical imperative as well. 
For Kierkegaard, in contrast, "principium, as the word 
says, is the primary, that is, the substantial, the idea in 
the unopened form of feeling and inspiration that impels the 
individual by its inner drive" {SV 14,92; TA, 101). In other 
words, principle is what develops the concrete individual from 
within, forms character by its passionate inwardness, and 
moves the individual to do the good. For more on doing the 
good, or as Kierkegaard puts it, "willing one thing" see 
Purity of Heart, tr. Douglas Steere, (New York: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1956) in passim, and Jeremy Walker's 
excellent interpretation To Will One Thing: Reflections on 
Kierkegaard's PURITY OF HEART (Montreal: Mc Gill-Queen's 
University Press, 1972). 
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disclosedness which has the homogeneous essentiality of 
deepening" (SV 14,93; TA, 102). Rather than achieving 
transparency, this form of disclosedness only uncovers 
appearances. That is to say, psychologically, the single self 
is not tending to personal development in terms of its nature 
as essentially spirit. 
When a person is caught in this publicness of 
disclosedness, he will instead resort to flattery (Leflerie) 
which suspends the distinction between loving and being 
dissolute or debauched (udsv~vende). Flattery in this sense 
indulges in tangentially daring to touch evil and hence 
avoids realizing the good (SV 14,93-4; TA, 103). Kierkegaard 
must have in mind the Don Juan (Don Giovanni) of Either/Or, 
vol. I, whom he calls the incarnation of sensuousness. His 
character falls entirely outside of ethical categories and 
hence he is an actor of ultimate deception (SV 2,93-6; EO I, 
98-102) . While you can love only one person essentially, 
"what is a joy for the poet to hear and celebrate," flattery 
can be extended to many. While loving indicates a being for 
the other, the object of the love, flattery is extended to as 
many as possible in order to satisfy only the self. 60 To 
satisfy oneself necessitates prudent calculation and a 
6° Kierkegaard is anything but clear on this subject of 
loving just one. In a journal notation he seems to say that 
loving just one is essentially self-love, what he calls the 
"satisfaction of being-in-love (Forelskelse) and preference 
but basically also of self-love," PAP VIII 2 B 71:6. 
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rationalization of one's externalized existence. Or to put it 
in negative terms, "the aesthetic single self never has the 
dialectical within him but outside of him, or the single self 
is outwardly changed, but remains inwardly unchanged" (SV 
10,121; CUP, 387). 
All the distinctions between inwardness and exteriority 
that have been mediated by the act at raisonere (to reflect 
in a special way), at least in its Danish use. 61 To reflect 
in this sense, which Kierkegaard underscores by using this 
untranslatable word rather than "reflection," which is used 
throughout most of Two Ages, is to emphasize the Hegelian use 
as in speculative reasoning. This kind of reflection 
ultimately suspends "the passionate disjunction between 
subjectivity and objectivity," two categories that 
essentially encompass the pairs discussed above (SV 14,94; 
TA, 103). Here the reader should be careful not to 
misunderstand Kierkegaard. In the realm of pure thought and 
pure being, he agrees with Hegel that there is no either-
61 Alexander Dru in The Present Age and Of the Difference 
Between a Genius and an Apostle (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1962), p. 76, has translated this word as 
"reasoning." The Hongs in Two Ages, which is being used in the 
present project, translates raisonere as being ''loquacious." 
It is unclear why Kierkegaard would suddenly use a different 
word than the one he had been using generally although in a 
variety of forms throughout this work (see especially p. 88), 
inasmuch as that word, Reflexionen, translated as reflection 
at least in this work embodies all the connotations of the 
verb at raisonere. In the following we shall maintain the verb 
"to reflect." 
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.62 or, the mediation (reconciliation) is applicable. To 
abstract from concrete existence, however, as the speculative 
philosopher does, is for Kierkegaard a misfortune for the 
human race, because it means to lose out on (gaae Glip af) 
the essential categories of existence, to be deprived of 
political (ethical) and religious life (SV 10,14; CUP, 272). 
To think of Existents in the language of abstraction is to 
objectify what constitutes humanness. It means to ignore the 
difficulty inherent to Existents, that is, the difficulty of 
thinking the eternal as a process of becoming (Verden) , 
something one must necessarily do inasmuch as the thinker is, 
by the very act of thinking, in the process of becoming. In 
the present age, therefore, 
life's existential tasks have lost the interest of 
actuality, no illusion preserves the divine growth 
of inwardness that matures to decision. There is a 
mutual inquisitiveness; everyone waits unresolved 
and experienced in evasions for someone to come 
along who wills something -- in order then to bet 
his hand (SV 14,96; TA, 105) . 63 
62 
"The either-or of contradiction is ipso facto 
suspended when it is lifted out of the sphere of the 
existential and introduced into the eternity of abstract 
thought" (SV 10,13; CUP, 271). 
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"To bet his hand" may be a little difficult to 
interpret without the advantage of the text that precedes this 
quotation. The Danish text reads: "parere hans Haand. 11 It 
could also be translated as "toe his line," or "obey his 
signs." The implication then becomes clear that Kierkegaard 
means to say that the present age expects to be led by some 
charismatic figure such as a prophet as the text following the 
quotation indicates. 
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III:2:5 
To wait unresolved, to live without decision, in the hope 
that someone special, perhaps an outsider, 64 will appear is 
precisely where the inconsistency of the age becomes glaring. 
How should a charismatic leader be able to emerge within a 
society where the leveling process is at work. Therefore, 
Kierkegaard warns, if a prophet should be hidden within the 
multitude, he must be careful not to distinguish himself. 
Where prophets of olden days would be in danger if they lost 
their distinctiveness, the prophet of the present age would 
be in danger if he should become distinguishable among the 
indistinguishable many. In other words, the present age waits 
for something impossible. 
Kierkegaard (the prophet?) is telling the reader that in 
a self-deified social system which negates anyone who sets 
himself above society and yet does not call himself god, the 
problem must be engaged by the single self itself. This is 
emphasized by his insistence that political authority or 
government ought not engage in the moral education of its 
citizens. Consequently the cure for the pathology of 
consciousness lies within the single self, not outside of it. 
Kierkegaard's genius becomes apparent when he makes the 
very problem of the age an instrument of its cure. Thus he 
takes the leveling process which he believes is about to 
64 It is odd (or maybe not so odd) that Kierkegaard does 
not think of the possibility of an outsider of some sort. 
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destroy humankind and, so to speak, stands it on its head by 
turning it into a didactic taskmaster. He suggests that a deep 
analysis of the phenomenon of leveling may indeed educate the 
single self to inwardness and hence to genuine self-awareness 
of the deeper meaning of leveling. The deeper meaning of 
leveling is, of course, the principle of equality {SV 14,81; 
TA, 88) . That is to say, the single self must gain an 
awareness that an existential act is necessary, and that in 
turn necessitates a separation from the group, from the 
superficial idea of sociality. 
The single self must penetrate to its most basic 
characteristic, its need for community. The call is for a 
courageous act, a leap of faith literally, and it is a heroic 
leap in the sense that it involves the risk of the world's 
displeasure. It is something the single self must risk on its 
own, precisely because it must learn to be satisfied with who 
it is, "satisfied with ruling over itself instead of over the 
world." In other words, the single self must learn to express 
"its equality with all human beings" {SV 14,81; TA, 89). 
Without this kind of faithfulness to oneself, the "idea 
of community," which we are reminded is "the individual's 
telos and duty, 1165 is not possible inasmuch as it requires a 
transcendence of one's basic nature to a higher state of 
being, a "second nature." On this level of consciousness, the 
65 Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," pp. 46-7. 
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single self can concern itself with the idea. As a group 
member and hence as part of the dreaded numerical, I am but 
an animal who functions according to my instincts, but as a 
single self, self-directed in inwardness and hence defined as 
spirit in nature, I can live for the idea, an idea that 
according to Kierkegaard "makes unconditional and ultimate 
demands of our existence. 1166 The aim is political 
consciousness, for without such a healthy state of mind, no 
"idea of community" can be actualized. 
Throughout the last two chapters we have seen Kierkegaard 
contrast a thinking grounded in an authoritative truth that 
allows for existential transparency (Gjennemsigtighed) with 
a thinking qualified by mediation. The latter fails to explain 
existence and instead emphasizes abstractions that objectify 
categorical distinctions and thereby reduce them to 
meaningless relativities which prohibit decisive action. 
Mediation, therefore, constitutes a thinking entrenched in 
concealment or obscurity (Uklarhed) (SV 12,344; WL 332). As 
Kierkegaard puts it, 
It is, after all, one thing to think in such a way 
that one's attentiveness constantly is merely 
directed outward, in the direction of the object 
which is something external; it is something else 
to be turned in thinking in such a way that 
constantly at every moment one becomes conscious of 
one's self, conscious of one's own condition during 
the process of thinking, or how it is with oneself 
during the process of thinking. But only the latter 
66 Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," p. 47. 
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is essentially to think, it is precisely 
transparency. The former is an unclear thinking that 
suffers from the contradiction: that which in 
thinking clarifies something else is itself 
basically unclear. Such a thinker explains by his 
thinking something else, and see, he does not 
understand himself; externally in the direction of 
the object he perhaps makes a profound use of his 
natural talents, but in the inward direction he is 
very superficial, and therefore all his thinking, 
however fundamental it seems to be, is still 
basically superficial {SV 12,344; WL, 331-32). 
Socratic teaching, as we saw earlier in this chapter, 
helps to establish the untruth of the human condition through 
self-examination. Thereby the door is opened to an even more 
fundamental teaching, namely the equality of all human beings 
achieved in freedom. It is this teaching that is constitutive 
of what here is called Kierkegaard's therapeutic "corrective." 
It makes the "idea of community" possible, an idea that will 
be explored in chapters four and five, and which expresses 
itself in the unconditional yet rational demand "You shall 
love the neighbor as yourself." 
184 
Chapter IV 
A THERAPEUTIC "CORRECTIVE": 
THE AUTHENTIC SINGLE SELF AND THE "IDEA OF COMMUNITY" 
When single selves (each one individually) 
essentially in passion relate themselves to an idea 
and thereupon in unity essentially relate themselves 
to the same idea: then the relation is the perfected 
and the standard. Individually the relation 
separates them (each one has himself for himself) 
and ideally it unites them. 1 
Although impractical, still the religious is 
eternity's transfigured representation of the 
political's most beautiful dream. 2 
In the last two chapters we have shown how the 
symptomatic effects of the separation of knowledge and 
experience negatively influenced both theoretical and 
practical thinking. The modern consciousness, which, in 
Kierkegaard's opinion had suffered from an interminable 
pathology because of this separation, was in serious need of 
a cure. The aim of this and the following chapter, and indeed 
1 SV 14,58; TA, 62. 
2 sv 18,149; POV, 107. Apparently Kierkegaard was an avid 
reader of Cicero who in On the Commonweal th, trs. George 
Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Educational Publishing, 1976), p. 112, made the 
following comment, "There is, indeed, nothing in which human 
excellence can more nearly approximate the divine than in the 
foundation of new states or in the preservation of states 
already founded." 
of the whole project, is to demonstrate that Kierkegaard 
provided such a cure in the form of a therapeutic "corrective" 
-- albeit one entirely neglected by contemporary philosophers, 
political and otherwise. This therapeutic "corrective" 
constitutes what in this project is called a philosophy of 
political consciousness. 
But first it seems appropriate to explain what is meant 
by political consciousness. We do not seek a particular label 
by which to denote this concept such as patriotism or the 
like. Neither are we looking for ideological orientations such 
as liberal or conservative. We want to argue that 
Kierkegaard's political philosophy transcends such 
characterizations. Rather the intent is to lay bare from 
Kierkegaard's writings a particular human attitude expressed 
in his concept of Existents: the comportment of the single 
self (den Enkelte) toward the other and toward the world. The 
aim is to understand the relationship of the single self to 
the other and to its community and to understand the inherent 
responsibilities of such relationships which, by their very 
nature, are ethical and/or political. Said in another way, and 
emphasizing a more phenomenological aspect of Kierkegaard's 
theory of the single self, it is our aim to understand the 
relationship of a concrete consciousness to the world in which 
it happens to find itself. 
The parameters of this relationship insofar as it 
pertains to Kierkegaard's "idea of community" we understand 
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as citizenship, and the requirements for there to be what we 
would consider citizenship are all grounded in existential 
character or in personality. Unlike the emphasis on rights in 
liberal theory as we understand it from Locke, Kierkegaard's 
political philosophy of citizenship and character emphasizes 
obligations, that is, the obligations of the relationship 
between the single self and the community -- not a particular 
geographical community, but any community constituted by human 
beings. As such Kierkegaard's "corrective" has universal 
application, although, as his categories show, it is quite 
clear that they are thoroughly and exclusively grounded in 
western thought. 
IV:1 
To begin, Kierkegaard is eager to avoid misunderstandings 
in terms of his approach. In an accompanying paper to a short 
account of his authorship3 he comments on his methodological 
approach to a critique of "the established order. 114 There he 
3 
"About my work as an Author" was published in 1851 but, 
according to the editors of S0ren Kierkegaard's Samlede 
V~rker, was written in March 1849 as a precursor to the larger 
essay, The Point of View for my Work as an Author: A Report 
to History (POV) (published posthumously by Kierkegaard's 
brother Peter Christian Kierkegaard in 1859) which was of a 
much more personal character than the shorter account. 
4 The reader should understand that Kierkegaard by" the 
established order" is referring to both the ecclesiastical as 
well as the political leadership. He can address the two 
together because the Danish Lutheran Church was and is a state 
church ultimately governed by the political regime. 
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insists that his calculation (Bestik) has considered "the 
single self with polemical aim at the numerical, crowd, and 
the like" (SV 18,75; POV,156), all of which had produced a 
depersonalized single self and a disorderly society. still, 
he insists his methodology has not been to attack, since his 
aim was never to have been in or conjoined with the opposition 
that wanted to do away with "government" (Regjering) • 5 Rather 
his approach was to deliver a therapeutic "corrective" which 
implores that rulership be left to those called upon and 
therefore presumably best suited believing, somewhat 
dogmatically, "that they, fearing God, would stand fast, 
willing only one thing, the Good" (SV 18,76; POV,156). 
The successful implementation of the "corrective" depends 
to a large degree on the present political system remaining 
intact. Only then will the therapy have its desired effect 
which is to engender healthy single selves whose character 
express the conscious "idea of community" (the Good) . 6 In 
other words, Kierkegaard does not believe in radical surgery 
as in revolution, but rather adheres to a medicinal approach 
5 
"Instead of all these hypotheses about the origin of 
the state, etc., one should occupy oneself more with the 
question: given an established order, how can new points of 
departure be provided religiously." PAP X 4 A 72 (JP 4205). 
6 In a footnote, Kierkegaard demonstrates that he is 
operating on several levels while writing when he insists that 
it cannot be directly affirmed that this is a defense of the 
established order inasmuch as the form of the communication 
is doubly reflected which makes contrary interpretations 
equally possible. Kierkegaard concludes that the one judging 
will be revealed by his judgment (SV 18,76; POV,156). 
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as in a reformative process from within the political order. 
As early as in 1835 Kierkegaard in a speech in the 
student Union in Copenhagen elaborated on this view claiming 
that political development must embody continuity, and that 
the importation of foreign revolutions (e.g. the French 
Revolution) is unhealthy. Indeed, Kierkegaard's speech 
demonstrates that he is opposed to any political leaps whether 
backwards or forwards. Echoing Edmund Burke, 7 he insists that 
natural developments do not happen by leaps and bounds, and 
that "life's earnestness will judge any such move ironic even 
if it is momentarily successful. 118 
In this speech Kierkegaard is concerned about the 
"aesthetic" jockeying for position by the liberal leaders. 
They appear to him to be more concerned about the personal 
advantages this political development has to offer, meaning 
their attitude demonstrates superficiality where earnestness 
is needed. His critique of the liberal leadership was directed 
7 Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1969), especially pp. 92-3, 119-125, 152-154, 
194-95. 
8 PAP I B 2, p. 172 (JP 5116). See also Frithiof Brandt, 
Den Unge S0ren Kierkegaard (K0benhavn: Levin & Munksgaards 
Forlag, 1929), pp. 54-5. Here Brandt suggests the author 
Henrik Hertz in his novel Stemninger og Tilstande (Moods and 
States) (1839) has captured Kierkegaard's attitude quite 
correctly when he has "the translator" (Kierkegaard) say: 
"When it is demanded that Denmark follows the rest of Europe 
in the struggle for the new liberal ideas, I completely agree. 
But this struggle must develop out of the given, out of the 
way in which we so far have been governed, out of the spirit 
that has animated the people under this government." 
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at their apparent lack of concern for the political future of 
the Danish people. Instead they manifested their personal 
concerns with image. That history was in the making was 
evident to everyone, including Kierkegaard, for whom the 
development was a development of consciousness. 9 But, and 
again he echoes Edmund Burke, 10 the natural historical step 
forward had been seduced by the aspirations for practical 
consistency with theoretical principles, forgetting the 
tendency of the practical to become extreme when transformed 
without modification. Consequently the original idea had been 
lost sight of. The mediator, through which we come to have the 
idea, that is, ideology, had grown too powerful, and this is 
what in Kierkegaard's opinion "in the political world produces 
revolutions1111 -- the tail is wagging the dog rather than vice 
versa. The fact that the eventual transition from an absolute 
monarchy to a constitutional monarchy {for all intents and 
purposes, a liberal democracy) took place without violence, 
in what Hannah Arendt would characterize as a political 
movement of reason, 12 would seem to justify Kierkegaard's 
claim. Had the monarch been completely opposed to the liberal 
developments of his time, it seems reasonable to argue that 
9 PAP X 3 A 527. 
10 Burke, pp. 89-90. 
11 PAP I B 2, p. 172. 
12 On Revolution {New York: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 95 
and in passim. 
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some blood would necessarily have been shed. By initiating the 
change from within government itself which, according to 
Kierkegaard, perceived the need for social and political 
change, he understands the emergence of liberalism as a 
natural development that underscores the continuity of Danish 
political history. 
This historical digression assists in the general 
understanding of Kierkegaard's choice of methodology which he 
refers to as a therapeutic "corrective." It is intended to 
address not a local condition, but rather the entire European 
situation as he understood it. The principles that follow from 
this "corrective" are meant to embody a universality that 
renders them respectable. 
Kierkegaard, like any serious political philosopher draws 
on personal experience to formulate the necessary steps to 
correct what in this case represents a diseased political 
society, 13 namely liberal democracy. He embraces a naturally 
developed liberal democratic form of government ( SV 9, 10; CUP, 
4) with certain qualifications. Immediately, however, and 
before this new form of regime is historically in place within 
his own sphere of existence, he has some reservations about 
its various aspects (as was shown in the previous chapter). 
For this complex reason it is important to understand 
13 For an analogous approach see Plato, The Seventh 
Letter, tr. Walter Hamilton (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), 
325d-326a. 
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precisely what Kierkegaard means by "corrective." The reader 
is assisted in this understanding by several notations in 
Kierkegaard's journal wherein he comments on this particular 
approach to a critique of "the established order." 
First it should be noted that Kierkegaard everywhere 
chooses a spelling of the word "corrective" (Correctiv) which 
is not properly Danish. He substitutes the letter "C" for the 
letter "K" twice, a substitution that lends a Latin sort of 
legitimacy to the word thereby underscoring the significance 
of this word to Kierkegaard. 14 Here it is interesting to note 
that in the Danish spelling, Korrektiv according to the Danish 
dictionary means to "improve (forbedre), to rectify 
(berigtige), or correct something else, especially: a guiding 
addition. 1115 According to the Oxford English Dictionary a 
second meaning of "corrective" reads as follows: "Something 
that tends to set right what is wrong, to remove or counter 
an evil." Kierkegaard appears to have all of the above 
mentioned meanings in mind when he uses the word "corrective." 
In a journal note from 1849 which is entitled "My 
productivity regarded as 'the corrective' of the established, 11 
the determination "corrective" is considered as a reflective 
determination that has to indicate the weak points of the 
14 I am indebted to John Llewelyn for this insight. 
15 Ordbog over det danske Sprog, ed. Verner Dahlerup 
(K0benhavn: Gyldendal, 1929). 
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established order and "onesidedly posit the opposite." 16 In 
positing the "corrective," the one doing so, Kierkegaard 
concedes, must adopt an attitude of resignation inasmuch as 
the "corrective," as soon as somebody else posits another 
corrective, the first corrective becomes part of the 
established. The implications of this statement are twofold. 
on the one hand, it could indicate on the part of Kierkegaard 
that he has no illusions about the longevity of his 
therapeutic "corrective." Indeed, he would seem to be 
confirming the general weakness of correctives, especially 
those that address a pathology of consciousness in an age 
spellbound by material concerns. On the other hand, by showing 
that another corrective would locate the initial corrective 
within the established, Kierkegaard has demonstrated that 
reform indeed emerges from within the governing order. The 
point is, Kierkegaard did not see the role of his "corrective" 
as a destroyer of the political and ecclesiastical order, but 
as one "constantly to inspire it with inwardness." 17 And what 
the age of speculation needs according to Kierkegaard is a 
dose of Socratic ignorance modified in the spirit of 
Christianity, and that, he insists, would represent 
maturity . 18 Thus he distinguishes between what the age demands 
16 PAP X 1 A 640 and X 3 A 527. 
17 PAP X 2 A 193. 
18 PAP X 1 A 679. 
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and what it needs. 
The misfortune of our time is just this that it has 
become simply nothing else but "time," a temporality 
which is impatient of hearinv anything about 
eternity (SV 18,150; POV, 108). 1 
From all these observations about Kierkegaard's approach 
to a critique of the new political order it seems reasonable 
to conclude: first, that he accepts the liberal democratic 
form of government arrived at through natural means, and 
second, that it suffers from a variety of defects (as 
elaborated above in chapters two and three) that need to be 
amended. The "corrective" is thus intended to improve upon the 
new form of political society by reintroducing ethical 
(political) categories and thereby provide a higher quality 
of life for the single self as well as a more permanent social 
order. In so doing, Kierkegaard will dispel a few illusions 
that liberal theory has operated under. By dispelling these 
illusions, however, he does not intend to undermine liberal 
theory, but rather to strengthen it. Hence the reader should 
not think of Kierkegaard's "corrective" as standing in 
opposition to liberal theory, but as a mending of it, as a 
"corrective." 
19 For an excellent discussion of Kierkegaard's concept 
of time, temporality, and eternity see Johannes Sl0k, 
Kierkegaard: humanismens tamker (K0benhavn: Hans Reitzel, 
19 7 8 ) , ch . 5 . 
194 
IV:2 
Kierkegaard's "corrective" consists in all its simplicity 
of his "idea of community" expressed in recognition of the 
law's demand to love the neighbor as oneself. In the following 
this concept and its political implications will be analyzed 
in terms of its constitutive elements which, taken 
individually, express the developmental particulars of the 
formation of character, and taken in its totality express the 
manifestation of political consciousness, what the title of 
this project also refers to as citizenship. 
The "corrective" focuses primarily on two concerns that 
in Kierkegaard's opinion has led liberal theory astray. On the 
one hand, liberal theory insists on collapsing the realms of 
the religious and the political, or, in more abstract terms, 
liberal theory has conjoined the divine and the human when it 
claims to "deduct" from nature's law which is of di vine 
origin, a condition of freedom and equality. 2° Kierkegaard 
objects, insisting 
No politics has been able to, no politics can, no 
worldliness has been able to, no worldliness can, 
think through to its last consequence or realize 
this thought: human equality (Menneske-Lighed) (SV 
18,149; POV, 107). 
On the other hand, in so conjoining the immanent with the 
transcendent, time and eternity has become one, what 
Kierkegaard refers to as temporality, which dominates human 
20 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 2, #4 
and #8. 
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existence. By making the eternal immediately present, it is 
not at all. Instead it has been subsumed by the temporal 
dimension (SV 18,150; POV,108) thereby denying what for 
Kierkegaard is essential: a differentiated human experience, 
but also denying what the world is demanding, namely genuine 
equality. 
The horizon of a one-dimensional existence is time, and 
such an existence will necessarily concentrate on the desire 
for pleasure, a desire that can only be satisfied by private 
property, which liberal theory intimates is divinely 
sanctioned. 21 But what the age needs, according to 
Kierkegaard, is eternity. The age needs to emphasize the 
activity of consciousness, or said more bluntly, it needs to 
focus on essential thinking, expressed in pursuit of the good. 
Such thinking expresses the "idea of community" or the good 
of the whole. As such it constitutes what will restore health 
to concrete consciousness, and hence restore authenticity to 
the single self. The irony is that community as such, 
presupposes that the other is perceived as equal, what the 
world demanded, but to do that necessitates precisely an 
experience of transcendence, what the world rejected. By 
taking back what the world needs, namely consciousness of the 
eternal, it can acquire what it demands, equality. In 
Kierkegaard's opinion, then, it is only through transcendent 
21 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 5, #25-6, 
#32 and #34. 
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experience human equality be achieved, in a manner of 
speaking. 
It is clear to Kierkegaard that by nature human beings 
are not equal (in spite of what liberal theory insists). But 
because he is more than willing to provide what the age 
demands, though not in an illusory form, he posits the 
therapeutic "corrective." It teaches that "the di vine, the 
essential, the non-worldly, the true (is] the only possible 
human equality" (SV 18, 150; POV, 108). In other words, human 
beings, who by nature according to this "corrective" exist in 
untruth, regard each other in apparent terms only and hence 
as differentiated or unequal. For that reason, Kierkegaard 
says, they are unable to set themselves free, meaning they are 
unable to see each other as they truly are in their essential 
constitutive structure. 
In order to rectify this problem of being in untruth, 
human beings must turn to the teacher who alone can provide 
the condition (Betingelsen) and hence enable the truth of 
their essential being to reveal itself (SV 6,19-20; PF, 14-
5). By undergoing this conversion experience (Overgang) in 
freedom, a move Kierkegaard refers to as rebirth (Gjenf0delse) 
(SV 6,23; PF, 19), they literally untie themselves from the 
naturally given, remove themselves from or overcome the 
exclusion from the truth that all human beings are essentially 
equal. As will become clear, to love the other is to see the 
other as essentially equal, and only the works of love, that 
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is, God's works, can occasion this condition. 
Kierkegaard thus infuses liberal theory with a moral 
dimension which was always implied, but which had been 
obscured by the adage of property as a natural right. By 
making property a natural right, liberal theory removed the 
whole idea of freedom and equality to an empirical dimension 
that on a theoretical level occasioned skepticism about the 
moral grounding of these principles. 22 
Therefore what perhaps is of most interest to political 
science is that Kierkegaard takes exception to the general 
assumption that the cherished tenets of Liberalism, freedom 
and equality, have political rather than existential 
significance (SV 12,43; WL, 53) . 23 For Kierkegaard such 
22 As David Hume noted, "A man's property is some object 
related to him. This relation is not natural but moral, and 
founded on justice. It is very preposterous, therefore, to 
imagine that we can have any idea of property without fully 
comprehending the nature of justice, and showing its origin 
in the artifice and contrivance of men. The origin of justice 
explains that of property." "Treatise of Human Nature" in 
Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy. ed. Henry D. Aiken (New 
York: Hafner Press, 1948), p. 60. 
23 Also PAP VIII 1 A 598 (JP 4131). For a parallel 
argument see Kresten Nordentoft, "Hvad Siger Brand-Majoren?" 
Kierkegaards Opg0r med sin Samtid (K0benhavn: G.E.C.Gad, 
1973), 93; hereafter known as Brand-Majoren. Nordentoft does 
not emphasize this novel interpretation of freedom and 
equality but merely sees it as a further indication of 
Kierkegaard's absolutist conception of the state. Interpreting 
Kierkegaard he says: "The state can and ought only give 
individuals freedom in the negative sense that it must secure 
them against encroachment from other sides. But legal security 
is not the same as freedom. Freedom cannot be imposed by 
decree personally. Politics and freedom have nothing to do 
with each other in a positive sense, but certainly in a 
negative, inasmuch as by imposing a free cons ti tut ion the 
people can be made to believe that they possess freedom, that 
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declarations underscore precisely the unnatural or 
revolutionary aspect of the liberal development. It is 
unnatural not only because it is practically disruptive, but, 
more importantly, because it posits a form of society where 
the truth of matters is concealed by an accumulation of 
(scientific) knowledge that has the stamp of human approval 
as Rousseau, for example, suggested, when he spoke of human 
equality. 24 The problem for Kierkegaard is that such 
determinations make these rights political in form, when in 
fact they are ethical in an existential sense. 
The ethical for Kierkegaard defines how the single self 
comports itself in action and in its relationships, its 
character, its willingness to commit itself in freedom to the 
other as equal, to the whole, to the good. What that means is 
that my good is inherently bound up with the good of the other 
as well as with the good of the community. From this 
perspective Kierkegaard's ethical dimension can be understood 
to have political meaning. 
is, made to forget that they do not possess it." Nordentoft's 
reading of Kierkegaard on the state appears very mechanical 
and tends to contradict what Kierkegaard is attempting to 
achieve, namely the individual's passionate appropriation of 
Christianity and thereby community. This chapter expects to 
demonstrate that Kierkegaard's conception of freedom and 
equality is not as apolitical as Nordentoft wants to argue. 
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundations of Inequality among Men," The First and Second 
Discourses. trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 92. Also "Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts," Ibid, in passim. 
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Here we must caution that Kierkegaard himself understood 
the political more in terms of "politics" by which he meant 
institutional structures as well as collective movements. In 
his own mind he is thus mired in the modern tradition that, 
unlike classical Greek philosophy, tends to separate the 
ethical from the political precisely because the political had 
been submitted to ideological infusion and thus had lost its 
essentially moral dimension. But in spite of Kierkegaard's own 
understanding of "the political," his "idea of community" is 
ethical inasmuch as it embodies the relationship to the other. 
It is political because in this relationship to the other is 
reflected a relationship to all human beings and hence a 
political consciousness that engenders action in a concern for 
the good of the whole. 25 
To continue, then, Kierkegaard argues that freedom and 
equality are principles that are ethical in nature, and 
therefore they represent something to be achieved -- not just 
once and for all as with Plato's caveman who undergoes the 
periagoge, the turning around experience, only once, 26 but 
25 In support of this claim we refer to such compelling 
sources as Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics 
{Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952) in passim, 
as well as to his Anamnesis, tr. Gerhart Niemeyer (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1978) in passim. For a rather 
different conception of the political, yet exalted as in our 
perception, see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, especially 
chapter 5: "Action." 
26
• Plato, The Republic, 515c-d, 518d, 521c. 
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with a constant vigilance. They are tasks {Opgaver) 27 the 
single self, not the state, must undertake in order to fulfill 
who it is by nature, that is, by its "second nature," and 
thereby realize the "idea of community" {SV 12,43; WL, 53). 
This interpretation of the categories of freedom and 
equality posits no direct demands for specific political 
circumstances such as is the case with rights perceived as 
political. On the other hand, it necessarily requires 
political circumstances that allow for such individual 
pursuits. Kierkegaard's approach in the form of a "corrective" 
would appear to coincide with the requirement of a liberal 
state, albeit one modified to admit the impetus for an 
existence that includes an ethico-religious dimension. Thus 
he shows prudence by referring to his interpretation of these 
tenets as a "corrective." 
Generally speaking, the "corrective" understood as the 
"idea of community" differs from other conceptions of 
community, such as the visions of socialist collectivities 
that were flourishing throughout Europe at this time. 28 By 
27
• As will become clear below, the dual meaning of the 
Danish word Opgave (task) is significant here, because it also 
denotes a "problem," as in something which needs to be worked 
out. 
28 Kierkegaard was familiar with socialist movements and 
ideology only through newspapers according to the editors of 
the Danish edition of Works of Love. They also note the 
interesting coincidence that Marx's Communist Manifesto was 
published in February 1848 and hence just four months after 
the publication of Works of Love. In Kierkegaard's journals 
there is a notation to ch. VII of Works of Love that explains 
that the concept of mercifulness is "rightly turned" against 
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insisting on a third element that unites and separates single 
selves in the relation, individual integrity is maintained, 
while at the same time the benefits of solidarity are enjoyed 
(SV 14,58-9; TA 62-3). 
When single selves ( each one individually) 
essentially in passion relate themselves to an idea 
and thereupon in unity essentially relate themselves 
to the same idea: then the relation is the perfected 
and the standard. Individually the relation 
separates them (each one has himself for him!elf 
and ideally it unites them (SV 14,58; TA, 62). 9 
In other words, for Kierkegaard it is important that the 
desire for unity does not gain the upper hand, for that would 
compromise the uniqueness of every single self. How he works 
this out will become clear in the following, but in a journal 
note he ponders the idea as he attempts to differentiate 
between an aggregate of people which he refers to as a crowd 
(M~ngde) or the (spectator) public (Publikum) and community 
(Menighed), which, strictly speaking, means "congregation". 
In the (spectator) public and the like the single 
self is nothing, there is no single self, the 
Communism and toward a Christian understanding. PAP VIII 1 A 
299. 
29 Compare Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 52: "To 
live together in the world means essentially that a world of 
things is between those who have it in common, as a table is 
located between those who sit around it; the world, like every 
in-between, relates and separates men at the same time. The 
public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet 
prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes 
mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people 
involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the 
world between them has lost its power to gather them together, 
to relate and to separate them." It is uncanny how Arendt has 
captured Kierkegaard's meaning of the "idea of community" 
whether intentional or not. 
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numerical is the constitutive and the law for coming 
into existence (Tilblivelse) of a generatio 
aeguivoca; detached from the public the single self 
is nothing, and as part of the public, he is, more 
basically understood, actually nothing either. 
In community the single self is; the single 
self is dialectically decisive as the presupposition 
for forming community, and in community the single 
self is qualitatively something essential and can 
at any moment also become higher than "community," 
especially as soon as "the others" fall away from 
the idea. The cohesiveness of community consists of 
each one being a single self and then the idea; the 
connectedness of a public, or its looseness consists 
of the numerical being everything. Every single self 
in community :ff,uarantees the community; the public 
is a chimera. 
To freely enter into such a concrete relation as community is 
for Kierkegaard the ethical task, the goal of which is to 
establish one's equality with every other human being on a 
conscious level. 31 It means the single self has chosen him or 
herself (in freedom) as an essential self and thereby gained 
identity. 32 Kierkegaard insists this is possible for every 
human being, because every human being is precisely equal in 
3o PAP X 2 A 390 (JP 2952). 
31 For a contrary understanding of Kierkegaard see 
Alastair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 41. 
MacIntyre interprets Kierkegaard to say that we develop the 
ethical for no reason. 
32 11 the person who chooses himself ethically 
chooses himself concretely as this particular individual .. 
. [who] becomes selfconscious (sig bevidst) as this particular 
individual with these talents, these inclinations, these 
drives, these passions, influenced by this particular social 
milieu, as this particular product of a particular 
environment. But when he becomes self-conscious in this way, 
he takes upon himself responsibility for it all (SV 3,232; EO 
II, 250-51). 
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the capacity to be ethical. 
Although at this stage equality is strictly formal, it 
nevertheless has an anthropological characteristic as pointed 
out by Kresten Nordentoft. He argues 
the task could not be set were it not possible for 
human beings to realize it .... [Thus] every human 
being becomes conscious of himself in concern for 
himself, because his existence takes place upon 
conditions of ambiguity, in time, in hope or fear. 33 
The possibility of equality, then, lies precisely in this 
awareness of one's position in a contingent world, and from 
it derives the condition of possibility for authentic selfhood 
or self-actualization. The trick is not to be caught up in 
this contingency, but to transcend it qua the "idea of 
community," that is, allow transcendence to interact 
dialectically with one's experience in the world. To do that 
is for Kierkegaard to be in Existents. 
IV:3 
Kierkegaard argues in Works of Love that when worldly 
wisdom deemed it desirable that all men be freed from the 
"abominable" bonds of serfdom, this craving for freedom and 
equality not only manifested itself physically, but also 
consciously. 
Just as nowadays attempts are made in so many ways 
to emancipate the people from all bonds, also 
beneficial ones, so also attempts are made to 
33 Kierkegaard's Psychology, tr. Bruce Kirmmse 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 77. 
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emancipate the emotional relationship between human 
beings from the bond that binds one to God and binds 
one in everythingj in every expression of life (SV 
12,115; WL, 119). 4 
It is a freedom that is without divinity in the world (Ibid). 
The bond to transcendent experience has become inconvenient 
for the modern single self. Instead it has been dethroned as 
the focus of human existence and replaced by the self-
deification of humanity, and the consequence is the obviation 
of all authority. It meant, according to Kierkegaard, that the 
rights of man (Menneskets Rettigheder) were misconstrued as 
rights given to man by man, when in truth they were already 
divinely granted (SV 12,115; WL, 119). The problem as he sees 
it, is that man has imposed himself upon the domain of 
transcendence "transforming all existence into doubt or into 
a vortex," meaning into an unstoppable confusion (SV 12,115; 
WL, 120) • 35 
34 Kierkegaard puts it more bluntly in his journal and 
gives the argument a slightly different turn when he notes 
that the idea of genuine equality, that is, essential 
equality, which he in Works of Loves insists has always been 
present, has now been abandoned. Instead equality has become 
a political question discussed throughout Europe where it has 
engendered a new form of tyranny, what we today refer to as 
totalitarianism, what Kierkegaard aptly labels the tyranny of 
"people-fear" (Menneske-Frygt). 
35 In Letters and Documents, p. 262, Kierkegaard has 
commented on the meaning of this vortex in a letter to 
Kolderup-Rosenvinge. Therein he explains how he sees what is 
happening in Europe as a vortex that is spinning out of 
control. But, he says in the letter, where there is motion, 
the category of stoppage belongs. The problem lies in how the 
ground of this stoppage is perceived. For Kierkegaard it is 
a teleological argument. It is commonly believed, he explains, 
that if one has a fixed point for a goal, the movement toward 
it is not out of control. In that case the movement is not 
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But the transcendent dimension is necessary because only 
it possesses the true standard (Maalestok), a standard by 
which Kierkegaard believes political movements must measure 
their aims. Thus he asks, if man has become deified, who 
defines the law's demand that "You shall love the neighbor as 
yourself?" (SV 12,23; WL, 34) . 36 Kierkegaard does not believe 
this question, which emerges out of revelation with its 
assumed to be an unstoppable vortex. Kierkegaard questions 
this assumption suggesting that the fixed point must lie 
behind the movement in order to control or steer it, in order 
to integrate the motion. He is distinguishing between a purely 
political movement such as the ideological movements that were 
sweeping Europe at the time and a religious movement whose 
teleological aim is safely posited before the fact, so to 
speak. The problem with a political movement that entirely 
lacks a religious dimension, he argues, is that it has posited 
the goal in the future -- the secularized eschatological 
expectation. In that case there is no control over the means 
to achieve this end. (No doubt Kierkegaard has the "Reign of 
Terror" in mind and by implication totalitarian systems in 
general). Kierkegaard goes on to suggest such a movement 
eventually will come to realize its need for religion as the 
only way to stop the vortex, will need a Socratic gadfly, (and 
here we may speculate), will need a Kierkegaard. {According 
to the editors of Letters and Documents, Kierkegaard is 
playing on the Danish word for gadfly, Bremse, which means 
both a "brake" or "to brake," as well as a gadfly or botfly). 
The religious movement Kierkegaard has in mind is very much 
one of his own development but with close similarities to the 
simplistic form of Christianity of Pauline teaching. Thus his 
understanding of a religious movement should not be confused 
with the religious movements described by Norman Cohn in his 
Pursuit of the Millenium (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1961, 1970) where he makes it quite clear that even political 
movements with a religious dimension, what he refers to as 
"revolutionary millenarianism" presumably with a fixed point 
controlling its movement, have flourished throughout Western 
history, but especially during the dark Middle Ages, spreading 
much violence in pursuit most often of some ideal conception 
of social reform (p. 284 and in passim). 
36 Kierkegaard is quoting Matthew, 22:39. 
206 
11divine origin" (SV 12,30; WL, 41) can be settled by decree 
or by human consensus (SV 12,115; WL, 120). Since the new 
order of the world leaves human beings as essentially 
responsible for their own selves and in that sense equal, the 
answer would be left to arbitrary determinations that in an 
attempt to compete, and as in political campaigns "win a 
following for it" (WL, 120; SV 12,115), would compromise the 
law's demand. In other words, revelation would be subjected 
to willful interpretations with ideological overtones, just 
as the single self's decision with whom to side would be 
dictated by arbitrary self-interest. 
The upshot of Kierkegaard's argument is that the form of 
the action by the single self, that is, how the law's demand 
would be interpreted, would be dependent upon the historical 
circumstances of his time. Consequently the universal 
authority implied in the law's demand would be entirely 
relativized, because temporality now dominates the life of 
such a single self and hence would dominate its actions. In 
other words, to love the neighbor as oneself would be 
historicized and would soon lose its effectiveness. 
The relativization of the law's demand and hence its 
essential weakening is precisely what happens to this ethico-
religious and rational criterion in liberal theory where it 
plays a central role in the fictitious but rational state of 
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nature, 37 but gives way to material self-interest in the 
theory of political society, and in fact entirely disappears. 
It is this form of an ethically undirected existence that 
Kierkegaard in his critique of modernity (above in chapter 
III) diagnosed as a "philistine-bourgeois mentality" (SV 
15,97; SUD, 41) . 38 It is this falling away of the law's demand 
that he attempts to restore with his therapeutic "corrective." 
IV:4 
The law's demand must have a transcendent ground and 
thereby gain unconditional authority and hence universality. 
By grounding it beyond the realm of human decision-making 
capabilities, the command "to love your neighbor as yourself" 
gains the respectability of being universally applicable and 
of being generally known and appropriable by anyone who 
chooses to act according to its precepts. Works of Love thus 
posits the category of freedom as something to be 
existentially chosen, not as something granted. Either the 
single self chooses to become a philistine bourgeois or it 
37 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 2, #5. 
38 Johannes Sl0k, Kierkegaard's Univers: Enny guide til 
geniet (Centrum, 1983), p. 28, in this introductory reading 
to Kierkegaard's works has accurately described the philistine 
bourgeois as someone who "without reservation and 
exhaustively, but without any inkling of this, is a product 
of what the given society and its culture invariably will make 
a person into given his presuppositions. A bourgeois 
philistine lives in the illusion that he has freely made the 
decisions that in actuality anonymous forces have made on his 
behalf. 
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chooses to become a person of character, which for Kierkegaard 
is to chose to become a Christian. 
It is from the perspective of this conception _of the 
grounding of the law's demand that Kierkegaard's "idea of 
community" becomes comprehensible. In turn, it is from this 
understanding of the "idea of community" that we derive his 
conceptualization of freedom and equality. These, then, cannot 
be viewed as political rights, but must be understood as 
existential obligations to the law to which every single self 
can and must respond. In other words, what liberal theory 
views as rights, the fulfillment of which is expressed in 
terms of material acquisitiveness, 39 Kierkegaard perceives as 
duties that essentially engage each in a common purpose 
without suppressing "the original individuation idea. 1140 
What Kierkegaard objects to is the givenness of the 
natural rights of freedom and equality that liberal theory 
posits. 41 Instead he wants to distinguish between what Isaiah 
39 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 5, #25, 
26. 
40 Nordentoft, Brand-Majoren, p. 50. 
41 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 1, #4 and 
#5. Also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundation of Inequality of Men, Preface, and "On the Social 
Contract" in The Basic Political Writings, ed. and trans. 
Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1987), Bk. I, chs. 1-2. 
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Berlin has differentiated as negative and positive freedom. 42 
But Kierkegaard goes further, meaning he finds it necessary 
to transcend the human realm in order to properly ground 
social existence. To put your faith in the "great, matchless 
common undertaking, the great achievement of the human race," 
as he sarcastically remarks, is to make the category of the 
others capricious. 
If what the law demands is merely a human 
determination of what the law demands (but not by 
the individual human being, because we thereby 
become involved in pure arbitrariness, as 
indicated) , how then can the individual come to 
begin to act, or is it not left to chance to decide 
where he happens to begin instead of everyone having 
to begin at the beginning? (SV 12,115-16; WL, 120). 
Thus Kierkegaard even rejects an interpretation of the 
law's demand by society as a whole as, for example, in 
Rousseau's "general will. "Inasmuch as the law's demand 
constitutes a universal claim, Kierkegaard is concerned about 
the human inferences made from it in accordance with some 
collective determination. His fear is that by so deifying the 
others, the ethical has become "an accidental matter" allowing 
the wrong to possibly be right (SV 12,117; WL, 121). 43 
42 Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: 
Press, 1969), ch. III. Berlin's essay 
Liberty" is helpful in understanding 
Kierkegaard's thought. 
43 Also SV 16,88-95; TC, 86-95. 
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Oxford University 
"Two Concepts of 
the direction of 
IV:5 
The fixed point of departure is still on Kierkegaard's 
mind. At the same time something else is revealed. Where 
others have interpreted Kierkegaard to require the single self 
to withdraw or "die away" from the world, 44 in Works of Love 
the dialectic of human existence and hence Kierkegaard's true 
intentions become evident. On the one hand, the single self 
is required to sharply differentiate between the finite 
worldly and the infinitely eternal. Yet, on the other hand, 
his life in temporal existence must be governed by 
transcendent standards that unarguably require him to attend 
to obligations that embody authoritative claims. Thus when 
Kierkegaard makes the infamous claim that the single self must 
"renounce the worldly," he does not mean for the single self 
to withdraw to a cloister, a solution he sharply distances 
himself from (SV 12,141; WL, 144). Rather, his point is that 
the single self must not succumb to the temptation of worldly 
distinctions. To do so would mean to emphasize differences and 
thereby reject true equality. 
To reject what Kierkegaard considers the only possible 
form of equality is also to reject the movement of freedom 
required to achieve this state of equality, and hence it is 
to reject not only the authentic self but also the very 
44 For a discussion of this perception of Kierkegaard and 
references see "Introduction," p. xxii and note 18. 
211 
foundation of the "idea of community." 45 From this rigorous 
perspective, freedom and equality become ethical categories 
to which the single self is existentially related. To 
recapitulate, to be existentially related meant the single 
self does not merely stand in a cognitive relationship to 
these ethical categories. Rather he passionately relates to 
them, meaning he expresses a dynamic personal interest. 46 It 
is what Kierkegaard means by inwardness. In other words, the 
self is a relating self, 47 and not, as David Burrell reminds 
us, the relation which relates. The choice is in the acting 
self to become the authentic self he or she is. "Each one of 
us can only do this himself." Such a person feels and is felt 
to be "at home with himself. 1148 
For this self-directed single self the choice in which 
the ethical is expressed is two-dimensional. As in Sophocles' 
45 The movement of freedom will be further delineated 
below. 
46 Cf. Plato's Theaetetus, tr. Francis MacDonald Cornford 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), 152b-c, 
where Socrates pronounces that no truth can be reached 
independently of its relation with the perceiving subject. 
Also Eric Voegelin, The World of the Polis, vol. II of Order 
and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1956), p. 298. 
47 The ideal position is that where despair has been 
rooted out: "[R]elating itself to itself and in willing to be 
itself, the self rests transparently in the power that posited 
it" (SV 15,74; SUD, 14). 
48 
"Kierkegaard: Language of Spirit," Exercises in 
Religious Understanding (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1974), pp. 165-66. 
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Antigone49 the single self is confronted with a dilemma. 
Antigone either buries her brother and thereby conforms to the 
unwritten laws of the gods, a choice that will make her 
subject to the king's punishment; or she refrains from burying 
him and conforms to the laws of the city as defined by the 
king, a choice that will make her subject to the wrath of the 
gods. Interpreting Kierkegaard, Johannes Sl0k has suggested 
that Antigone's dilemma expresses the seriousness of 
existence: the definite meaning of the choice and the absolute 
incommensurability between the opposite possibilities, the 
either/or of the economy of life. Thus Kierkegaard subscribes 
to the principle of contradiction between good and evil as the 
foundation of thinking (SV 14,88ff; TA, 97ff) a principle that 
formulates a philosophy of life. As we saw above in chapter 
three, this philosophy of life constitutes the standard by 
which a person of self-conscious awareness chooses his or her 
existence (Tilv~relse). 
When Antigone chooses either to bury her brother or 
not, then it is not merely this single isolated act 
she either chooses or not chooses; she chooses those 
principles that legitimate either the one or the 
other possibility, she chooses -- as Kierkegaard 
would express it -- her idea or that category under 
which she will live her life, the mode of her 
existence, the standard, finite or infinite, she 
wishes to establish.so 
49 Either/Or, pp. 137-64. 
so Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker, p. 81. 
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In the very choice to bury her brother Antigone embraced the 
principle that defined her as an authentic self and defined 
her action in accordance with Kierkegaard's understanding of 
Existents. 
In the same manner, Kierkegaard insists each single self 
must choose freedom and equality and thereby choose the 
standard for its existence. Each must personally embrace or 
appropriate these categories in the actions it undertakes, 
inasmuch as those very categories express genuine humanity and 
thereby authenticate the single self. The opposite kind of 
existence is that of the philistine-bourgeois, whose life is 
not even governed by aesthetic concerns, although one would 
have to say that such a life is governed by the desire for 
pleasure. That life, therefore, is ultimately influenced by 
fate. It is the kind of life where the contrasting 
possibilities and their analogous consequences make choice 
impossible. When choice becomes impossible skepticism has done 
its work and nihilism makes its presence in what Kierkegaard 
characterizes as a meaningless form of existence. 51 
51 
"Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you 
will also regret it. Marry or do not marry, you will regret 
it either way. Whether you marry or you do not marry, you will 
regret it either way. Laugh at the stupidities of the world, 
and you will regret it; weep over them, and you will also 
regret it. Laugh at the stupidities of the world or weep over 
them, you will regret it either way. Whether you laugh at the 
stupidities of the world or you weep over them, you will 
regret it either way. Trust a girl, and you will regret it. 
Do not trust her, and you will also regret it. Trust a girl 
or do not trust her, you will regret it either way. Whether 
you trust a girl or do not trust her, you will regret it 
either way. Hang yourself, and you will regret it. Do not hang 
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What must now be determined, therefore, is whether 
Kierkegaard defines the categories of freedom and equality 
strictly in ethical terms and hence as distinct from political 
meaning in the way modernity has come to separate these 
categories of human existence, 52 or whether indeed his 
therapeutic "corrective" aims at reforming, if not politics, 
then at least the single self's relationship to the political. 
The latter would result in what is here referred to as a 
condition of political consciousness. What we are looking for, 
then, is the single self's disposition or comportment toward 
the world. To make this determination, we have to analyze the 
movement Kierkegaard's single self (den Enkelte) must 
undertake. It is, significantly, a movement of love as 
indicated in the law's demand. 
IV:6 
Love, the most fundamental human characteristic according 
to Kierkegaard (WL, 153; SV 12,150), is the dynamic force 
underlying the essential experience of achieving freedom and 
equality and hence community (WL, 53; sv 12,43). Love exists, 
before it is practiced, because love is the presupposition. 
yourself and you will also regret it. Hang yourself or do not 
hang yourself, you will regret it either way. Whether you hang 
yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it either 
way. This, gentlemen, is the quintessence of all the wisdom 
of life." Either/Or, vol. I, pp. 38-9. 
52 Cf. Nordentoft in Brand-Maioren. 
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Love is the essence of the single self, indeed is being itself 
in an ontological sense (SV 12,150-51; WL, 153-54). This 
condition defines the single self in its natural state in 
which the human being exists and which it can only avoid if 
it ceases to exist as a human being. 53 
Kierkegaard can make the claim that love is a 
presupposition inasmuch as he acknowledges the sociability of 
human beings, their inherent need for community as attested 
to throughout the ages. He expresses this fundamental need in 
the profound words of wonder which introduce the obligation 
of every single self to love the person he sees: "How deeply 
indeed is the need for love grounded in human nature!" (SV 
12,150; WL, 153). The whole "idea of community" is embedded 
in this sentence which emphasizes that love is not an 
accidental happening, something that may or may not have 
significance. Love is precisely grounded so deeply in human 
nature that the single self can be defined by it. As Sl0k 
interprets, "Man is qualified passionately as love [and] 
therefore this passion expresses itself entirely elementary 
and irrefutably in a need for companionship." 54 Kierkegaard 
continues, "throughout all ages anyone, therefore, who has 
thought deeply about human nature has acknowledged this need 
for companionship" (SV 12,150; WL, 153). 
53 Johannes Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismen's t~nker, p. 
138. 
54 Ibid, p. 139. 
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From this perspective of love as an inherent 
characteristic of human nature, it follows that for 
Kierkegaard human nature is given, its constitutive element 
is fundamental and permanent. It is also the faculty of human 
nature that expresses the eternal dimension, but only in its 
acquired form. 
The concealed life of love is in its most inward 
state unfathomable, and still, in turn, is in an 
unfathomable coherence with all of existence . 
. In this way the life of love is concealed, but its 
concealed life is in itself a movement and has the 
eternal within itself (SV 12,15-6; WL, 27). 
This thesis of love as the dominant element of human nature 
pervades the discourse which can be characterized by the often 
repeated sentence, "So deeply is this need grounded in human 
nature, and so essentially does it belong to being human" (SV 
12,150; WL, 153). 
The form of love that Kierkegaard promotes in Works of 
Love is love transformed in the Christian sense of the word. 
But love as such is a passion that can take many forms. 55 In 
this work Kierkegaard emphasizes the distinction between the 
two higher forms of passion (Lidenskab), between erotic love 
55 on the title page of Either/Or, vol. I, there is a 
quotation from Edward Young, The Complaint or Night-Thoughts 
on Life. Death. and Immortality, that indicates Kierkegaard's 
readiness to do battle with the Enlightenment as well as with 
speculative philosophy and install passion as a legitimate 
function of the human condition. This, of course, will 
necessitate a redefinition of passion as well as of its place 
and function, and consequently it will necessitate a 
redefinition of the human individual. (Sl0k, Kierkegaard: 
humanismens tamker, p. 97). The quotation asks, "Is reason 
then alone baptized, are the passions pagans?" 
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(Elskov) or friendship both of which he refers to as 
spontaneous (umiddelbar) or preferential love (Forkjerlighed) , 
and love (Kjerlighed) as expressed in love of neighbor. Erotic 
love as in eros is characterized as an appetite, a yearning 
desire, which is aroused by the attractive qualities of its 
object. Here the prime example would be Plato's "heavenly 
Eros. 1156 In Kierkegaard's configuration, this form of love is 
aesthetic. In his earlier pseudonymous authorship and most 
especially in Either/Or, vol. I, Kierkegaard referred to the 
lower form of this passion as a desire for pleasure. He called 
it pure sexuality as with Don Juan (SV 2,83-98; EO,I, 87-103), 
or simply self-interest as with Johannes the Seducer (SV 
2,279-410; EO,I, 301-445). 57 In Works of Love, however, all 
the latter seem to be integrated into his conception of erotic 
love or friendship both of which are bound by the rules of the 
worldly, and both of which have preference as the middle term 
(SV 12,62; WL, 70). Love as in Kjerlighed or love of neighbor 
also has a middle term, namely transcendence, but it is a 
56 
"Translator's Preface" to Anders Nygren, Agape and 
Eros, tr. Philip s. Watson (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1953), p. viii. 
57 For an informative chart of these different 
manifestations of the passion of love see Sl0k, Kierkegaard: 
humanismens t~nker, p. 140. It is important to note that these 
several forms of the passion of love do not annul previous 
forms as will be discussed below. In other words, they are not 
mutually exclusive. 
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response to a commandment, and hence it is controlled. 58 
The worldly rules that are especially offensive to 
Kierkegaard's project are those that promote differentiation 
between people which necessarily leads to comparison and 
competition. 59 The categories of comparison and competition 
necessarily express a concern with the self that can never 
overcome the distinctions between human beings in order to 
love the neighbor as oneself. Moreover, spontaneous love and 
friendship have a tendency to change because of their inherent 
dependency on external objects and hence on fortune (SV 12,36; 
WL, 46). Significant to this change is what Kierkegaard refers 
to as "spontaneous combustion" which can be easily ignited by 
comparison and competition (SV 12,40; WL, 50). The point is 
that spontaneous love can turn into its opposite, hate, or 
58 This form of love has some affinity with Anders 
Nygren' s conception of agape when he says that "neighborly 
love loses its specifically Christian character if it is taken 
out of context of fellowship with God," meaning it cannot be 
reduced to a simple ethics. QJ2. cit., pp. 95-6. Nygren goes 
on to say neighborly love is only genuine when it "springs 
from the same root as love for God -- that is, from. 
experience of God's agape (p. 75). To some degree, then, human 
beings can learn to love as in agape. But their concepts 
differ when Nygren characterizes agape as "spontaneous and 
unmotivated." For Kierkegaard love of God is a duty, and must 
be a duty so as not to be dependent upon accident. It is a 
response to a commandment that requires obedience. In that 
sense love cannot be characterized as spontaneous. 
59 
"It is unbelievable how tragic and weakening the 
change that takes place in a human being as soon as he has 
included comparison in the economy of life. Comparison is a 
damned guest whom no one can fulfill, because it craves more 
and more, and takes food from the children. Comparison is an 
unruly dweller in what before was a calm house; comparison 
sleeps neither night nor day." PAP VIII 2 B 37:5. 
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into jealousy, or it can simply turn sluggish and become 
"exhausted in the lukewarmness and indifference of habit" (SV 
12,41; WL, 50). In other words, spontaneous love can turn into 
something by which it becomes unrecognizable as love. The fact 
that it is spontaneous means that it can turn off just as 
suddenly as it had turned on, something we, of course, are 
still unable to explain, but which is an important 
consideration for Kierkegaard's conception of genuine love. 
What bothers Kierkegaard is spontaneous love's capacity 
for change and hence its unreliability. This is a 
circumstance, he notes, that even the worldly rules have 
attempted to overcome by eliciting promises from the partners 
in love or by the partners constantly testing each other (SV 
12,38; WL, 48). The problem is that spontaneous love is not 
consciously grounded in transcendence, it has no ethical 
dimension. 60 Although its dependency on fortune -- and good 
fortune may have some longevity -- enables it to demonstrate 
a lack of change and hence it can claim existence (Bestaaen), 
it nevertheless does not acquire constancy (Bestandighed), and 
that is its main problem. 
Insofar as it has existence, it exists, but insofar 
as it has not won constancy amid change, it cannot 
60 We should differentiate this claim in Works of Love 
from Kierkegaard's early work, especially Either-or vol. II, 
wherein he suggests the erotic (as in Plato) can be taken to 
a higher level where it acquires an ethical dimension. (SV 
3,34,49; EO II, 30,47). In Works of Love he has entirely 
abandoned such gradations. Here all the existence spheres have 
been reduced to the possibilities of a more definitive either-
or. 
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become contemporaneous with itself. Then it is 
either happily ignorant about this incongruity or 
disposed to sadness. Only the eternal can be and 
become and remain contemporaneous with every age; 
temporality, in contrast, separates within itself, 
and the present cannot become contemporaneous with 
the future or the future with the past, or the past 
with the present (SV 12,36-7; WL, 46-7). 
The consideration of constancy is important to 
Kierkegaard inasmuch as he defines human nature as a synthesis 
of the temporal and the eternal. 61 On the one hand, the human 
being is an historical being active in and subordinated to the 
determinations of time. on the other hand, the single self 
also has an ontological foundation in transcendence, meaning 
it is also subordinated to the determinations of the eternal. 
Here the discussion has to proceed with some caution because 
Kierkegaard, in the words of Vigilius Haufniensis, the author 
of The Concept of Anxiety, differentiates between time and 
temporality. 
Time Vigilius defines as an infinite succession of 
moments "passing by" and hence as an "infinitely contentless 
present" (SV 6,174; CA, 85-6). This means that time cannot be 
defined as the present, the past, or the future, because this 
distinction appears only through the relation of time to 
eternity and through the reflection of eternity in time. In 
61 The central concept here to be kept in mind is that 
according to Kierkegaard human nature consists of several 
syntheses. Thus it is also a synthesis of psyche (soul) and 
body sustained by the spirit, of infinitude and finitude, and 
of possibility and necessity. These syntheses will be 
discussed below. 
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other words, time cannot be stopped at some fixed point that 
would enable such a di vision, meaning the present only 
represents "the abstract in-between of past and future and 
such an abstract in-between is a nothing. n 62 The point 
Kierkegaard wants to make is that a life lived exclusively in 
time, meaning sensuous life, "and is only of time, has no 
present (Ncervcerende) , " and, as the Danish word also indicates, 
"has no presence" (SV 6,175; CA, 86). In contrast, the eternal 
is the present, Vigilius explains, meaning thought can annul 
the succession of time and, so to speak, attempt to stop it. 
Thereby the present acquires fulness, it acquires presence. 63 
But this means that neither can the eternal be divided into 
the past, the present, or the future. As Johannes Sl0k points 
out, inasmuch as time and eternity are defined "as each 
other's contradiction" and hence with the help of a common 
conceptual device, it suggests "that it is possible to think 
a relation between them." 64 That conceptual device is 
precisely temporality, and it is differentiated from time 
insofar as it relates to the eternal. 
Temporality realizes this possible relation through one 
of Kierkegaard's favorite concepts about the present, the now, 
62 Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens tcenker, p. 188. 
63 
"For representation it is a going forth that 
nevertheless does not get off the spot, because the eternal 
is for representation the infinitely contentful present," SV 
6,174-75; CA, 86. 
64 Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens tcenker, p. 190. 
222 
the moment (0jeblikket). But the reader is cautioned not to 
think of the moment as a determination of time just because 
it separates out the past and the future from itself, since 
the determination of time, we are reminded, is that which 
"passes by." Rather, "the moment is that ambiguity in which 
time and eternity touch each other," something that happens 
in time. "With this the concept of temporality (Timeliqhed) 
is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and 
eternity constantly pervades time" (SV 6,177; CA, 89). Or as 
Kierkegaard posits this problematic in Works of Love in terms 
of genuine love thereby distancing himself from the 
impoverished capacities of spontaneous love: 
Consequently if the eternal is in the temporal then 
it is in the future ... or in the possibility. The 
past is the actual, the future is the possible; 
eternally the eternal is the eternal, in time the 
eternal is the possible, the future. Therefore we 
call tomorrow the future, but we also call eternal 
life the future. The possible as such is always a 
duality and the eternal relates itself in 
possibility equally to its duality. On the other 
hand, when the human being to whom the possible is 
relevant relates himself equally to the duality of 
the possible, then we say: he expects. To expect 
contains in it the same duality which the possible 
has, and to expect is to relate oneself to the 
possible simply and purely as such {SV 12,240; WL, 
234) . 
The human being is a synthesis of temporality and 
eternity we are now told in Works of Love, and from Vigilius' 
explanation of these terms, as well as from that of 
Kierkegaard himself, it would seem the eternal in a double 
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sense relates itself to time. 65 Here it becomes necessary to 
remind ourselves of Kierkegaard's philosophical anthropology 
which claims human nature is constituted by body and soul 
united in spirit (SV 6,137; CA, 43), something that must 
necessarily be cognitively acknowledged if his philosophy of 
political consciousness is to be comprehensible. 66 
This brings us back to the problem of spontaneous love 
being able to claim existence but unable to exact constancy. 
What Kierkegaard is talking about is precisely the kind of 
existence that spontaneous love lays claim to, namely a lack 
of presence and hence a life without what Vigilius (ironically 
yet biblically) refers to as "the fullness of time" (SV 6,178; 
CA, 90). Presence necessitates the eternal dimension, 
necessitates transcendence, according to Kierkegaard's 
understanding of authenticity, and therefore spontaneous love 
cannot provide authenticity, cannot lead to genuine humanity, 
much less to human equality. Erotic love or friendship contain 
65 Ibid, p. 191. 
66 Reidar Thomte explains how Kierkegaard's philosophical 
anthropology should be understood in his "Historical 
Introduction" to The Concept of Anxiety, p. xiv: 
"Historically, the psychology with which Kierkegaard worked 
is quite different from present day psychological research. 
His is a phenomenology that is based on an ontological view 
of man, the fundamental presupposition of which is the 
transcendent reality of the individual, whose intuitively 
discernible character reveals the existence of an eternal 
component. Such a psychology does not blend well with any 
purely empirical science and is best understood by regarding 
soma, psyche, and spirit as the principle determinants of the 
human structure, with the first two belonging to the temporal 
realm and the third to the eternal." 
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no ethical task, a transcendent category, but is entirely 
dependent upon chance, a category of immanence. One may have 
to be grateful for one's good fortune, but "the task can never 
be that one ought to find the beloved or to find this friend" 
(SV 12,55; WL, 64). 
What has been shown here is that Kierkegaard's dialectic 
defines the single self as qualified by empirical necessity, 
and hence subject to change and to chance, as we have seen, 
but this single self also has a consciousness that renders it 
independent of time and hence free. That is to say, 
Kierkegaard insists on the distinction of the worldly life and 
the spiritual life with the only connection between the two 
being located in the existential enactment of the requirement, 
that is, in the ethico-religious moment. Hence the 
concreteness of the self is precisely expressed by making 
itself infinitely present to itself and to see this as its 
task, as its primary ethical obligation (SV 12,55; WL, 64). 
IV:7 
Kierkegaard opposes spontaneous or preferential love 
(Elskov) to what we have chosen to call simply love 
(Kierlighed) . The latter implies a transformation of the 
passion expressed as erotic love or friendship into a kind of 
love that can claim Existents implying among other 
characteristics constancy, yet without annulling love of the 
beloved or friend. If that were a requirement, Kierkegaard 
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insists, the category of neighbor would be a fraud (SV 12,65; 
WL, 73). However, love as an obligation is not dependent upon 
the mysteriousness of "falling in love." "By coming into 
existence, by becoming a self, [the single self] becomes free, 
but in the next moment it is dependent upon this self. In 
contrast, the obligation makes a person dependent and in the 
same moment eternally independent" (SV 12,43; WL, 53). Love, 
then, is not dependent upon accident or fortune, upon the 
notion of "falling in love," something over which human beings 
have no control. It is a constant inasmuch as the command of 
the law is eternally posited. It is universal inasmuch as 
revelation was meant to speak to all humankind. 
Love of neighbor is not an erratic passion qualified by 
emotional and sensuous desires. Rather it is a love of the 
spirit "which in earnestness and truth is inwardly more tender 
than erotic love is in the union and more faithful in the 
sincerity of solidarity than the most famous friendship" (SV 
12,49; WL, 58). Kierkegaard is content to suggest that natural 
inclinations cannot be counted on to initiate the "idea of 
community." Therefore we get the law's demand which elicits 
an obligation, something human beings can control. 
This transfer of control is possible inasmuch as his 
philosophical anthropology showed the human individual to be 
a two-dimensional being making a dialectical life experience 
possible. The point is that the single self must love in a 
different way, in an ethical way, and that is an obligation 
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constitutive of its (second) nature. In other words, 
Kierkegaard's authentic self is a responsible being, 
responsible to the other, to the community, and to the self. 
In this chapter we have seen how Kierkegaard begins to 
implement his therapeutic "corrective" by differentiating the 
categories freedom and equality from how they are conceived 
by liberal theory. To Kierkegaard these most important 
principles of the modern experience have been incorrectly 
understood as political rights. This misunderstanding was 
caused by the self-deification of man -- a symptomatic effect 
of the separation of knowledge and experience -- resulting in 
a materialist conception of these principles and indeed of the 
single self. It meant that the dialectic of immanent and 
transcendent experience, traditionally understood by classical 
philosophy to render a differentiated human existence, had 
been confounded. Consequently the single self had been reduced 
to an undifferentiated being who in its egological condition 
experiences only estrangement and envy, and thus a being 
reduced to its lowest common denominator. 
Kierkegaard's "corrective" aims at revising this mistaken 
interpretation of the single self and the principles that 
governs its existence and thereby provide the possibility for 
a higher form of existence. He does so by emphasizing the 
ethical nature of freedom and equality, meaning they are tasks 
to be achieved and as such will express the "idea of 
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community." He wants to remind people of the possibility of 
a differentiated self that acts in the world in terms of its 
most genuine characteristic which is love. Kierkegaard 
differentiates this form of love, whose basic trait is 
constancy, from erotic love which he considers generally 
unreliable because it is subject to change. Kierkegaard 
overcomes this problem by positing the possibility for a 
higher form of love, for transcending this passion of love in 
its most basic expression and become a love that understands 
freedom and equality as obligations fulfilled by love's 
obedience to the demand of the law. 
In the next and final chapter we shall look closer at the 
law that is the foundation of the command "You shall love the 
neighbor as the self," and we shall take a closer look at 
Kierkegaard's concept of neighbor. More specifically, however, 
we shall investigate his concept of love with its unique 
characteristic of upbuilding as its fundamental task. As such 
we shall come to understand why it is that love must transcend 
its basic self and become a higher form of love that has the 
capacity to love the other as the self and hence the freedom 
to acknowledge the other as the equal of the self. 
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Chapter V 
A THERAPEUTIC "CORRECTIVE": 
LOVE AS UPBUILDING 
The only actuality there is for an existing being 
is his own ethical being; all other actualities he 
is only knowledgeable about, but true know1edge consists in a translating within possibility. 
See, now the discourse has stopped by that which it 
wants to make the object of its considerations. The 
commandment about being obliged to love the neighbor 
turns out to be synonymous with that of being 
obliged to love oneself. Our intention has not been 
to talk about love of neighbor. Rather we wish to 
talk about 
that love is duty, that 
we ought to love the neighbor; 
for this is precisely the mark of Christian love 
that it includes this apparent contradiction: that 
to love is duty. And yet it is only this type of 
love that discovers that the neighbor exists, and, 
what then comes to the same, that everyone is that 
[an existing neighbor]. If it was not a duty to 
love, then there could be no talk of loving the 
neighbor j the concept neighbor corresponds to loving 
as duty. 
By making the imperative that one should love the 
neighbor as oneself the foundation of love, Kierkegaard 
creates a higher form of love by constituting it as an 
1 SV 10,22; CUP, 280. 
2 PAP VIII 2 B 30:4. 
obligation. This he understands as an act of obedience. As 
such it is not plagued by the vicissitudes of erotic love, but 
rather engenders a constancy in existential experience that 
renders harmony in the self. Moreover, by so cons ti tu ting 
love, he is able to institute the concept of neighbor as a 
relational quality of the self, something that was alien to 
classical Greek philosophy. 
In this chapter we shall look at how Kierkegaard qua his 
"corrective" reveals a space for human action that transcends 
the mundane egological reality of the single self. Here we 
should take careful note of the fact that the possible implied 
in this obligation to the law's demand to love the other as 
the self is possible, and therefore it is a higher reality 
than any the inauthentic single self may have created for 
itself. It is only possible, however, if the single self 
freely chooses it. By choosing to love the neighbor, and by 
extension all of humankind, in that special sense, the single 
self has committed itself to a stance, that is, to a level of 
political consciousness that expresses a concern for the good 
of the whole thereby manifesting the "idea of community." By 
choosing to love in a sense that incorporates the unique 
characteristic of being upbuilding, the single self has 
created a space in which transparency can be achieved. It is 
a transparency that unconceals the single self acting 
according to its understanding of citizenship, a category that 
in and of itself unconceals the particular human being as a 
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single relating self of character. It is the experience of 
Existents. 
V:1 
Kierkegaard's emphasis on the law (SV 12,23-48; WL, 34-
57) has a two-dimensional aspect to it. As Bruce Kirmmse has 
pointed out, it is both rational inasmuch as it posits a 
command to respond to the universal standards of ethical 
conduct, and doctrinaire insofar as it demands obedience to 
Mosaic Law or the Christian Law of Pauline teaching. In its 
broadest sense Kierkegaard's conception of the law is meant 
to "summon up both its Enlightenment philosophical sense and 
its traditional New Testament dogmatic sense. 113 The latter 
becomes necessary inasmuch as Christianity as a religion of 
grace speaks to the single self as it really is according to 
revelation: weak and sinful. For that reason the single self 
is in need of "a religion more absolute, outgoing, and 
personal than the religion of rational, universal, ethical 
statements (the Law)," which expect rationally perfected and 
hence abstract beings for its fulfillment. 4 
But there is more to the differentiation than this. The 
problem for Kierkegaard is that, for example, with respect to 
3 Kierkegaard's Politics: The Social Thought of S0ren 
Kierkegaard in Its Historical Context. Ph.D. dissertation 
(University of California, Berkeley, 1977), p. 592. 
4 Ibid. 
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Kant's categorical imperative the autonomous individual acts 
on principle. Kant's only concern is the validity of the 
principle. In the case of the principle of utility, one acts 
in accordance with a merely mechanical principle. The problem 
is that acting "on principle" is to act in accordance with 
something external which means to engage in something 
inherently detrimental and disharmonious to the self. 
Ultimately, as we saw in chapter three, this is to be in 
conflict with the principle of contradiction. Before we jump 
to the conclusion that the principle of contradiction also is 
an external principle, however, it must be remembered how 
Kierkegaard understands this Aristotelian principle in its 
moral application: to discern between good and evil. It is an 
ethical qualification and therefore existential in nature. 
In the cases of the categorical imperative and the 
principle of utility the duty is to universal law; it is not 
to the other nor to the self in the strict sense. As Climacus 
comments in the Postscript, "(w]hen an individual [Individ) 
abandons himself in order to lay hold of something great 
[ outside himself), his enthusiasm is aesthetic; when he 
forsakes everything to save himself, his enthusiasm is 
ethical" (SV 10,85; CUP, 350). 
One might argue that the commandment to love the neighbor 
is equally external to the single self, especially as 
Kierkegaard defines it: as the law's demand (Fordring), as an 
obligation that is not natural to the basic self. The point 
232 
is that the obligation is entered into freely and only when 
faith has become the actuality of the consciousness of the 
single self, i.e. the possibility that is possible for every 
single self. Moreover, faith cannot be categorized as external 
to the self as it constitutes inwardness (Inderlighed). The 
law that obliges the single self to love the neighbor as the 
self is g priori in the sense of being a law written on the 
mind, and in that sense is innate within the self. But the 
law also comes from without in the form of the commandment to 
which the self is obliged, and inasmuch as this means to 
become genuinely consistent with that deeper self, it is 
constitutive of selfhood. Conceived in this manner, obedience 
to the law's demand constitutes Existents. 
The purpose of the law is to compel the single self to 
love the neighbor as itself, which for Kierkegaard is the 
highest good. He insists Christianity teaches the shortest 
way to find this good is through grace (SV12,56; WL, 64). And 
since law addresses the single self as it is, no human being 
can claim exemption from the law's demand. There is no 
requirement for the single self to be what it is not, i.e. 
there is no requirement for a specific talent or super human 
effort. There is only the requirement that it, through grace, 
wills to see the neighbor as its equal. Therefore, as Paul 
Muller has pointed out, the relation to transcendent being "is 
the unavoidable (uomg~ngelige) condition for the human 
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individual becoming a loving, social self. 115 
A relationship to Christianity must therefore be sober 
in an eternal sense, meaning it must attain a self-
renunciating stance, which is precisely where it sets itself 
apart from worldly love which essentially is self-love. To be 
obedient to the law's demand is to enter into a sober 
existence, while an irreligious life implies the intoxication 
of self-feeling since erotic love and friendship are the very 
height of self-feeling. As such they represent the height of 
self-intoxication (SV 12,60; WL, 68). It is a delicate 
dialectical move Kierkegaard engages in here. His intent is 
to assure that the worldly -- neighborly love can obviously 
not be practiced anywhere but within a social arrangement --
must be carefully balanced yet differentiated from the 
transcendent experience of the standard (Malestok) that is 
embodied in the law, and to which the single self can never 
be equal. It is in this carefully balanced differentiated 
experience that Kierkegaard's intentionality is rooted. 
The law demands that we love the neighbor. Kierkegaard 
promotes an interesting thesis about the concept of neighbor. 
He suggests that erotic love and friendship as conceived by 
"the poet" are categories that belong to paganism, while love 
of neighbor is strictly a Christian concept. Among the pagans 
there was no concept of neighbor, only a poetic celebration 
5 
"Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaardiana, 13, 
som social og 
(1984), p. 124. 
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politisk tamker" in 
of erotic love and friendship. But in the New Testament the 
poet will find no such celebration, only repeated celebrations 
of the concept of love of neighbor. Here Kierkegaard makes a 
rare judgment on revelation as such placing it and its message 
of "the true love" (den sande Kjerlighed) above pagan (poetic) 
teaching. Kierkegaard concedes that although it is true that 
people listen more to the poet and his worldly promises than 
to the words of the preacher, Christianity should not attempt 
to ban poets or poetry reading. We live in that world, but as 
Christians we understand everything differently from the non-
Christian; we know how to make the distinction between worldly 
and non-worldly promises (SV 12,52; WL, 61). The Christian may 
speak the same language, but by his words he means something 
entirely different. 
V:2 
Because the single self resides in the world, its 
language contains a dialectical dimension that both endangers 
and harmonizes existential experience. Thus belief also 
becomes an attitude. One should not believe evil but good 
about one's neighbor. That is to say, the knowledge we have 
about others is interpretation. Therefore, how we interpret 
the neighbor is in the knower, not in the neighbor (SV 12,219-
20; WL, 214-15). It is a matter of the condition of the 
consciousness of the single self. As Kresten Nordentoft 
comments, "To live is to interpret the uninterpreted given, 
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not in an arbitrary pleasing of itself, but in a continuing 
interpretation of the ambiguous. 116 
Kierkegaard here posits the basic framework for reading 
Works of Love, a framework that differs rather dramatically 
from his earlier authorship. There, and especially in the 
indirect communications of the pseudonymous authorship, he 
laid out the three existence forms: the aesthetic, the ethical 
and the religious. 7 But here in the direct communication of 
his later authorship, Kierkegaard in a sense, but only in a 
sense, goes back to where he started, he again posits the 
either/or. Now there are only two existence forms, and the one 
unambiguously excludes the other, in contrast to the earlier 
tripartite division where one existence form did not 
necessarily exclude the others. Thus in Works of Love 
Kierkegaard is not operating on the abstract levels of the 
aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence forms that belong 
to the indirect communication of his pseudonymous authorship. 
Now the communication is direct; the choice has become 
6 Kierkegaard's Psychology, p. 339. 
7 There are a variety of intermediate stages that have 
been discussed in much detail in the secondary literature. See 
for example Steven Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of 
Inwardness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985; John 
w. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous 
Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Mark c. 
Taylor Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A study of Time 
and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); 
Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth: Kierkegaard 
Pseudonymous Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1967; James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1953. 
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concrete: either you are a Christian or you are not. 8 The 
requirement is that the whole being of the single self 
responds to this demand for choice. 
The choice to be a Christian does not mean a withdrawal 
from the world -- it is tempting to say that the opposite is 
indeed true. 
Erotic love and friendship relate themselves to 
passion; but all passion, whether it attacks or it 
defends itself, fights in one manner only: either -
- or: "Either I exist and am the highest, or I do 
not exist at all, either all or nothing" (SV 12,50; 
WL, 59). 
From this it would seem to follow that human passion embraces 
its own self-critical dimension9 that requires it to progress 
to its highest dimension in terms of its own self-
understanding. Christianity, according to Kierkegaard, 
presents the highest form of differentiation to which 
therefore passion must direct its efforts. That would mean 
that obedience to the command to love the neighbor as oneself, 
a command that never ceases, is considered a higher form of 
passion than that expressed by spontaneous and essentially 
8 As Kierkegaard remarked in his journal: "The whole 
pseudonymous production, and my existence in virtue of it, was 
in a Greek mode. Now I must elicit the characteristic 
Christian form of Existents. For more on this change in 
Kierkegaard's presentation of existence forms see Sylvia Walsh 
Utterbach, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Christian Existence," 
Ph.D. dissertation (Emory University, 1975), pp. 1-8. 
9 Not unlike Hegel's concept of spirit which also 
progresses toward higher self-development by the self-testing 
inherent to consciousness, what in traditional terms was 
referred to as "the quest for truth." Hegel's Science of 
Logic, p. 55. 
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unreliable love. 
But, of course, there is more to the story than that. 
Love of other is seen as a higher form of passion than love 
of self -- even worldly love recognizes some forms of self-
lessness (SV 12,123; WL, 127). 10 But love of other, before 
self, that is, the immanent self, is not a natural 
inclination. Love of the neighbor does not come naturally to 
human beings. Natural or spontaneous love is ultimately love 
of self, while the law that issues the "love-commandment" 
(Kjerligheds-Budet) is essentially aimed at self-renunciation. 
But this would seem to contradict the very language of 
the law which says to love the neighbor as the self. 
Kierkegaard should here be approached with much caution when 
he says that "this commandment will teach each person how he 
is to love himself" (SV 12,65; WL, 73-4). To obey the command 
to love and hence to comprehend love as a duty is to 
acknowledge the self as essentially spirit. In this sense, the 
"love-commandment" promises eternal life (Ibid) . 11 The spirit 
is thus constituted as love, that is, as in love of other. To 
1° Kierkegaard is somewhat ambiguous on the world's 
perception of self-lessness. See, for example, SV 12,119-20; 
WL, 123-24. 
11 This is one of the few, if not the only place in Works 
of Love where Kierkegaard hints at eternal salvation. Such 
reluctance would appear to suggest that although that may be 
the ultimate benefit to the believer, the struggle to achieve 
the truth of one's self is for immediate purposes, to fully 
concretize or existentialize experience. According to 
Kierkegaard, such a life constitutes a higher form of 
happiness. See discussion above in chapter I. 
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love the other is therefore to love oneself (as essentially 
spirit). To love oneself in this sense is to practice 
Christian self-denial, while its absence is to succumb to the 
"intoxication of self-feeling," meaning immanent self-love. 
Self-denial is precisely this transformation of the self from 
one sensually-psychically-spiritually qualified, to a self 
"purely qualified as spirit and the neighbor a purely 
spiritual qualification" (SV 12,61; WL, 69). It is a 
transformation, as Kierkegaard says, "by which a human being 
becomes sober in an eternal sense" (SV 12,60; WL, 68), i.e. 
he acknowledges the differentiated reality that constitutes 
a concretized life. It is in this sense Kierkegaard talks 
about an ethico-religious existence as it concerns the 
relation between the self and the other, 
world. 
the self and the 
The perspective of the 
essentially spirit, revelation, 
universal authority embedded 
single 
the 
in 
self understood 
commandment, and 
this command 
as 
the 
gain 
significance, but a balanced significance. Bruce Kirmmse may 
be correct when he claims that this is the death of natural 
man, 12 as long as we understand that this abolishment does not 
imply an abandonment of the differentiated experience, that 
Kierkegaard has so carefully developed, and make the single 
self a religious fanatic. Thus Kierkegaard is very careful to 
12 
' 0 C 't Kirmmse, p. 1. p. 592. 
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add that to love in this sense does not prevent engagement in 
erotic love and friendship, but now these relationships take 
place on a higher level than before inasmuch as the beloved 
and the friend are not just loved as unique human beings, they 
are loved as neighbors as well (SV 12,65-6; WL, 73-4). 
V:3 
The understanding of differentiated experience developed 
above suggests that Christianity also represents a 
paradigmatic change in how human beings theoretically relate 
to each other (SV 12,30, WL, 41). 13 For Plato and Aristotle 
the obligation was grounded in the political relationship of 
the zoon politikon toward the city, toward the whole, in an 
organic conception of that relationship. 14 At times, 
13 As Eric Voegelin suggests in The Ecumenic Age, vol. 4 
of Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1974), p.232: "Revelation is not a piece of 
information, arbitrarily thrown out by some supernatural 
force, to be carried home as a possession, but the movement 
of response to an irruption of the divine in the psyche." 
14 We hesitate to use the organic conception to 
characterize the political relationship as depicted in the 
political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle inasmuch as this 
would be an incorrect definition of the philosopher's 
relationship to the political dimension of the city, 
especially as we understand it in Plato's Republic. That, 
however, would not constrain us from characterizing it as a 
necessary relationship, but the category of necessity is not 
connected to the organic conception in this case. Rather we 
want to argue, fully realizing the conflicting opinions of 
other interpretations, that Plato insists that the philosopher 
returns to the cave, because he sees that it is the good that 
wisdom rules in the city. The relationship of philosophy and 
politics is therefore a necessary relationship. The Republic 
of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1968), 517c, 519c-d, 520b-c, and especially 540a-b. It is, 
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Kierkegaard sounds as if he conceives of the political 
relationship in somewhat the same manner, for instance when 
he as a twenty-three year old makes the following statement: 
When the dialectical (the romantic) is world-
historically lived through (a period I perhaps could 
very appropriately call the age of individuality -
something which can also quite easily be 
demonstrated historically), social life must again 
come to play its role to the highest degree, and 
ideas such as the state (for example as the Greeks 
knew it; church in the older Catholic meaning) must 
necessarily return richer and fuller, that is, with 
all the content that the transmitted diversity of 
individuality can give the idea, so that the single 
self as such means nothing, but everything is as a 
link in the chain. 15 
But the concept of the neighbor puts a whole different light 
on Kierkegaard's thinking. For one thing, it posits human 
relationships based on conscience rather than on conventional 
mores (SV 12,133; WL, 137), meaning authority is now located 
within rather than externally. Yet in spite of its religious 
connotations, it urges a political understanding. 
Kierkegaard's concept of neighbor not only dates him, but 
the "deduction" he makes from this concept of categories such 
then, a rational qualification that governs the relationship 
between philosophy and politics from Plato's perspective. On 
the other hand, when Plato argues in Book IV of the Republic 
that "each of the other citizens too must be brought to that 
which naturally suits him -- one man, one job -- so that each 
man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many 
but one; and thus, you see, the whole city will naturally grow 
to be one and not many" ( 423d) , then Plato is indeed 
characterizing an organic relationship. For a similar account 
in Aristotle see The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1252b25-35, 1276b15-
35. 
15 PAP I A 307 (JP 4070). 
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as equality and freedom, humanity and community, firmly 
establishes him as a political thinker in the modern 
tradition. There is no trace of any organic conception of the 
state left in the picture his understanding of the concept of 
neighbor reveals. That, however, should not be construed as 
an introduction to a Kierkegaardian theory of state. What 
concerns him is how (hvorledes) the single self is disposed 
to the larger whole, what throughout this project is referred 
to as political consciousness. Kierkegaard is much less 
interested in the what of things, and therefore we do not get 
a theory of state from him outlining the institutional 
structures of procedural governing. 16 We might add that a 
philosophy of consciousness does not necessitate a theory of 
state, while a theory of state necessarily presupposes a 
philosophy of consciousness. 17 
V:4 
Kierkegaard entitles one of the chapters of Works of Love 
"You shall love the neighbor." It is time to find out who this 
neighbor really is. First, Kierkegaard does not say "your 
16 As we have already seen and shall see later, there are 
other more compelling reasons why Kierkegaard does not provide 
a political theory as such, the most important being that he 
in fact accepted the natural emergence of liberal democracy 
and its governing structures which in Denmark took the form 
of a constitutional monarchy. 
17 We are grateful to Joseph Roberts for reminding us of 
this truth. 
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neighbor" as it has heretofore been translated. In fact, the 
Danish word he uses does not mean neighbor in the ordinary 
sense at all. Neighbor in Danish is Nabo. The word Kierkegaard 
does use is N~sten which is derived from neahgebur (near-
dweller),18 and which incorporates within it the definitive 
article. Literally it would mean "the next one." This is 
precisely the meaning Kierkegaard draws from it when he says 
the neighbor worthy of your love is the next person you see, 
"the neighbor is the one who dwells nearer to you than all 
others, but not in a preferential sense" (SV 12,26; WL, 37), 
"the neighbor is every human being" (SV 12,64; WL, 72). 
Kierkegaard asks whether the neighbor is closer to you than 
you are yourself and answers in the negative. The neighbor is 
as near to you as you are to yourself, and in that sense "the 
neighbor is actually a doubling of your own self; the neighbor 
is what the thinkers would call the other, that by which the 
selfish in self-love is to be tested" (SV 12,26-7; WL, 37). 
Kierkegaard is struggling to explain what "as the self" 
could possibly mean without collapsing the concept of love of 
other into an egological conclusion. The "doubling" is 
manifested by the word of the commandment, and it is a 
doubling "the selfish [erotic lover] unconditionally cannot 
tolerate" ( SV 12, 27; WL, 38) . His burning passion would 
18 Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" in 
Poetry. Language. Thought, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 146-47. 
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prohibit him from giving up his love if the beloved should 
demand it. It would mean to deny what his passion dictates, 
and this he is unable to do. "Consequently the lover does not 
love the beloved "as himself," for he is demanding 
[fordrende), but this 'as himself' contains precisely the 
demand [Fordringen) to him -- alas, nevertheless the loving 
one believes still to love the other person higher than 
himself" (Ibid, emphasis added). In that sense the other is 
as close to the truly loving self as it is possible to be 
with out attempting to change him or her in any way; the 
egological move would be to succumb to the temptation of being 
demanding, succomb to the temptation to try to change the 
other. 
Using a Heideggerian interpretation, we can say that 
Kierkegaard understands the law's demand (the only point where 
demand apparently is appropriate) that "You shall love the 
neighbor as the self" to mean to let the other be. 19 Inasmuch 
19 Ibid, p. 151: "Dwelling presences the fourfold by 
bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things. But 
things themselves secure the fourfold only when they 
themselves as things are let be in their presencing. How is 
this done? In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture the 
things that grow, and specially construct things that do not 
grow." Also Discourse on Thinking, tr. John M. Anderson and 
E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 
55-6 (Gelassenheit, pp. 24-5): "Releasement [or letting-be, 
Gelassenheit] toward things and openness to the mystery [that 
which shows itself and at the same time withdraws) belong 
together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the 
world in a totally different way .... What great danger then 
might move upon us? Then there might go hand in hand with the 
greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing 
indifference toward meditative thinking, total 
thoughtlessness. And then? Then man would have denied and 
244 
as you choose to remain indifferent to the differences in the 
other, the other can be whatever he wants to be. To be 
indifferent to his alterity is an act of letting-be. 
In the direct communication of Works of Love Kierkegaard 
is less concerned with the phenomenology of the ethical 
relationship and more concerned with its practical 
possibility. On the other hand, the political in this concept 
of other becomes dominant when Kierkegaard adds: "To be sure 
the neighbor is in itself a multitude, for the neighbor means 
all people (alle Mennesker)" (SV 12,27; WL, 37). Thus he 
embodies the political in the ethical in a way reminiscent of 
this unity in Plato and Aristotle. As the single self is 
obliged to the neighbor, in the same way he is obliged to all 
of humankind. As is suggested, Christianity relates itself, 
not to cognition, but to action thereby "imprisoning" (fange) 
a questioner to the ethical, just as Socrates did to knowledge 
(SV 12,97; WL, 103). One might argue that Kierkegaard posits 
a universal responsibility for the state of the world on each 
single self. He thereby enlarges upon the duties of the 
individual of liberal theory whose aim was merely to 
aggrandize his own lot in accordance with political rights to 
thrown away his own special nature -- that he is a meditative 
being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential 
nature. Therefore, the issue is keeping meditative thinking 
alive. Yet releasement toward things and openness to the 
mystery never happen of themselves. They do not befall us 
accidentally. Both flourish only through persistent, 
courageous thinking." 
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which no apparent obligation is attached. 20 
Kierkegaard's philosophy of political consciousness not 
only posits a responsibility for the neighbor, but it also 
posits the criterion for this relationship, which is 
especially captured in his comparison of the self to the 
other. The relationship is precisely grounded in the 
"likeness" of the two entities which rules out any apparent 
differences in terms of talent, social position or economic 
advantage or disadvantage. In other words, the neighbor is 
simply any person that appears before you, and importantly the 
neighbor is "the absolutely true expression for human 
equality" (SV 18,156; POV, 118} . 21 Hence justice becomes the 
qualifier for the relationship of the self to the other, the 
neighbor, meaning justice is the aim of love. In this sense 
not only love, but justice as well, form the foundation of 
Kierkegaard's "idea of community, " the task to which every 
20 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. V, #49. 
Locke is remarkably scarce in his language in terms of 
attaching obligations to the rights of possession "which may 
be hoarded up without injury to any one." (Emphasis added). 
21Although very different from Kierkegaard, it is 
difficult not to be reminded of Emmanuel Levinas' "face to 
face" encounter: "My relationship with the other as neighbor 
gives meaning to my relations with all the others. All human 
relations as human proceed from disinterestedness. The one for 
the other of proximity is not a deforming abstraction. In it 
justice is shown from the first." Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), p. 159. See also his Totality and 
Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), pp. 212-14. 
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individual consciousness is called. 
The relationship of love and justice (Retf~rdighed) as 
Kierkegaard understands it, finally compels us to accept that 
his philosophy is anything but removed from the world of 
action. Indeed this relationship underscores how the single 
self is related to the state, and why the single self must 
come before the state, (as Kierkegaard admires in Plato). It 
also explains why all of his energies are focused on the 
single self -- the elementary unit of the state -- rather than 
on the structures of the state. 
v:s 
Ideally, the relationship between the single self and 
the state is grounded externally in justice and internally in 
love. Under the authority of justice, during peaceful times, 
proprietary interests would be safeguarded, and the state 
would have no rights of intervention (SV 12,255; WL, 248). 
That is to say, the difference between what is mine and yours 
is unambiguous. Everyone has what is his or hers and if 
someone attempts to defraud (fravende) another what is his, 
justice will intervene. 
The problem with this idyllic picture is that sometimes 
calamitous events occur such as "revolution, war, earthquake," 
and everything becomes confused (Ibid). Then justice may 
vainly attempt to secure to each what belongs to the single 
self, may vainly attempt to "emphasize the difference between 
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what is mine and yours" (Ibid). But in the confusion justice 
is unable to maintain its balance. Its blindfold may 
momentarily have slipped off, and as Kierkegaard argues, 
justice despairs. The result is social chaos. Political 
authority has lost control and is unable to live up to its 
foremost responsibility: "regulating and preserving property," 
to use the words of Locke's description of the obligations of 
the minimalist state. 22 
The problem with justice is in Kierkegaard's opinion its 
inability to maintain stability. The reason for this is its 
emphasis on proprietary rights. More fundamentally, the 
problem with justice is its inherent concern with external 
differences, the difference between what is mine and yours. 
With emphasis on difference, any form of authority, whether 
it is considered just or not, will be forced to choose sides, 
and hence its legitimacy is compromised. Its legitimacy is 
compromised, most fundamentally, because its focus is on 
externality, and therefore it is relatively easy to unbalance. 
Love (Kjerlighed), in contrast, although it within itself 
represents change in its transformed expression as love of 
other, nevertheless embodies a posture that dissolves/elevates 
or suspends (oph~ver) the distinction between mine and yours, 
and the more so the deeper the love. 
Its perfection depends essentially on that it does 
not reveal the original and continual difference 
between mine and yours that is fundamentally hidden; 
22 Second Treatise of Government, Ch. I, #3. 
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consequently it depends essentially on the degree 
of the revolution (Omvi!!l tning) ; the deeper the 
revolution is, the more perfect is the love ( sv 
12,256; W:, 249). 
So rather than succumbing to distinctions, love decisively and 
undauntedly expresses the "idea of community" even in the face 
of calamities. As such love is more reliable with regard to 
maintaining social stability where justice, in Kierkegaard's 
opinion necessarily fails. In this sense love is essentially 
political and necessary expressing the fundamentally political 
nature of the single self. 
V:6 
The love of neighbor, as we have shown, represents much 
more than a utopian and otherworldly conception of the 
relationship between the single self and the world. But there 
are other reasons for why Kierkegaard would appeal to the 
concept of neighbor and thereby bring to fruition his "idea 
of community." 
On the one hand, Kierkegaard is well aware that people 
are naturally disinclined to care for anyone beyond their 
immediate circle of family and friends. To care for strangers 
and to devote oneself to their needs is in worldly terms 
considered strange, something reserved for 'saintly' people. 
The point is, no one would naturally love his neighbor if the 
neighbor, as Kierkegaard insists, is merely the next person 
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(Na!sten) you see. 23 on the other hand, Kierkegaard is fighting 
the illusion promoted by the "wellmeaning . . . but . 
false prophets of secularism" (SV 12,74-5; WL, 81-2) who by 
mechanical means claim to bring about "likeness in the world 
among human beings, to apportion the conditions of temporal 
existence equally, if possible, to all human beings" (SV 
12, 75; WL, 82) . The earthly distinctions that modern man 
clings to as much as the citizens of Plato's Republic are 
unchangeable, Kierkegaard insists, and no ideology is going 
to improve on that condition. 
From the distance of superior condescension the 
distinguished person understands equality between 
human beings; from the distance of concealed 
superiority the scholar and the gentleman understand 
23 Plato had the same problem and therefore we get the 
often misinterpreted and ill labeled "noble lie." The 
Phoenecian Tale has a twofold purpose. It wants to explain the 
naturalness of the division of labor in spite of which the 
people of the city in speech are all brothers. That is to say, 
Plato engages in the tale in order to get across the reality 
of an uncomfortable truth that will stand up against the 
"dream images" which express the natural and conventional 
differences (Republic 414d). Or to put it more bluntly, people 
were comfortable with the worldly divisions, but would abhor 
the call by Socrates, the physician, to brotherly love among 
all the citizens unless it was couched in an "unbelievable 
big lie." See Eric Voegelin, Plato (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
state University Press, 1966), p. 105. For a notorious 
contrasting interpretation see Karl Popper, The Open Society 
and Its Enemies, vol. I (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1962, 1966), pp. 138-141. Note that Popper does not 
mention Plato's insistence on the brotherhood of all men 
although it appears twice in the tale (Republic, 414e, 415a). 
Kierkegaard says much the same as Plato when he comments: "It 
is veritably true, then, (what is already evident in what has 
been developed, where it was shown that the neighbor is the 
pure qualification of mind), the neighbor one sees only with 
closed eyes or by looking away from the distinctions. The 
sensual eye always sees the distinctions and looks to the 
distinctions. (SV 12,71-2; WL, 79). 
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equality between human beings; from within the 
concession of a little advantage the one whose 
distinction is to be as most people are understands 
equality between human beings -- at a distance the 
neighbor is recognized by all, but only God knows 
how many recognize him in actuality, that is, up 
close (SV 12,82; WL, 89). 
Thus he charges the modern secular movements with attempting 
to fool the people into believing that the natural condition 
can somehow be altered by technical means. In other words, 
there is an appeal to ideology to promote brotherhood based 
on the results of scientific progress. The implication is that 
what was not possible before, resulting in humankind being 
plagued by caste and class systems, can now be remedied thanks 
to modern technology. But brotherly love, Kierkegaard warns, 
cannot be grounded in external illusions. It must have its 
foundation in the truth promoted by Christianity that 
spiritually human beings are all equal and are therefore able 
to love one another in spite of the worldly differences. By 
being Christian the single self is not "exempted from the 
difference, but by being victorious over the temptation of 
distinction" (SV 12, 73; WL, 81), he accomplishes the law's 
demand. Thus Christianity wills that every single self carry 
its difference loosely in order to allow its likeness to shine 
through, thereby revealing the "essentially other, that which 
for everyone is common" (SV 12,90; WL, 96). In that sense, 
then, Christianity again represents a paradigmatic change in 
251 
Kierkegaard's view. 24 From this it follows that Kierkegaard's 
concept of neighbor in its proper application is not only what 
is going to promote equality and the "idea of community" and 
consequently the single self's fulfillment. Importantly, for 
Kierkegaard, it will also restore Christianity to its proper 
role as the standard (Maalestok) for human conduct in the 
world. Essential to this standard is the concept of love as 
upbuilding. 
V:7 
What appears to be unique about Kierkegaard's concept of 
love is its upbuilding (opbyggende) quality. By this 
Kierkegaard means that through love 
the loving one [den Kjerlige] presupposes that love 
is in the other person's heart. and by this very 
presupposition he builds up love in him -- from the 
ground up. provided. of course. that he lovingly 
presupposes it in the ground {SV 12,210; WL, 206). 
24 Kierkegaard is either incredibly insensitive or 
equally incredibly oblivious to the reality of the European 
and American history of slavery, not to mention the history 
of the world. Thus he claims even the non-Christian is 
grateful to Christianity for having "saved humankind from the 
evil II which in pagan times had expressed itself in such 
11 inhuman II iris ti tutions as slavery and the caste system ( SV 
12,72,77; WL, 80, 84). He seems to forget that neither 
disappeared after the emergence of Christianity. Of course, 
in a theoretical sense he is correct inasmuch as Christianity 
did II imprint the kinship between human beings because the 
kinship is secured by each individual's equal kinship and 
relation to God in Christ" {SV 12,72; WL, 80). But inasmuch 
as Kierkegaard himself refers to historical conditions, he has 
opened himself up to such criticism. 
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Kierkegaard explains that this upbuilding quality is like 
nature's secret. Nature edifies inasmuch as its magnificence 
compels one to reflect on its hidden but very present order 
(SV 12,211; WL, 207). In the same sense love has an ordered 
presence as its ground, be it ever so hidden. Kierkegaard 
reflects on this ordered presence, conceding the incomplete 
presence of eternal love in any one human being ( Ibid) • 
Nevertheless, love transformed, in Kierkegaard's unique 
reading, possesses a nurturing quality that establishes the 
other's worth thereby constituting the ground of community. 
That is to say, love builds up the other in order to allow the 
possibility of fulfillment in the other. As such, to love 
would mean to be essentially responsible for the other. That 
is the task. 
The capacity to love in this way is present in every 
human being inasmuch as it is not an 
exclusive superiority based on individual talents, 
such as knowledge and poetic talent and beauty, and 
the like ... Quite on the contrary, every human 
being by his life, his conduct, by his behavior in 
the everyday, by his association with those equal, 
by his word, his expression ought to and could build 
up and would do it if love rightly were in him (SV 
12,206-07; WL, 202). 
Kierkegaard is quite sure that the fulfilled life is not the 
life measured by a given ordinary standard which essentially 
would abolish the eternal dimension. Such a life, entirely 
externally directed would only fulfill itself in 
institutional, associational, or organizational entities, all 
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of which express as their prime feature sheer number and thus 
make self-deepening impossible and unnecessary. In other 
words, the love expressed in such political and social 
relationships, measured only in relative terms, would not have 
the upbuilding quality required, would demonstrate neither 
the possibility nor the necessity of "the effort as well as 
the self-deepening that develop the God-relationship in a 
human being in the most difficult collision of infinite 
misunderstanding." (SV 12,223; WL, 217). That kind of life is 
too easy, Kierkegaard insists, reminding us that genuine love 
implies sacrifice and hence suffering. 25 It is not stimulated 
merely by reward as earthly love tends to be and which 
therefore is essentially self-love. Here the reader must be 
careful not to misread Kierkegaard. 
As Roy Martinez has explained, the problem lies not with 
the world as such or even the institutions. They are depicted 
unfavorably only because human beings tend to revert to them 
25 
"One must actually have suffered a great deal in the 
world and have been made very unhappy before there can be any 
question of beginning to love the neighbor. The "neighbor" 
only comes into existence [blive til] in self-denial's dying 
away from earthly happiness and joy and good times. Therefore 
the spontaneous person [den Umiddelbare] cannot really be 
censured for not loving the neighbor, because the spontaneous 
person is too happy for "the neighbor" to exist [vaere til] for 
him. Anyone who clings to earthly life does not love his 
neighbor --that is to say, for him the neighbor does not 
exist." PAP VIII 1 A 269 (JP 4603). It would be interesting 
to pursue this concept of suffering as an inherent and perhaps 
necessary part of human existence, a concept modernity, and 
especially liberal theory, has distanced itself from believing 
all human existence must somehow hover in infinite happiness. 
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in times of stress. Then they will attempt to unburden 
themselves of personal responsibility and will refuse to act 
according to their own conscience. The "outside" world they 
turn to is what Kierkegaard refers to as externality, and 
inasmuch as it is the natural thing to seek help outside 
oneself in rough times, this externality stands as 
differentiated from what Kierkegaard refers to as inwardness 
(Inderlighed). Inwardness is that which emphasizes the 
conscious life of the authentic single self. Conscience is 
that which links the single self directly to the eternal. 
Insofar as the eternal's concern is with the truly good, the 
single self must dialectically respond to this command and 
relegate "pleasure, pain, and desire to peripheral roles in 
his existence. 1126 Martinez continues, 
What is involved in inward deepening is a growing 
capacity on the part of the single self not only to 
distinguish between his organic dependence and his 
spiritual independence, but the sustained effort to 
live out this recognition. 27 
Kierkegaard's point is that because of our natural 
tendencies to resort to externality, to seek pleasure, the 
claims of the eternal are expressed in terms of commands, such 
as the command to love the neighbor. Such commands force the 
single self to search deep within the self for the appropriate 
response and thus recognize "that the dynamism of his essence 
26 Roy Martinez, "Kierkegaard's Ideal of Inward 
Deepening" in Philosophy Today, 32 (Summer 1988), p. 112. 
27 Ibid. Cf. SV 12,344; WL, 332. 
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issues from, and points towards, a transcendent source and 
goal. " 28 It bears repeating, then, that Kierkegaard is not 
positing a requirement to abandon the world or withdraw from 
it. That, of course, would negate the thesis of this project. 
The point is precisely to commit to the concreteness of a 
daily life governed by the self's transcendent dialectic. 
From this perspective, to presuppose love in the other 
is to place a duty on oneself. As such this constitutes a work 
of love. Kierkegaard warns, however, that the other is not 
loved in an upbuilding sense in order to transform the other 
or to force love to the surface in the other. The tendency to 
dominate must be avoided -- we must learn the act of letting-
be -- just as the tendency to tear down or to destroy, a 
tendency which is commonly associated with building up, must 
likewise be avoided. As Kierkegaard notes in his journal, such 
love presupposes that even if a wrong has been committed, 
there has been no break, for only then is love upbuilding. 29 
"When the loving one builds up, then it is the direct opposite 
of tearing down, because the loving one does something to 
himself: he presupposes that love is present in the other 
person -- which certainly is the very opposite of doing 
something to the other person" (SV 12,212-13; WL, 208). Where 
upbuilding usually implies a lack of something -- Kierkegaard 
28 Ibid, p. 113. 
29 PAP VIII 2 B 50:6. 
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uses the examples of the teacher who presupposes the ignorance 
of the student or the disciplinarian who presupposes the 
corruption of the other person -- but eternal love has no 
other choice but to presuppose love as the ground in the 
other. In this way the Good is elicited as love is encouraged, 
as love is nurtured, in the other. 
Unlike the teacher and the disciplinarian, however, both 
of whom can show results, "the love that builds up has nothing 
to show inasmuch as its work is merely to presuppose" (SV 
12,211; WL, 206). To presuppose love as the ground in the 
other, yet have no visible results to show for one's 
commitment is to practice humility and hence to build 
character. "For it is more difficult to master one's mind than 
to capture a city, and more difficult to build up as love does 
than to execute the most astonishing undertaking" (SV 12,211; 
WL, 207). Therefore we get the analogy to nature's secret work 
which never stops, yet is never seen, but precisely in its 
invisibility lies its upbuilding quality. 30 It forces the 
single self to reflect on the wonders of nature and the 
creative force behind it. 31 In the same way, by presupposing 
3° Kierkegaard reminds us of the gentleness with which 
nature asserts itself on all people indiscriminately: "Imagine 
that nature were as we human beings are, severe, domineering, 
cold, partisan, petty, capricious -- and imagine, yes, then 
imagine what would become of the beauty of the field (Markens 
Dejlighed]" (SV 12,259; WL, 252). 
31 These paragraphs in Kierkegaard's Works of Love lend 
themselves to thinking about the question why it is we are 
destroying the very environment on which we depend. Is it 
possibly because we have forgotten how to wonder about that 
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love in the other, the single self communicates invisibly the 
foundation of the relationship which is the Good, a Good that 
may be concealed, 32 but which nevertheless is expressed in 
loving the other as an equal. By insisting that love is 
presupposed as the ground in the other, the other is seen not 
for his apparent distinctions, for true love refrains from all 
comparison, but for his likeness (Ligeliqhed). The aim of the 
relationship is unity, not differance, for community can only 
exist where unity makes a presence. 
Kierkegaard asks the reader to imagine the kind of person 
that would be preferred if indeed another person were to build 
one up. Although the reader may at first opt for such 
characteristics as insight and knowledge, talent and 
experience, decisive would be that we all would want such a 
person to be reliable and loving. "Knowledge puffs up. And yet 
knowledge and the communication of knowledge can also be 
upbuilding, but if it is, it is because love is present" (SV 
12,208; WL, 204). 33 What kind of love is this, Kierkegaard 
asks? "Love is to presuppose love; to love is to presuppose 
love in others, to be loving is to presuppose that others are 
which we cannot see? 
32 As Hannah Arendt has commented, the Good never sees 
the light of day, for then it becomes tarnished and/or 
perverted. On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963 and 
1965), p. 98. Cf. Glaucon's argument in Plato's Republic 361b-
c. 
33 Cf. Paul, First Corinthians 8:1: "Knowledge puffs up, 
but love builds up." 
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loving" (SV 12,216; WL, 211). To presuppose love as the ground 
in the other is thus constructive, yet concealed. 
Self-determination is uppermost on Kierkegaard's mind. 
Only by choosing the qualitative life can the single self be 
genuinely free in Kierkegaard's radical conception of freedom. 
Hence any external support or build up must remain concealed 
because the recipient must not be made to feel that he or she 
is in debt, must not lose the self-defining character of his 
or her being. Therefore the loving one must, like Socrates, 
act as a spiritual midwife. He must maintain a certain 
distance from the recipient inasmuch as "the person who does 
not freely appropriate does not subjectively appropriate." The 
recipient must grasp the truth on his own. 34 The element of 
separation within the unity is evident here. The other should 
know only that standing on one's own is one's own achievement. 
In Kierkegaard's view that would be the greatest benefaction 
34 Evans, Op. Cit. p. 103. Evans goes on to remind the 
reader of the difference between the Socratic and the 
Christian maieutic as presented in the concept of "neighbor-
love": "When Socrates has helped the other, he can take a 
certain ironic satisfaction in observing the other stand alone 
-- with his help. This satisfaction is bound up with Socrates' 
own independence. The Christian maieuticist, on the other 
hand, is bound to the one helped in a way that Socrates was 
not. For the Christian both the one who is helped as well as 
he himself stand alone -- with God's help. The helper and the 
one helped are independent of each other but totally dependent 
upon God. In thus sharing a total dependence on God's love 
they are bound together in a way. This binding does not 
compromise their independence of each other. The divine love 
they share is infinite and eternal; it does not make 
distinctions or draw boundaries around its love. It is this 
love that the Christian grasps as the truth, and it is this 
the Christian wants to communicate to others" (p. 110). 
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one person could give to another. (SV 12,264-68; WL, 257-60). 
By implicating Socrates, Kierkegaard wants to remind the 
reader that this passion of love is, on the one hand, latent 
within the single self and merely needs to be recalled. This, 
however, relegates the teaching of Socrates to merely 
historical interest inasmuch as the truth he awakens in his 
student is already within the student and therefore can be 
recalled by the student herself. (SV 6,17; PF, 12). On the 
other hand, the transformation of the innate passion to a love 
of the neighbor necessitates a different kind of teaching that 
not only brings the truth of what love means, but provides the 
condition for its acceptance and for understanding it. 
By receiving the condition and the truth the single self 
becomes a new person; there is a qualitative difference, a new 
consciousness. Such a transformation, Kierkegaard claims, can 
only be accomplished by transcendent manipulation, by "the 
god." (SV 6,19, 22-3; PF, 14,18-9). But even here the Socratic 
principle applies inasmuch as the single self's consciousness 
is awakened to the fact of his being untruth, that is to say, 
untruth is discovered through self-examination. "I can 
discover my own untruth only by myself, because only when I 
discover it is it discovered" (SV 6,19; PF, 14). But 
"discovery" implies untruth was present all the time 
(Kierkegaard's conception of original sin) thereby concealing 
the need for truth by exclusion. That truth, according to 
Kierkegaard, can only come from outside the single self. 
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Therefore this teacher, in contrast to the midwifery of 
Socrates, must bring both the truth as well as the condition, 
that is, grace, for its appropriation. (Ibid). 
With truth and as truth the single self is able to 
presuppose love in the other. To presuppose love in the other 
involves a decisive act of self-consciousness which expresses 
the single self's comportment towards other human beings. 
V:8 
Kierkegaard distinguishes between the powers of faith and 
those of knowledge. Knowledge by itself, he says, is incapable 
of performing the same feat. That is, speculative knowledge 
can only operate in the category of possibilities. Its 
inherent impersonal indifference prevents it from making 
choices, and thus it sets itself outside "the actuality of 
existence in possibility" (SV 12, 223; WL, 218). Knowledge is 
incapable of producing commitment, indeed its perfection is 
precisely to remain uncommitted. 
Why is knowledge bound to this stand? Kierkegaard 
suggests this is because speculative knowledge keeps company 
with skepticism (Mistroiskhed) which is the exact opposite of 
love inasmuch as it believes nothing. For it truth and 
falseness have the same value, honesty and dishonesty carry 
the same weight. Thus while knowledge remains non-committal 
and hence is not to blame especially since it provides a 
valuable cognitive service, acts of judgment, decision, and 
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choice must come either with skepticism which believes nothing 
or with love which believes all things. 
Precisely because existence (Tilvcerelsen) has to 
test "you," test "your" love, or whether there is 
love in you, precisely for this reason and with the 
help of the understanding existence confronts you 
with the truth and the deception in the equilibrium 
of the opposite possibilities so that as "you" now 
judge, that is, as you now in judging choose, what 
dwells in you must become disclosed" (SV 12,220; WL, 
215). 
Before the decision, love and skepticism partake equally of 
knowledge (SV 12,223; WL, 218). But existence demands a 
conclusion, life demands a decision, and then they become 
opposites. Skepticism chooses not to choose in its distrust 
of all judgment. As such it can never function as a mediator 
of human relationships, for ultimately its message is 
nihilistic. If it is nihilistic, it can never be upbuilding, 
and that was the criterion for such a mediator. 
In contrast, love, inasmuch as it believes all things, 
can presuppose love in the other and thus in its upbuilding 
capacity it has laid the foundation for individual character 
and the disposition toward human community. "When knowledge 
in a person has placed the opposite possibilities in 
equilibrium and he is obliged or wants to judge, then who he 
is, whether he is mistrustful or loving, becomes apparent in 
what he believes about it" (SV 12, 223; WL, 218). 
To love in this upbuilding way is to be genuinely human 
(Menneskelig). It is to express one's true humanity 
(Menneskelighed). Kierkegaard has thereby demonstrated the 
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goodness of his scheme, for it has indeed concluded one's 
nature as essentially love. It is the fullest demonstration 
of what Kierkegaard defines as passionate inwardness and 
consequently it is a demonstration of character, of what 
Robert Musil would call the qualitative life. Moreover, 
inasmuch as Christianity demands self-renunciation, yet we are 
born with the need to love, it follows that love must be 
directed away from the self and toward someone external to the 
self, namely toward another human being who as neighbor, as 
"the person you see," universalizes the condition that 
expresses the idea. That is to say, when spontaneous love is 
confronted with a demand and thereby commanded to a duty, its 
source is now the demand and not the object. It is for this 
reason that love cannot now stop. The beloved can fail or 
disappoint, but the loving one (den Kjerlige) will 
nevertheless love inasmuch as he shall love {SV 12,56-7; WL, 
65). As Johannes Sl0k expresses Kierkegaard's induction, 
Because man in an ontological sense is love, he is 
already at the outset on an errand of love. The 
command 'You shall love your neighbor' -- and it is 
this command that from a purely dispositional 
perspective dominates Works of Love is 
consequently a command that at the outset is in 
agreement with that which man is by nature. 35 
Here it may be useful to recall that immediate or 
spontaneous love may have existence, but can claim no 
constancy. If it does exist, it is purely accidental because 
35 Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker, pp. 138-39. 
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it can change at any time. Spontaneous love only has the 
eternal within it in the imagination of the poets, but it is 
not consciously grounded in the eternal and hence it cannot 
become contemporaneous with itself. That is to say, it is not 
possible while it exists to say that it exists, because it can 
change; only afterwards, when it is all in the past, only then 
can one perhaps say about it that it existed. 36 
Just as self-love in the strictest sense has been 
characterized as self-deification, so erotic love 
and friendship (as the poet understands it, and with 
his understanding this love stands and falls) is 
idolatry. For in the last instance, love of God is 
the decisive; from it derives the love of neighbor" 
(SV 12,61-2; WL, 69-70). 
With erotic love and friendship preference becomes "the 
middle term," but with love transformed, a transcendental 
dimension becomes "the third person" in this equation, becomes 
the possibility (Muligheden) for "seeing" the neighbor as 
oneself, and in the neighbor every human being as oneself. In 
these words we thus find the ground both of the ethical and 
the political, for the concept of neighbor is a representation 
of all humankind. It is not appearances, then, that will 
define the relationship. The neighbor's hostility or 
receptivity is not the ground of this relation of love, but 
rather oneself. "To love the neighbor is therefore the eternal 
equality in loving" (SV 12,62; WL, 70), it is an expression 
of the essential quality of human relationships and hence a 
36 Also Ibid, pp. 205-06. 
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manifestation of genuine human equality (Menneske-Liqhed) (SV 
12,64; WL, 72). As Kierkegaard tersely states in a journal 
note: "Hvad er Menneskelighed? Det er Menneske-Liqhed. 
Uliqheden er det Umenneskeliqe." (What is humanity? It is 
human equality. Inequality is the inhuman") . 37 
V:9 
In his analysis both of the human condition and Christian 
teaching Kierkegaard has found that the only source of true 
equality is within the single self, in its inwardness with its 
transcendent 
foundational 
appeal. As 
consciousness 
such 
of 
equality represents 
Kierkegaard's "idea 
a 
of 
community" with its constitutive elements as laid out above. 
The "idea of community" requires that the single self not 
cling too tightly to the temporal differences, but instead 
lets the eternal equality shine through. This is to allow the 
meaningfulness of its commonality with its fellow human beings 
to emerge and make it want to do what it "shall" do: love the 
neighbor as the self (SV 12,92; WL, 98). Ultimately the "idea 
of community" represents freedom in the truest sense. By 
achieving a disposition or comportment toward the world in 
terms of genuine equality is, on the one hand, to achieve 
freedom from all physical and social determinations 
(Bestemmelser), and, on the other hand, to achieve freedom to 
37 PAP VIII 1 A 268. 
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be equal in a relationship of love (Kierlighed) with all of 
humanity. 
The dialectic of Kierkegaard's single self (den Enkelte) 
is thus embodied in the thinking that the "idea of community" 
is something that must emerge from within before it can truly 
express itself in the world. The difficulty lies in that first 
step which signifies the conception of freedom as understood 
by Kierkegaard. 
Freedom is not a disposition like temperament, nor is it 
a property handed down. Freedom only exists in the transition 
from possibility to actuality, what Anti-Climacus phrases in 
the language of becoming: "the self [which] has the task of 
becoming itself in freedom" (SV 15,92; SUD, 35). 38 
Consequently the synthesis expresses both the single self's 
independence as well as the eternal's demand on it. The single 
self is free, yet obligated not to fulfill divine 
providence, as it were -- but to fulfill the requirements of 
its own constitutives which compose the authentic self. 
The constituent requirements of the authentic single self 
call for the existential appropriation of the "idea of 
community." As Johannes Climacus promises in the Postscript, 
the ethical constitutes "even in solitude the reconciling 
fellowship with every human being" (SV 9,126; CUP, 136). This 
accomplishment, then, constitutes the concretization of the 
38 Cf. Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker, p 158. 
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single self, constitutes what both Climacus and Vigilius refer 
to as actuality. Inasmuch as the single self is then prepared 
to express its human equality (Menneske-Lighed), it is 
prepared to express its humanity (Menneskelighed). From this 
it would follow that the act of citizenship -- how the single 
self is disposed toward the "idea of community" presupposes 
a relationship to the transcendental which makes it possible 
and, indeed, is not indifferent to it. 39 
39 PAP VII 1 A 20 (JP 4110). Kierkegaard does not usually 
entitle his journal notes, but in this case he made an 
exception: "The Dialectic of Community or Society Is As 
Follows: ... The individual is primarily related to God and 
then to the community, but this primary relation is the 
highest, yet he does not neglect the latter." Robert Dale 
Bonser in "The Role of Socrates in the Thought of Scpren 
Kierkegaard" Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California, 
Santa Barbara, 1985), pp. 118-19, argues good citizenship is 
merely a by-product of the Christian concern for salvation 
inasmuch as Kierkegaard in agreement with Socrates does not 
stand indifferent to things secular, but consider it a matter 
of priorities. Proper concern with the highest things first 
would lead to the proper ordering of the other aspects of 
life. But Works of Love, a book Bonser has omitted from 
consideration, would seem to suggest not only a relationship 
of necessity in each act as has been shown above, but 
apparently also a necessary relationship between the two acts. 
Thus Kierkegaard explains: "The matter is quite simple. The 
human being shall begin by loving the invisible, God, for 
hereby he himself shall learn what it is to love. But the fact 
that he then really loves the invisible shall be indicated 
precisely by this that he loves the brother he sees" (SV 
12,156; WL, 158) , meaning that he does not love what is 
apparent before him, but rather, he loves what is concealed 
in the other, the other's equality (Lighed) with himself. Of 
course, this could be read as if to love the other is only for 
the purpose of demonstrating one's love of God. But if such 
an interpretation were to capture Kierkegaard's intent, not 
only would it be a negation of what he has so carefully 
constructed in Works of Love, but his critique of the present 
age and the positing of a "corrective," an undeniable event 
as we have tried to show, would be nonsensical. 
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In contrast, by granting freedom and equality, 
Kierkegaard charges what "the world honors and loves under the 
name of love" is engendered (SV 12,119; WL, 123). Then the 
world becomes dominated by collective and united self-love 
which demands the sacrifice of any transcendental relation for 
the sake of secular solidarity and hence essentially for the 
sake of appearance. 40 The happiness that follows from such 
love is dependent upon good fortune and is always subject to 
change ( SV 12 , 5 5 , 3 6 ; WL, 64,46}, echoing Aristotle's 
differentiation of friendship based on utility or pleasure 
from friendship grounded in a common love of a greater good. 41 
That the world itself is confused as it, on the one hand, 
regards self-love as the soundest "practical wisdom," yet at 
the same time also regards a more noble love as praiseworthy 
(SV 12,118,256; WL, 123,249}, is an irony Kierkegaard most 
profitably exposes. More seriously, however, where Liberalism 
grounds freedom and equality in enlightened self-interest, 42 
it follows that the single self needs only prudently to act 
on his or her self-understanding of these interests to achieve 
fulfillment. In this case an appropriation of the political 
4° Kierkegaard distinguishes between "self-love" by which 
"every man has in himself the most dangerous traitor of all," 
and love of self "in the right way," which he says 
"corresponds perfectly" to loving one's neighbor (SV 12,28; 
WL, 39}. 
41 Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, 1156a6-1158b10. 
42 b · · · · L.T. Ho house, Liberalism (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964} pp. 33-4, 66, 69. 
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dimension of human existence is diminished insofar as 
individual freedom is expressed in proprietary acts that owe 
nothing to society. 43 In contrast, Kierkegaard argues freedom 
and equality are grounded in acts of self-determination 
expressed as obligation to a law. Inasmuch as these acts 
originate in love, which is an inherent attribute of human 
nature that essentially seeks satisfaction in community (SV 
12, 150-55; WL 153-58) , it follows that political consciousness 
becomes a necessity for the completion and fulfillment of 
human experience. Thus Kierkegaard's "corrective" posits a 
love as duty which does not deny the tension within individual 
experience, but which does assist in overcoming some of these 
contingencies and misconceptions of modern political life that 
he claims has confused modern individual experience. From this 
perspective it can be concluded that Kierkegaard's conception 
of community as an external social arrangement presupposes an 
internal transformation of human nature, presupposes 
43
• As T.H. Green expressed it in his essay on "Political 
Obligation" in The Political Theory of T.H. Green, ed. John 
R. Rodman (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1964), p. 123: 
"That active interest in the service of the state, which makes 
patriotism in the better sense can hardly arise while the 
individual's relation to the state is that of a passive 
recipient of protection in the exercise of his rights of 
person and property." Also James L. Wiser, Political Theory: 
A Thematic Inquiry (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), p. 101: "By 
positing the existence of certain natural rights, liberal 
politics secures a grounding for the worth and dignity of the 
individual, which is believed to exist independently of any 
specific social custom;" and Leo Strauss, Natural Right and 
History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950, 
1953), pp. 245-46. 
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character. 
To come to understand oneself and hence to undergo the 
necessary transformation means to reveal one's true nature as 
a social being. The achievement of such self-consciousness is 
the achievement of genuine actuality. Kierkegaard complains 
that all too often human beings "find escapes in order to 
avoid 
deceptions 
this happiness, " and instead they "manufacture 
in order to deceive themselves or to make 
themselves unhappy" (SV 12,152; WL, 155). What he means is 
that in such single selves love in its true sense is utterly 
lacking inasmuch as they find no one worthy of their love. For 
them there is no actuality, no community, because they are 
unwilling to love in the unconditional way required by the 
law's demand. Such people, unwilling to commit to an authority 
chosen in freedom, Kierkegaard points out, would rather 
attempt to transform human society, transform the person seen, 
but that is utopian and hence superfluous. 
Kierkegaard's point is precisely that it is a duty to 
love the person one sees, thereby transcending objectionable 
differences (SV 12,156-57; WL, 159). It might be argued that 
this is not an act of freedom. But Rousseau argued that 
freedom is precisely to place oneself under a necessity which 
is self-imposed. 44 To place oneself under the demand of the 
44 
"Removing all morality from his actions is tantamount 
to taking away all liberty from his will." "On the Social 
Contract," in The Basic Political Writings, bk. I, ch. 4, pp. 
144-45; also ch. 6, p. 148. 
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law, is to freely choose the act of self-deepening, to embrace 
the highest level of existence human capacity can aspire to. 
This requires that the single self maintains a .constant 
dialectic vigilance, that has a twofold dimension. 
In order to understand one's true nature and hence to 
understand love as a duty, it is necessary to actively engage 
in the transcendental relationship. However, satisfying one's 
social nature requires the act of community, meaning there has 
to be a continuous recognition of 'the other' as a distinct 
human being, namely the person one sees. Kierkegaard thus 
embraces the plurality of givens characteristic of modern 
society inasmuch as it poses no hindrance to the "idea of 
community."45 Simultaneously the other must be recognized as 
a neighbor, and hence as an equal whom one must love. The 
single self must acknowledge the tension of its experience and 
balance the desire for transcendent experience with its 
immanent obligations. 
Kierkegaard anticipates character in the single self to 
uplift political and/or social life as he or she acts out the 
"idea of community." That is to say, if human beings did not 
act in different ways, unlike animals, and we therefore could 
be judged in terms of a universal criterion, the 
transcendental relation ( inwardness) would fall away and human 
existence would express itself entirely in externality, that 
45 PAP 1 A 139 (JP 4062). 
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is, exclusively in political or social terms. Then the 
required deepening of the self would be neither possible nor 
necessary. From that perspective the political or social would 
not have the capacity for upbuilding the self nor for judging 
another person. 
Kierkegaard's point is that knowledge places contrasting 
possibilities in equilibrium -- what the single self believes 
in becomes apparent, its character is revealed: whether it is 
skeptical or loving. In other words, the question is whether 
the judgment of the single self is grounded in the 
acknowledgement of love, or whether it is grounded in 
knowledge which can only judge in general terms and is not 
able to distinguish human differences in terms of love. It is 
a decision between good and evil, he says, between loving and 
skepticism or nihilism (SV 12,226; WL, 220). 
It is this form of self-control that in Kierkegaard's 
opinion will engender a more genuine and therefore longer 
lasting social order. The competition for goods will be 
superseded by the higher criterion of reciprocal response to 
the law's demand (SV 12,212,216; WL, 207,211). From that 
perspective it becomes clear that Kierkegaard's ''corrective" 
merely re-constructs what self-interest has torn down in 
liberal theory, the rational argument to love the neighbor as 
oneself, which Locke, quoting the "judicious Hooker" 
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considered a "natural duty. 1146 In that upbuilding sense, 
therefore, love constitutes a philosophy of political 
consciousness. That is to say, freedom and equality become 
acts of self-determination in Kierkegaard's thought 
underscoring his acknowledgement that, in addition to the 
immanent world of particularized concerns, "there is also 
another reality that enters into each moment" of human 
experience necessitating the self-defining act. 47 S0ren 
Kierkegaard's "corrective" thus transcends the problem in 
liberal theory which perceives of political society as a mere 
convenience, 48 and instead posits the political as a necessary 
requirement for human fulfillment. 
46 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 2, #5. 
47 John B. Cobb, Jr., "God and the scientific worldview" 
in David Tracy and John B Cobb, Jr., Talking About God (New 
York: The Seabury Press, 1983), p. 53. 
48 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 7 #90,91; 
ch. 8, #95. 
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